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Chapter 1
Dissertation Overview
This dissertation, “Essays in Economic Demography”, addresses two subjects in economic
demography: intergenerational mobility and disability insurance. In Chapters 2 and 3, I
explore changes in intergenerational occupational mobility in Zurich over the nineteenth
century and how estimates of mobility might be affected by different kinds of sample
selection, respectively. Chapter 4 studies the welfare implications of different incentive
structures in modern disability insurance systems. The unifying feature of all three chap-
ters is that they shed light on different aspects of social inequality. Social mobility can
be seen as inequality of chances with respect to social advancement, and disability insur-
ance is concerned with inequality in health. Chapters 2 and 3 approach their research
questions empirically, whereas Chapter 4 features a theoretical approach paving the way
for empirical implementations.
Chapter 2 explores how occupational mobility changed among the citizens of Zurich
over the course of the nineteenth century. It is joint work with Joe¨l Floris and Ulrich
Woitek and is titled “Intergenerational Mobility in the Nineteenth Century—Micro-Level
Evidence from the City of Zurich”. Economic inequality has been strongly increasing over
the past few decades and is currently at a similar level as at the end of the nineteenth
century (Piketty, 2014). The concept of intergenerational mobility is interrelated with
economic inequality in two ways. First, mobility quantifies how permeable the social
structures are, and thus how inequality might evolve over time. Second, lack of social
mobility can be interpreted as inequality of chances to achieve economic success. Con-
sequently, investigating intergenerational mobility is crucial to understanding inequality.
Intergenerational mobility is, by construction, a topic that has to be addressed with his-
1
torical data. One needs information on at least two generations to quantify the level of
mobility. In order to examine changes in social mobility, one has to go back in time even
further. A period mirroring the extent of the current structural change is the nineteenth
century. While today’s enhancement of computers and information technology induces
a shift in the sectoral distribution of occupations, the expansion of steam power, facto-
ries, and the financial sector did as much during the nineteenth century (see e.g. Ashton,
1997; Mokyr, 1998; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012; Dorn, 2015, and Figure 1.1 for the sec-
toral change in nineteenth century Zurich). Analyzing this historical period might, thus,
yield insights into the evolution of intergenerational mobility in times of major structural
change.
Figure 1.1. Occupational distribution of Zurich citizens across sectors 1799–1926.
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Note: This figure depicts the rise of the industrial sector (Factory) and the financial sector
(Trade/Banks/Insurances/Transport). The data for the figure originate from the directories of
citizens of the city of Zurich described in Chapters 2 and 3. The classification of occupations by
sector follows Schu¨ren (1989).
Chapter 2 tackles this question with historical data from Zurich. One of the main
contributions of the chapter is the construction of a data base containing extensive panel
information on the universe of Zurich’s male citizenry over more than one century (1799–
1926). Using this novel data, we are the first to analyze social mobility in nineteenth
century Switzerland. The data originating from the directories of citizens of the city of
Zurich are unique in their richness of detail on each individual citizen, and hence allow us
to contribute to the literature on social mobility beyond providing evidence for Switzer-
land. Most importantly, the data contain information on family relationships, making it
obsolete to link generations with automated linking procedures as the intergenerational
2
link is observable. The continuity of the data further enables us to provide measures of
mobility at a high frequency (every two to eleven years).
We provide a rich set of measures based on occupations that allows us to reveal
structural change and different aspects of social mobility in Switzerland. We shed light
on both the level of and the changes in absolute mobility and relative mobility. While
absolute mobility refers to mobility as experienced by the individual, relative mobility
describes a society’s openness net of structural change (see e.g. Dribe et al., 2015). We
find that Zurich’s citizenry exhibited increasing probabilities of transitions towards oc-
cupations associated with intermediate socioeconomic status. This partially reflects the
structural change increasing the industrial and financial sector as depicted in Figure 1.1.
Furthermore, we discover decreasing rates of intergenerational mobility with respect to
all absolute and relative measures. This result suggests that the fathers’ occupational
outcomes gained importance for the sons’ outcomes among Zurich citizens despite the
new opportunities generated by the industrialization process (Kury, 2012), and the com-
parably progressive political climate in the city of Zurich (Behrens, 2015). A key driver
of this change was that sons with low socioeconomic background experienced strong and
increasing intergenerational persistence. Our estimates on the level of mobility for Zurich
lie between the existing estimates for the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom
in the late nineteenth century (Long and Ferrie, 2013; Modalsli, 2017).
Chapter 3 is titled “Bias in Social Mobility Estimates with Historical Data—Evidence
from Swiss Microdata” and is closely related to the previous chapter. I investigate the
same data from a more technical point of view, exploiting the uniqueness of the data
base. In particular, Chapter 3 explores how estimates of social mobility are affected by
three potential sources of bias: (1) migration, (2) occupational life-cycle patterns, and (3)
automated record linkage procedures. Many existing studies on social mobility cannot
account for some, or even all, of these issues. This raises the questions if the estimates
that result from such studies are significantly biased and, if so, in which direction. The
results of this chapter provide insights on how serious these concerns are. Thus, they allow
researchers in the field of intergenerational mobility to put their results into context. To
the best of my knowledge, no comparably comprehensive evaluation of potential sources
of bias in social mobility estimates exists, especially in a historical context.
3
Why should one be concerned about bias due to migration, life-cycle patterns in oc-
cupations, or linking procedures? First, migrants are usually omitted from analyses of
intergenerational mobility because they are no longer observable in the data. Conse-
quently, migration affects estimates of social mobility if migrants experience a different
level of social mobility than non-migrants. The Zurich data keep track of Zurich’s citizens
even when they move abroad, allowing me to quantify the potential for bias by comparing
the estimates of the two groups. Indeed, I find that migrants overproportionally came
from families with a higher socioeconomic status (as measured by the father’s position)
and entered intermediate socioeconomic positions more often than non-migrants. This
selection of migrants is similar to what has been found for nineteenth century Germany
(Wegge, 1999, 2002, 2010). Furthermore, migrants exhibited higher levels of intergenera-
tional mobility as compared to non-migrants, and the former experienced lower rates of
upward mobility than the latter. This could indicate that emigrants experienced a diffi-
cult start in the country of destination and potentially also a slow rate of assimilation (see
e.g. Borjas, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995). Additionally, I find large differences with respect
to selection and exhibited levels of social mobility of emigrants by destination continent.
Swiss migrants to other European countries were selected in a particularly positive way
with respect to both the SEP of the father and the son as compared to emigrants to
Canada and the United States. Similarly, the former were 1.12 times more likely to expe-
rience upward mobility vs downward mobility, while the latter were 1.59 times more likely
to experience downward vs upward mobility. All of these findings indicate that focusing
the analysis of intergenerational mobility on geographically immobile individuals leads to
a selection of the socially less mobile part of the population. The resulting bias when
omitting emigrants lies between 1 and 10 percent in the Zurich data.
Second, individuals’ socioeconomic position may change over the course of their lives
(intragenerational mobility). Taking this pattern into consideration requires multiple
observation of an individual—a property that historical data usually do not provide. The
Zurich data allow to observe citizens repeatedly. Thus, I can investigate these life patterns,
and whether they translate into differential estimates of social mobility. I observe that,
with increasing age, individuals entered occupations associated with higher socioeconomic
status. Evaluating the level of father-son mobility conditional on both the father’s and the
son’s age at classification reveals that some of the social mobility estimates are affected
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by the life-cycle patterns. The point estimates change up to 10 percent with different
classification ages. However, neither the father’s nor the son’s classification age exhibit a
monotone correlation with the direction of the bias.
Third, most studies on social mobility depend on linking several distinct data sets to
obtain information on two or more generations. As the procedures used for these record
linkages are imperfect, estimates of social mobility may be affected significantly (see e.g.
Eriksson, 2017; Massey, 2017; Bailey et al., 2019). The observable intergenerational link
in the data at hand enables me to put these mechanisms to the test by separating and
automatically re-linking father-son pairs. State-of-the-art linking procedures exhibit high
rates of correct matches (between 77 and 95 percent) in the Zurich data. However, these
high (correct) match rates are mostly caused by the fact that sons can be identified easily
by the characteristics employed for the matching procedures (correct name, year of birth,
and place of family origin). Other sources of data usually do not allow for such an easy
identification as they contain misspelled names, small deviations in the inferred year of
birth, and information on place of birth rather than place of family origin. Consequently,
I do not observe significant bias in social mobility estimates, but employing data with less
detailed information on individuals may still induce significant bias, as e.g. Bailey et al.
(2019) point out.
All in all, one should be cautious when estimating intergenerational mobility without
taking migration or life-cycle patterns in socioeconomic positions into account. Linking
procedures may also induce bias depending on the quality and quantity of the data to be
linked (Bailey et al., 2019). The relative size of the migration bias and the life patterns
bias is comparable with a deviation of up to 10 percent, while the bias induced by linking
procedures lies consistently below 1 percent of the baseline in the Zurich data.
Chapter 4 tackles the topic of incentives in disability insurance (DI) systems. It is
joint work with Andreas Haller and Stefan Staubli and is titled “Offsetting the Cliff?
A Sufficient Statistics Approach to Measuring the Welfare Effects of Work Incentives in
Disability Insurance”. On the one hand, both the beneficiary population and the expen-
ditures of DI have been rising continuously in recent decades (Autor et al., 2018). For
example, the share of the working age population receiving DI benefits has increased from
below 1 percent to almost 5 percent in the United States and from 1 percent to 7 percent
in the United Kingdom over the past five decades (Autor et al., 2018). On the other hand,
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disability insurance systems in many countries feature strong work disincentives unneces-
sarily dampening the labor supply of disability insurance recipients (Autor and Duggan,
2003; Bound et al., 2010). According to Autor and Duggan (2006), three potential ways
to curb the increasing costs of DI programs are: (1) increasing incentives to work while
receiving DI, (2) reducing incentives to enter DI, and (3) introducing stricter eligibility
standards. In this project, we focus on the first of these routes, providing (financial)
incentives for DI recipients to return to work. We develop a sufficient statistics model
that allows us to estimate the welfare impact of such a policy.
The strong work disincentives in most DI programs mentioned above usually come
in the form of so-called “cash cliffs”. If a DI recipient’s labor income crosses a certain
income threshold (the so-called earnings disregard), she loses her entire cash benefits.
Introducing a “benefit offset program” increases work incentives by reducing DI recipients’
cash benefits more gradually beyond the earnings disregard (see Figure 1.2 for stylized
budget sets under a cash cliff and a benefit offset system). Norway and the United
States are two recent examples of countries that tested replacing the cash cliff system
with a benefit offset. Norway introduced a benefit offset that allowed DI beneficiaries
to keep NOK 0.40 of every NOK 1.00 earned beyond the earnings disregard, resulting in
substantial increases in labor supply (Kostol and Mogstad, 2014). In the United States, a
$ 0.50 for $ 1.00 benefit offset has been evaluated in the large scale benefit offset national
demonstration (BOND) field experiment. Gubits et al. (2018) report small increases
in labor supply resulting in similarly small increases in earnings of DI beneficiaries but
increased program costs. In general, the introduction of a benefit offset may have two
opposing effects. First, individuals currently receiving DI benefits might be incentivized to
supply more labor (labor supply effect). Second, the DI program becomes more attractive
overall, which may attract applications and thus entry to DI (induced entry effect). In
our model, we formalize this trade-off and present robust sufficient statistics formulas that
capture the insurance value and incentive costs of such a policy reform. We find that the
earnings elasticity of DI recipients is a sufficient statistic for the labor supply effect, and
that the DI benefit take-up elasticity is a sufficient statistic for the induced entry effect.
Hence, estimating these elasticities facilitates evaluating the welfare effects of “offsetting
the cliff”.
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Figure 1.2. Budget sets under cash cliff vs benefit offset system.
(a). Cash cliff. (b). Benefit offset.
Note: b denotes the base DI benefits, SGA the earnings disregard, and r the offset rate. The
benefit offset system reduces income beyond the earnings disregard gradually (panel 1.2b) while
the cash cliff features a discontinuous drop (panel 1.2a). The dashed 45 degree line represents
the budget set of individuals not receiving DI benefits.
Canada operates two distinct disability insurance programs: the “Quebec Pension Plan
DI program” (QPP-D) for Quebec and the “Canadian Pension Plan DI program” (CPP-
D) for the Rest of Canada (RoC). Two policy reforms in the CPP-D led to exogenous
variation in the benefit level (in 1987) and in the earnings disregard (in 2001) in RoC but
not in Quebec. This exogenous variation can be exploited in a difference-in-differences
approach with administrative data to estimate both elasticities for a welfare analysis.
We provide a summary of the data, the policy reforms, and an outlook on the empirical
approach in Chapter 4. Using estimates on the United States from the existing literature,
we find that the introduction of a benefit offset system is unlikely to reduce program costs,
which is in line with the evaluation of the BOND field experiment (Gubits et al., 2018).
Still, we find that such a policy might improve welfare, which has not been and cannot
be evaluated with the BOND experiment.
The unifying feature of all three chapters is that they shed light on different aspects
of social inequality. As the seminal work by Piketty (2014) has pointed out, the past
few decades have seen an increase in the inequality of individual economic outcomes both
within and between countries. One of the keys to explaining the extent of social inequality
is intergenerational mobility. Recent numbers suggest that only 15 percent of children
with parents that did not complete secondary school achieve a university degree across
OECD countries. This number compares to 60 percent if at least one of the parents
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obtained a university degree (OECD, 2018).1 Chapters 2 and 3 of my thesis aim at
providing this vibrant policy debate with evidence from historical data.
Chapter 4 is a contribution to the debate of optimal social insurance policy. This
debate has important implications for inequality as well. First, a large body of literature
explores whether there is a relationship between health, thus disability, and economic
inequality with causality potentially running in both directions (Deaton, 2003; Leigh
et al., 2009). Second, impairments to health and disability have been found to decrease
labor supply and thus wages or disposable income of individuals (Currie and Madrian,
1999). This reduction in disposable income may aggravate economic inequality if the
poor are more likely to be hit by health shocks. Even if disability shocks are equally
distributed, they induce, ceteris paribus, economic inequality by resulting in differential
levels of disposable income. Third, health insurance and DI may affect this induced
inequality in two ways: (1) DI allowance discourages labor supply even more (Maestas
et al., 2013), increasing wage inequality, but (2) DI benefits compensate for earnings
loss and have been found to increase disposable income (Kostøl and Mogstad, 2015).
Consequently, the optimal design of DI systems is of crucial importance to reducing
health induced economic inequality. In Chapter 4, we explore whether adjusting labor
incentives in current disability insurance programs can improve welfare.
Another common feature of all chapters in this dissertation is their empirical approach.
The analysis of intergenerational mobility requires historical data entailing information on
at least two life spans. To shed light on the change in mobility, one has to go back in time
even further. Consequently, Chapter 2 addresses changes in intergenerational mobility
employing data covering the entire nineteenth century. To provide insights as detailed
and complete as possible, we employ data featuring true intergenerational links and a large
variety of individual-level information observed repeatedly over time. These features of
the data turn them into a formidable basis to investigate the questions in Chapter 3, as
well. The possibility to track individuals both across the globe and over time and the
observable intergenerational links facilitate quantifying the relative size of bias in mobility
estimates due to migration, life-cycle patterns, and automated linking procedures. The
employed data base is unique in allowing to address all of the three sources jointly. While
the main part of Chapter 4 is of theoretical nature, we provide an outlook on how we
1Interestingly, recent research has shown that even DI claiming is transmitted across generations (Dahl
and Gielen, 2018).
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plan to empirically implement our sufficient statistics approach. Estimating the labor
supply and the benefit take-up elasticity requires detailed individual-level information
contained in administrative data. One needs to observe earnings (labor supply), benefit
reception, and program entry and exit. Further, one needs exogenous variation in the level
of DI benefits. The Canadian case poses as a perfect setup in both dimensions. First,
the Canadian Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) fulfills all data requirements
containing rich individual- and family-level information on 20 percent of all Canadian
tax filers between 1982 and 2016. Second, the dual DI system in Canada and two policy
reforms only affecting the CPP-D but leaving the QPP-D unchanged provide exogenous
variation, which allows us to estimate the two elasticities and thus the welfare effect of
introducing a benefit offset scheme.
Another unifying characteristic of all chapters is their aspiration to advance the ex-
isting methodology in one way or another. Our analysis in Chapter 2 provides a more
continuous measure of intergenerational mobility than previous historical studies, to the
best of our knowledge. This methodological innovation crucially depends on the longi-
tudinal nature of our data: we observe not only subsequent generations, but also each
generation over its life cycle. The detailed analysis of an entire period rather than disjoint
snapshots at specific points in time is supposedly closer to the evolution of social mobil-
ity. Our results accentuate this impression by displaying a relatively smooth transition
in the level of mobility over time. Chapter 3 unites the investigation of three separate
sources of potential bias. Again, this unification is possible because of the richness of the
employed data. While separately addressing the three sources of bias is important, only a
comparison of the three may indicate which concerns are the most pressing. Additionally,
the split of emigrants by destination continent presents novel insights in the selection of
migrants in a historical context. Finally, Chapter 4 advances the existing methodology by
expanding existing models of disability insurance (Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Par-
sons, 1996; Inderbitzin and Wallimann, 2013). Our model allows to study the effect of
work incentives on labor supply at the intensive margin and provides estimable sufficient
statistics formulas. The baseline model is robust to a wide set of extensions. Further,
we aim at directly estimating the induced entry effect, which has usually been performed
with structural models (e.g. Hoynes and Moffitt, 1999 or Benitez-Silva et al., 2010).
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Eventually, all chapters pave the way for future research. Chapter 4 provides a suf-
ficient statistics model to evaluate welfare effects of replacing a cash cliff with a benefit
offset system in DI. The model can be employed to estimate these effects in all countries
that feature such a cash cliff in their DI programs and provide the appropriate data. Fur-
thermore, future research may extend the model to similar programs, e.g. the “Marginal
employment” in Germany that allows workers to earn up to AC 450 exempt from income
tax. For Chapters 2 and 3, we constructed a data base containing the universe of Zurich’s
male citizenry and a large fraction of its registered inhabitants in the nineteenth century.
The data collection is still ongoing, but the data base is already unique in its level of detail
and amount of information. The data contain first name, middle names, last name, year
of birth, year of death, place of family origin, exact address in the city of Zurich or place
of residence outside the city, occupations, military affiliations, public offices, number of
children, number of houses owned, spouses’ names, and references to all living (and some
deceased) relatives of all male citizens of the city of Zurich between 1799 and 1926. Hence,
estimating the level of social mobility and the size of potential bias is merely scratching
the surface of possible research questions that can be addressed with these data. For
example, one might investigate family size, mortality, life expectancy, assortative mating,
and intragenerational mobility in greater detail. Furthermore, these chapters indicate
how many (data) treasures may be found in historical archives.
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Chapter 2
Intergenerational Mobility in the Nineteenth Century
Micro-Level Evidence from the City of Zurich
Joint with Joe¨l Floris and Ulrich Woitek
Abstract: We construct a data base of Zurich citizens and analyze their level of social mobility
between 1819 and 1879. The data allow us to repeatedly observe the over 20,000 individuals
irrespective of their place of residence. We provide a continuous measure of intergenerational
mobility for a homogeneous population. Focusing on such a homogeneous group ensures that
the estimates of mobility are comparable over time. Further, we provide a first estimate on the
extent of social mobility of Zurich’s resident population and compare it with our estimates for
the citizenry and existing estimates for other countries. We find decreasing levels of intergener-
ational occupational mobility over time both among Zurich’s citizens and resident population.
The reduction in mobility is comparable to the cross-country difference between the United
States and the United Kingdom at the time.
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2.1 Introduction
Economic inequality is on the rise again, reaching levels similar to those present at the
end of the nineteenth century (Piketty, 2014). Lack of intergenerational mobility is a very
important aspect of inequality as for example pointed out by Piketty (2014, p. 65). Hence,
analyzing social mobility is central to understanding inequality. We describe changes in
the level of occupational mobility of Zurich’s citizenry and resident population over the
course of the nineteenth century employing a broad set of measures. Our contribution
is fourfold. First, we constructed a comprehensive data base containing rich information
on the universe of Zurich’s adult male citizenry and most registered residents at several
points in time between 1799 and 1926 (see e.g. Figure 2.2 for the specific time points).
Second, the detailed information allows us to categorize individuals with respect to oc-
cupation and to construct comparably frequent measures of intergenerational mobility
(every two to eleven years). The measures provide a more continuous picture of changes
in mobility than usually analyzed in the literature. Most studies rely on between two and
five key years (e.g. Long and Ferrie, 2013) whereas our data cover twenty-five allowing us
to estimate mobility in fifteen time points. Third, we provide results that do not rely on a
linking mechanism between generations, because we directly observe family relationships
guaranteeing unbiased estimates. Fourth, we shed light on the level and changes of mobil-
ity in nineteenth century Switzerland with Zurich as a case study and compare our results
to estimates for Argentina, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Our
main finding is a decrease in father-son mobility, mainly driven by the intergenerational
persistence of occupations with low socioeconomic position (SEP). In the late nineteenth
century, our estimates are comparable to the estimates for Norway (Modalsli, 2017) and
the United Kingdom (Long and Ferrie, 2013).
As Switzerland in general (e.g. Veyrassat, 2012), the city of Zurich experienced rapid
economic development during the nineteenth century, accompanied by structural change.
In the period from 1812 to 1888, the population of the city and its surrounding mu-
nicipalities increased more than tenfold with a large population boom starting around
mid-century (see Figure 2.1). After the incorporation of the surrounding municipalities
into the city area in 1893, Zurich became the most populous city of Switzerland with over
100,000 inhabitants (Behrens, 2015). Zurich turned not only into an economic metropo-
lis but also a financial center, traffic hub, and a major center of education and research
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(Behrens, 2015; Illi and Ko¨nig, 2017). Phenomena such as the growth of the textile in-
dustry, the construction and expansion of the railway, the formation of the Credit Suisse
and similar institutions, and the foundation of the two universities (University of Zurich
and ETH Zurich) were both causes and consequences of immense economic growth. On
the federal level, the constitution of 1848 and its revision in 1874 set the institutional
framework for this development, with reforms such as the introduction of the freedom of
movement and the freedom of trade (Kley, 2011; Kury, 2012). Zurich’s political history
in the nineteenth century was marked by a progressive democratization. Liberal forces
were able to break the political power of the conservative forces in the 1830s. After the
liberal founding of the federal state in 1848, the political dominance of the liberals and
the representative system that they shaped were reversed in Zurich in the 1860s by the
introduction of direct-democratic instruments (Behrens, 2015).
What are the consequences of these economic and institutional changes for social
mobility? Going as far back as to de Tocqueville’s work from 1835 on the democracy in
America, there is the expectation of a positive relationship between democracy and mobil-
ity. Similarly, one would expect industrialization to increase both upward and downward
mobility. As Landes (2003, p. 546) puts it, “A competitive industrial system [...] will
increase social mobility, raising the gifted, ambitious and lucky, and lowering the inept,
lazy, ill-fortuned”.
However, the recent literature shows that these expectations might be misleading, and
our results provide further evidence for this finding. Acemoglu et al. (2017) demonstrate
that democratic processes can actually reduce social mobility. With respect to industrial-
ization in the United States, Blau and Duncan (1967) suggest increasing levels of mobility.
The British example provides mixed evidence. While Long (2013) finds very high mobility
rates during the Industrial Revolution, the results of Humphries (2010, p. 222–229), Clark
(2014), Clark and Cummins (2014, 2015), and Clark et al. (2015) point in the opposite
direction. On the other hand, Dribe et al. (2015) finds that absolute and relative mobility
in rural Sweden increased with industrialization. According to Schu¨ren (1989), larger
German cities exhibited reduced chances of intergenerational mobility after 1870, while
horizontal job mobility increased.
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There is a large body of research on social mobility in the fields of economics, history,
and sociology.1 For the main part of our analysis, we follow the approach of Long and
Ferrie (2013) and Modalsli (2015, 2017) employing transition matrices. Long and Ferrie
(2013) show large differences in the evolution of social mobility between the United King-
dom and the United States. The estimates for Norway provided by Modalsli (2017) show
that Norway’s level of mobility was comparable to the United Kingdom. Pe´rez (2019)
employs the same strategy to show that social mobility was larger in Argentina in the
late nineteenth century than in Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Clark (2014) and Clark et al. (2015) propose to use the persistence of surname shares
in elite groups as a measure for mobility, which, to some extent, overcomes the prob-
lem of attenuation bias (e.g. Clark, 2014, p. 108–113). Barone and Mocetti (2016) apply
this method to study long-run intergenerational mobility in the city of Florence. These
studies show a very high persistence in social status over time. Olivetti and Paserman
(2015) analyze father-daughter mobility in the nineteenth century US employing a novel
strategy related to first names. Dribe and Svensson (2008), Dribe et al. (2015), Dribe
and Helgertz (2016), Lindahl et al. (2015), and Adermon et al. (2018) describe mobility
in nineteenth century Sweden. Among these, Dribe and Helgertz (2016), Lindahl et al.
(2015), and Adermon et al. (2018) contribute to the fast growing branch of research on
multi-generational mobility exploring a potential influence of grandfathers and distant
relatives.2
The studies of Falcon (2012, 2013, 2016), Jann and Combet (2012), and Jann and Seiler
(2014) analyze intergenerational mobility in Switzerland during the twentieth century.
While Falcon (2012, 2013, 2016) finds a relatively constant level of mobility, Jann and
Combet (2012) and Jann and Seiler (2014) show either slightly decreasing or u-shaped
levels of mobility, depending on the specific categorization. In contrast to the other studies
on Switzerland, we analyze mobility in the nineteenth century, and narrow the focus down
by restricting the analysis to the citizenry of Zurich. An advantage of this approach is
that it provides a more homogeneous sample, which helps reducing the random influences
problem pointed out by Clark (2014).
1Solon (1999) and Black and Devereux (2011) provide a review on intergenerational mobility.
2See Solon (2018) for an overview of the mixed evidence on the causal influence of distant relatives.
In this paper, we follow the standard one-generational approach.
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The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows. Section 2.2 contains a
description of our data base and some descriptive statistics. We present our main results
in Section 2.3 with several robustness checks and extensions in the Appendices 2B and
2C. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Directory of Citizens and Residents of the City of Zurich One contribution of
this study is the digitization of twenty-five editions of the directory of citizens of the city
of Zurich and thirty-two editions of Zurich’s directory of registered residents covering the
period 1799–1926 (original title: Verzeichniß der Bu¨rger der Stadt Zu¨rich and Verzeich-
niß der Niedergelassenen der Stadt Zu¨rich).3 These directories were originally created
through a collaboration of several former government officials, scholars, and the munici-
pal authority. The directories contain information on all of Zurich’s adult male citizens,
i.e. individuals holding Zurich citizenship, and registered residents, i.e. people officially
living in the city of Zurich at that time. The information was collected through official
records, interviews, and mail-in forms and was regularly updated (see e.g. Hofmeister,
1819).
The information in the directories entails a list of all male relatives4, the first and last
names, the year of birth, the year of death, occupations, military affiliations, public offices,
the number of houses owned, the family origin, and the living address within Zurich. For
citizens, the directories even contain the place of residence if individuals lived abroad or
generally outside the city allowing to track citizens irrespective of their location.5 The
directories’ information enables us to follow individuals over time and to reconstruct the
male lineage of almost all citizens and several residents. The direct reference of all male
relatives is a major advantage when analyzing social mobility, as we do not rely on any
linking mechanism between generations which guarantees representativeness (see Chapter
3 or e.g. Bailey et al., 2017 on this matter). Unfortunately, the information on women
3The digitization is still ongoing for one part of the residents’ directories and the earliest (before 1819)
and latest (after 1892) citizens’ directories.
4The information on residents is less detailed. It only features a list of all sons irrespective of their
current location. A reference to further male relatives is only provided if they also resided in Zurich.
5Information on emigrants was acquired partially through foreign authorities, partially through rela-
tives in Switzerland, and partially by mail-in forms. If no current information was available, the directory
contains the latest available characteristics. Further, it contains a note stating that this specific citizen
was untraceable at the time and the last date of notice.
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is sparser. Only widows and unmarried adult daughters whose father already deceased
are directly contained in the directories. Otherwise, women are indirectly referred to as
daughters or wives of male citizens and residents without much detail (only name, year
of birth, and place of origin).6
In total, our citizen data set contains over 20,000 individuals born between 1708 and
1926, constituting more than 10,000 father-son pairs and 6,000 different families covering
up to 7 generations. The residents data contain over 10,000 individuals born between
1723 and 1869 and constitute roughly 2,500 father-son pairs with information on both
father’s and son’s occupation. We classify the occupation of both fathers and sons ac-
cording to a procedure described below (p. 21). In order to obtain a continuous measure
of intergenerational mobility, we examine fathers’ occupations in every available key year
and combine these father-observations with the corresponding son-observations. Conse-
quently, we estimate the level of intergenerational (father-son) mobility for every father
that lived at a specific point in time. The corresponding son-observations are not fixed
by observation year but rather the approximate age of the son. Namely, we classify the
occupation of each father’s sons’ in the year closest to their fortieth birthday.7 This pro-
cedure is supposed to reduce life-cycle bias due to intragenerational occupational mobility
(see Chapter 3).
The resulting data base allows us to quantify social mobility of two sub-populations.
First, one can construct a sample that is comparatively homogeneous over time and not
bound to one specific location by including only father-son pairs whose families held Zurich
citizenship already before one specific point in time, in our case 1820. The advantage of
this selection is that the sample’s homogeneity helps to smooth out random influences
on social status (Clark, 2014, p. 108–113). As living outside of Zurich did not lead to
an automatic loss of citizenship, this sample does not exhibit selection of geographically
immobile individuals (see Chapter 3). This first sample is featured in our main analysis,
as we want to emphasize the time aspect in the change of social mobility over the century.
Second, one can construct a census sample for the city of Zurich containing both resi-
6Consequently, we miss the intergenerational transmission through the female side as presented in
e.g. Chadwick and Solon (2002) or Dribe et al. (2017). Similarly, we cannot analyze transmission from
parents to daughters as Chadwick and Solon (2002) or Olivetti and Paserman (2015).
7We exclude individuals whose occupation is only available before the age of twenty or after the age
of sixty-five (185 observations).
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dents and resident citizens.8 This sample allows to focus on the level of intergenerational
mobility of the permanent resident population within Zurich. However, the geographic
fluctuation rate was high. Thus, only few registered residents are linkable to their father,
and the sample excludes all citizens that emigrated from the city. Consequently, we treat
the second sample merely as a comparison group for both the main analysis and other
international studies on social mobility in the nineteenth century and discuss the results
in Appendix 2C.
Citizen Status in Nineteenth Century Zurich As we restrict our main analysis
to citizens, the characteristics of citizens need to be introduced in greater detail. With
respect to the institutional framework, the citizens of Zurich comprised a relatively homo-
geneous group. They shared the same rights and had to fulfill the same obligations. The
rights of a citizen included voting rights (for males), access to pauper relief, and the right
to use community resources. One key difference between residents and citizens was that
residents were not allowed to vote on the municipality level. Citizenship in the city of
Zurich could be obtained in three ways (Wirth, 1871-1875, Vol. 2, p. 29–33): (1) by birth,
(2) by marriage to a citizen (for women), or (3) by paying a fee. Female citizens lost the
citizenship in their home municipality when marrying a citizen from another municipality.
The fee was high and could vary within certain limits. The level depended on regional
origin: it was highest for foreigners, intermediate for citizens from other Swiss cantons,
and lowest for citizens from other municipalities within the canton of Zurich. Thus, it
provided a barrier to geographical mobility and naturalization.9 Besides having to pay
the fee, individuals wishing to join the municipality had to proof good reputation and
pass a property threshold. In addition, future citizens had to prove their membership in
the Christian church until 1866.
Descriptive Statistics and Trends Similar to the bulk of the social mobility litera-
ture in a historical context, we base our estimates on occupation data instead of income
8Besides citizens and registered residents, the population of a municipality also consisted of foreign
temporary residents (in German: Aufenthalter). Individuals belonging to the third group are not traceable
through official records as their stay in Zurich was of a limited amount of time.
9In 1813, the fee of purchasing the citizenship was 1,500 Gulden for former citizens of other municipal-
ities within the canton of Zurich, 2,000 Gulden for citizens from another Swiss canton, and 2,500 Gulden
for foreigners (Hofmeister, 1813). Using the official exchange rate of Gulden to the Swiss Franc of 2.29
(Bundesblatt 1851, 1(18) 335ff), we can compare the fees with data from tax registers. We find that only
very few top earners within the city had an annual income comparable to these levels.
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or education (see e.g. Ferrie, 2005; Dribe and Svensson, 2008; Dribe et al., 2015; Long
and Ferrie, 2013; Modalsli, 2017; Pe´rez, 2019). The restricted information provided by
tax directories does not suffice to reliably quantify intergenerational mobility over the
entire period and educational data is even scarcer. Thus, our analysis of social mobil-
ity is based on a classification of occupations into several categories. In the main part
of our analysis, we employ a categorization of occupations appropriate for the German
speaking area that is based on Schu¨ren (1989). This classification divides occupations
into three socioeconomic positions (SEP): low, middle, and high SEP.10 The low SEP
category contains laborers, craftsmen, and servants. The most frequent occupations are
locksmith, mechanic, and baker. The middle SEP category contains master craftsmen,
lower white-collar workers, and small-scale entrepreneurs. This SEP is dominated by
merchants, followed by engineers and teachers. Lastly, the high SEP category consists
of academics, large-scale entrepreneurs, and clerics. It is most frequently represented by
priests, physicians, and professors. In general, these categories are ordinal with respect
to social status but most of our estimates of social mobility do not crucially rely on
this feature. We exclude farmers in the main analysis, since their share is negligible in
our sample (below 3 percent over the entire period). Instead, we provide results when
including farmers in Appendix 2B as a robustness check.
We argue that the SEP categorization by Schu¨ren (1989) is the most suiting one for our
Zurich citizens sample as it is specifically designed for occupations in the German speak-
ing area in the nineteenth century. In order to obtain internationally comparable results,
we also categorized occupations similar to Long and Ferrie (2013), Modalsli (2017), and
Pe´rez (2019) into farmers, a white-collar group (all non-manual workers), skilled workers
(that require some education or training), and unskilled workers (requiring little to no
training).11 We call this classification the Long-Ferrie classification. First, we employed
the Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO) according
to Van Leeuwen et al. (2002) that allowed to map occupations into the Historical Inter-
national Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS, Van Leeuwen and Maas, 2011). We further
divided HISCLASS into the four mentioned categories. Following Long and Ferrie (2013)
10Schu¨ren (1989) actually provides six distinct SEPs that further divide low and middle SEP in three
and two sub-groups, respectively. However, Zurich’s citizenry was concentrated in the upper part of this
SEP distribution. Thus, we condense the original classification into three groups.
11The most frequent occupations in the white-collar group are merchant, priest, and physician. Skilled
workers are predominantly working as mechanics, bakers, and blacksmiths. Mercenary, upholsterer, and
glazier are the most frequent occupations among unskilled workers.
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and Modalsli (2017), we split the white-collar group in two (the resulting classification
will be called extended Long-Ferrie categorization) to investigate the effect of the number
of categories on our results. We provide a detailed description on how we classified occu-
pations and the results excluding and including farmers in Appendix 2B. Qualitatively,
our results of the main analysis employing the SEP categorization and the robustness
checks employing the Long-Ferrie categorizations are in line.
Figure 2.2 displays the occupational distribution across the three SEPs among Zurich
citizens belonging to families that held Zurich citizenship already before 1820 (henceforth:
C1820 families or C1820 sample) over time. We observe that middle SEP occupations
became more frequent while there was a reduction in both the share of individuals in
low and high SEP occupations. This concentration towards middle SEP is in line with
the structural changes related to the industrialization in Zurich (Section 2.1). Figure
2B.1 in Appendix 2B shows that the structural changes can be observed with the Long-
Ferrie categorization in a similar way. We see a strong increase in the share of white-collar
occupations concentrated in the lower white-collar category. The share of manual workers
is comparatively small and decreasing over time. Note that the number of observations
is slightly decreasing because we include all families holding Zurich citizenship already
before 1820. Consequently, we exclude families naturalized thereafter. Similarly, we
miss all daughters reducing the sample population in spite the overall population growth.
Again, this procedure homogenizes the sample improving the comparability across time
(Clark, 2014, p. 108–113). In the next section, we want to examine how intergenerational
mobility changed over time, so we switch the focus from the cross-section of citizens to
the father-son pairs contained in the data.
2.3 Results
Absolute Mobility We start our analysis of the level of social mobility of Zurich’s
citizenry with a measure of absolute mobility.12 Measures of absolute mobility describe
what people actually experienced given the changes in the social structure. Thus, they
do not account for the structural changes described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. The most
important of these measures is the transition matrix with dimensions according to the
number of occupational categories NxN (in our case 3x3). The transition matrix shows
12In this entire section, we follow the structure of Modalsli (2017) closely.
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absolute frequencies Xij of achieving a specific occupational category j conditional on the
father’s category i, with i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} indexing the three categories low, middle, and
high SEP. The transition matrices by year of observation are displayed in Table 2A.1 in
Appendix 2A. Note that we quantify social mobility between 1819 and 1879 throughout
the paper. We restrict the analysis to this period for two reasons. First, the data collection
is still ongoing for the years before 1819. Second, we quantify social mobility by year of
the father’s observation. Consequently, we observe the son’s occupation some decades
later. Hence, the number of observations with a father-son pair (in which the son is of
full age) decreases over time. Consequently, we restrict our period to 1819–1879.13
Based on the transition matrices, we can calculate transition probabilities pij measur-
ing how probably a son entered category j ∈ {1, ..., N} conditional on the occupational
category of the father i ∈ {1, ..., N}. These probabilities are defined as
pij =
Xij∑N
j=1 Xij
, (2.1)
where N = 3 and i, j index low, middle, and high SEP occupations.
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution these probabilities. First, we observe that the proba-
bilities of remaining in the same occupational category as the father were large over the
entire period. The probabilities lie between 51 and 62 percent for low SEP occupations,
between 52 and 68 percent for middle SEP, and between 35 and 43 percent for high SEP.
The intergenerational persistence in SEP is least pronounced for high SEP occupations
which can be partially explained by the small fraction of occupations in this category
(around 20 percent). Second, the transition probabilities between the two tailing SEPs
(low and high) are comparatively small and decreasing over time. The probability for the
son of a low (high) SEP father to enter a high (low) SEP occupation decreased from 12
(26) to 7 (14) percent. Third, Figure 2.3 shows that the probability of a son entering a
middle SEP occupation increased irrespective of the father’s occupation. The transition
probabilities increased from 25, 52, and 37 percent to 37, 68, and 44 percent for sons of
low, middle, and high SEP fathers, respectively. This is closely linked to more middle
SEP occupations becoming available over the course of the century as shown in Figure 2.2.
The evidence on changes in absolute mobility over time is mixed. While absolute mobility
increased for low SEP occupations, it decreased for middle and high SEP occupations.
13Further, note that fathers show up multiply in the transition matrix if they have more than one son.
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To control estimates of social mobility for structural changes in the economy, one has to
apply measures of relative mobility.
Relative Mobility Our second approach to measuring intergenerational mobility is
based on measures of relative mobility. These measures allow to account for changes in
the occupational structure to put more emphasis on the (in)equality of chances. The eas-
iest method to display relative mobility are two-way log-odds ratios. Following Modalsli
(2017), there are two steps to arrive at two-way log-odds ratios starting from transition
probabilities. First, one has to quantify the “advantage” the son of a father with occu-
pational category i has to enter the same category as compared to all other categories.
This “advantage” is given by the transition probability ratio pii/(1 − pii). The “advan-
tage” measure is still affected by structural changes in the economy as the probability to
enter an occupational category is affected by the relative size of the respective category.
Second, one has to compare pii/(1 − pii) to the “advantage” for occupational category i
for sons of fathers in any other category ¬i, given by p¬ii/(1− p¬ii). The ratio of the two
“advantage” measures yields an odds ratio. Taking logs of this odds ratio results in the
two-way log-odds ratio for category i given by
Θ2,i = log
[
pii/(1− pii)
p¬ii/(1− p¬ii)
]
. (2.2)
The resulting two-way log-odds ratios tell how much more likely the son of a father
with occupational category i is to enter category i rather than any other category as
compared to the son of a father with different occupational category ¬i. This log-odds
ratio would be equal to zero if the probability of the son to enter category i is independent
of the father’s occupation.
Figure 2.4 depicts the two-way log-odds ratios for the three SEPs over the entire period.
The figure displays that the log-odds ratios of all occupational categories increased over
time. Even though low SEP occupations exhibit increasing absolute mobility, they are
subject to the most pronounced decrease in relative mobility as measured by the two-
way log-odds ratio. The son of a low SEP father (classified in 1819) was approximately
e1.54 = 4.7 times more likely to enter a low SEP occupation compared to other occupations
than the son of a middle or high SEP father. This ratio increased to approximately 8
by 1879. Moreover, low SEP occupations did not only exhibit the largest increase in
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immobility but were the least mobile over the entire period, while middle SEP occupations
were the most mobile and exhibited the least pronounced increase (the odds ratio increased
from 2.5 to 3.0). Overall, the log-odds ratios draw a picture of decreasing intergenerational
mobility for Zurich’s citizenry with increasing persistence of low SEP being the main
driver.
The two-way log-odds ratios display relative mobility and thus allow to correct for
structural changes in the occupational distribution. However, they merely emphasize the
diagonal of the transition matrix. Consequently, one has to employ a different measure
to obtain a more comprehensive description of relative social mobility. Such a measure
has to aggregate all possible log-odds ratios Θijlm = log
[
pij/pim
plj/plm
]
for any two occupation
categories of the father i and l and any two categories of the son j and m.14 The Altham
statistic introduced by Altham (1970a,b) is such a metric that has been employed in the
recent occupational mobility literature (e.g. Altham and Ferrie, 2007; Long and Ferrie,
2013; Modalsli, 2015, 2017; Boberg-Fazlic´ and Sharp, 2018; Pe´rez, 2019).15 The statistic
quantifies the total distance between two transition matrices P and Q by calculating the
quadratic mean of all differences in the log-odds ratios between the two matrices. The
Altham statistic for any two NxN matrices P and Q with log-odds ratios ΘPijlm and Θ
Q
ijlm
is defined as
d(P,Q) =
[
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
(ΘPijlm −ΘQijlm)2
]1/2
. (2.3)
To quantify the distance of a transition matrix P to perfect mobility, one has to
compare P to a matrix of ones J (representing perfect mobility). All log-odds ratios of
J are equal to zero as rows and columns are independent. Consequently, the Altham
statistic for the comparison of P with J to quantify the extent of immobility becomes
d(P, J) =
[
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
(ΘPijlm)
2
]1/2
. (2.4)
14This log-odds ratio quantifies the odds that a son enters category j rather than m, given that the
father’s occupation belonged to category i respectively l. If the occupational outcome of the son is
independent of the father’s occupation these log-odds ratios are equal to zero.
15Powers and Xie (2000, p. 95–99) and Agresti (2002, p. 43–47) provide theoretical background on the
Altham statistic.
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The first column of Table 2.1 contains the Altham statistic d(P, J) comparing each
year’s transition matrix with perfect mobility. The G2-test proposed by Altham and Fer-
rie (2007) reveals that the Altham statistics are significantly different from zero on the
0.1 percent level in all years. The strong increase in the Altham statistic confirms the
impression from Figure 2.4 of decreasing mobility over the nineteenth century. Comple-
mentary to the change in the level of mobility, we investigate how quickly the structure of
social mobility changed. Namely, we provide an Altham statistic comparing each year’s
transition matrix with the one from 1819 (second column of Table 2.1). We observe that
the structure of mobility started to differ around the 30s and 40s.16 We do not observe
large jumps in the value of this Altham statistic, which might have indicated a structural
break. Thus, the decrease in relative mobility appears to have been a more continuous
process.
We provide alternate measures of mobility in the other columns of Table 2.1. First,
we display the share of mobile individuals M representing the off-diagonal of the transi-
tion matrices being a measure of absolute mobility. The fraction of mobile individuals
was comparatively small as only 48 (42) percent of sons entered a different occupational
category than their father exhibited in 1819 (1879).17 We still observe that mobility de-
creased over time but in a less monotone manner. The decrease in absolute mobility as
represented by M seems to be concentrated in the second half of the analyzed period. To
correct the fraction of mobile individuals, we follow Altham and Ferrie (2007) to calcu-
late M’. M’ is the share of individuals not entering the same occupational category as
their father when the transition matrices are adjusted to have the same marginal fre-
quencies as the transition matrix in 1819. Hence, M’ should display relative mobility.
The drop in occupational mobility is similar to the one estimated when employing M but
exhibits a more continuous reduction in mobility. Second, U, D, U’, and D’ are the only
measures of mobility that depend on the interpretation of low, middle, and high SEP
occupations being sorted according to their socioeconomic status (ordinal interpretation
of SEP). They split M and M’ into upward and downward mobile individuals. If for
16Keep in mind that the measurement year of our mobility estimates are defined by the year of obser-
vation of the father’s occupation.
17As a comparison, Falcon (2016) finds that between 50 and 60 percent of Swiss men were socially
mobile during the twentieth century. Her categorization of occupations is better comparable to our
extended Long-Ferrie categorization exhibiting between 52 and 56 percent mobile individuals (see Table
2B.1). This provides suggestive evidence of small differences between the levels of mobility in the two
centuries. Still, the numbers are only roughly comparable.
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example a middle SEP father has a son that enters an occupation with high SEP this
is categorized as upward mobility. Interestingly, U exhibits an inverse u-shape implying
that upward mobility became more likely before dropping a little below the initial level.
This inverse u-shape vanishes if one corrects for structural changes as shown by the drop
in U’. This is in line with middle SEP becoming more prevalent while the share of low
SEP occupations dropped strongly. This structural change featuring transition out of low
SEP occupations into middle SEP occupations shows up in U but leaves U’ unaffected. D
and D’ both decreased continuously. Jointly, one can conclude that the drop in absolute
mobility (M) was mostly concentrated in a reduction of downward mobility (D), while the
reduction in relative mobility (M’) seems to exhibit a more balanced reduction in upward
and downward mobility.
All of the measures provided so far have addressed life-cycle bias for sons to some
extent.18 However, we did not control for differences in the age of the father in the
year his occupation is classified. Thus, one concern is that the observed changes might be
affected by a changing age structure in the sample. To tackle this issue, we follow Modalsli
(2015) who provides a means to estimate log-odds ratios with controls: one can employ a
multinomial logit model (see e.g. Agresti, 2002, p. 268) to get controlled log-odds ratios.
Closely following the notation of Modalsli (2015) and Modalsli (2017), let us denote the
occupational outcome of son s in the father-son pair q by osq. Dq = {D1, ..., DN} is a
set of dummies indexing the corresponding father’s occupation if there are N different
occupational classes. Let Xq denote a vector of individual control variables (e.g. age).
Then one can estimate a system of N − 1 equations (indexed by k) for son’s occupation
log
[
Pr(osq = k)
Pr(osq = 1)
]
= αk + β
′
kDq + γ
′
kXq + k,q, k = 2, 3, ..., N, (2.5)
where αk is the estimated constant, γ
′
k are the coefficients of the controls, and β
′
k =
{β1k , ..., βN−1k } is the parameter vector of interest. Using the β coefficients allows to cal-
culate the Altham statistic (for a comparison with perfect mobility represented by J)
18As mentioned in Section 2.2, we classified sons’ occupations as close to their 40th birthday as possible
and excluded sons older than 65 or younger than 20 in the corresponding year.
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by
d(P, J) =
[
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
{(βij − βim)− (βlj − βlm)}2
]1/2
. (2.6)
We employ this controlled Altham statistic to account for age differences of both
fathers and sons. Specifically, we estimate the system of equations given in equation (2.5)
with controls for a quadratic function of son’s age and father’s age. The resulting estimates
for the controlled Altham statistic are provided in Figure 2.5. The point estimates of the
controlled Altham statistics are higher and increase marginally less pronounced (from
7.4 to 10.9) as compared to the uncontrolled statistic. We still find that our result of
decreasing intergenerational mobility is robust to controlling for differences in the age at
classification.
Correlation Coefficient Many studies on intergenerational mobility rely on income
rather than occupation data (Black and Devereux, 2011). The use of income data does
not only allow for estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticities but also for estimates
of an income correlation coefficient. Moreover, Clark (2014), Clark and Cummins (2014,
2015), and Clark et al. (2015) provide correlation coefficients for elite status. The advan-
tage of correlation coefficients is their simplicity with respect to interpretability. Further,
the square of the correlation coefficient displays how much of the variation across the
underlying measure among sons can be explained by its variation among fathers (Clark,
2014).
In order to get estimates that allow for similar interpretations, we cannot rely on
income data nor elite status among rare surnames. Instead, we provide a standardized
measure based on the Historical Cambridge social interaction and stratification scales
(HISCAM, Lambert et al., 2013) that allow us to estimate a correlation coefficient.19
After categorizing all occupations according to HISCO (Van Leeuwen et al., 2002), we
are able to employ the linked HISCAM measure of occupational stratification, ranking
occupations in a continuous way on a scale from zero to one hundred. In order to arrive
at an estimate of an intergenerational correlation coefficient, we have to standardize this
measure in every observation year. Namely, we replace the original HISCAM values for
19Note that comparing correlation coefficients of different measures is merely illustrative and does not
allow for too detailed interpretations.
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both the father f and the son s in the father-son pair q where the father is observed in
year t by
HISCAM stdqtk =
HISCAMqtk −HISCAMtk
σ(HISCAMtk)
, k ∈ {s, f}, (2.7)
where HISCAMtk is the average HISCAM value among all k in the set of father-son
pairs observed in year t and σ(HISCAMtk) is the corresponding standard deviation of
the HISCAM value among k. The resulting standardized value of HISCAM has zero
mean and a standard deviation of one. Following Clark (2014), this enables us to get the
correlation coefficient βt for year t directly out of the regression
HISCAM stdqts = βtHISCAM
std
qtf + εqt, t = 1819, 1821, ..., 1879. (2.8)
Figure 2.6 contains our estimates of the correlation coefficient. We find predominantly
insignificant fluctuations in the correlation coefficient over time. Similar to the share of
mobile M, we find a slight but insignificant increase in social mobility in the first part of
the period followed by a decrease until the end of our observation period. The values lie
between 0.29 and 0.40 suggesting that between 9 and 16 percent of the variation across
standardized HISCAM measures among sons can be explained by the variation in the
fathers’ scores. A comparison with income or education correlation coefficients does not
yield conclusive evidence on the relative level of mobility. However, we find that our
estimates are roughly comparable in size to recent estimates for earnings and education
correlation for several countries (e.g. Black and Devereux, 2011; Vosters and Nybom,
2017; Adermon et al., 2018; Torche and Corvalan, 2018; Vosters, 2018). Hence, we find
significantly lower levels of correlation than Clark (2014) as well. To wrap up, all of the
measures employed above agree with respect to a decreasing level of mobility in the second
half of the observed period.
Robustness and International Comparison Appendix 2B explores whether our re-
sults are affected by the our choice of the occupational categorization according to SEP.
We employ the Long-Ferrie categorization described in Section 2.2 and Appendix 2B
with distinction between white-collar occupations, skilled, and unskilled manual work.
To investigate whether the number of categories affects our results, we follow Long and
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Ferrie (2013) and Modalsli (2017) and further split the white-collar group into a lower
and a higher managers group. We find that our results are not driven by the specific
categorization employed to measuring mobility. Including farmers, does not change the
results qualitatively either. We observe decreasing levels of absolute and relative mobil-
ity in Zurich’s citizenry over the course of the nineteenth century across all occupational
categorizations.
In Appendix 2C, we shift the focus of the analysis away from our homogeneous C1820
sample including only citizen-families that held Zurich citizenship already before 1820.
Instead, we combine our data on citizens who lived in the city of Zurich with the available
data on registered residents to generate a census sample that should be able to reflect the
level of social mobility in the city of Zurich. Note that we are not able to reconstruct the
entire resident population of Zurich as we do not have information on foreign temporary
residents. Moreover, the information on father-son pairs in the pool of registered residents
is sparser. Hence, these results have to be taken with caution but should give some insight
in how mobility has evolved in the city of Zurich for the largest part of the population.20
We find that, mobility decreased less in our census sample than in our C1820 sam-
ple. When we include farmers in the census analysis, however, we find a strong decrease
in immobility similar in magnitude to the cross-country difference in mobility between
the United States and the United Kingdom or Norway around the late nineteenth cen-
tury (Long and Ferrie, 2013; Modalsli, 2017). Excluding farmers, we find that mobility
decreased until mid-century. Thereafter, it stagnated.21
Summarizing, we find that both absolute and relative mobility decreased significantly
among Zurich citizens between 1819 and 1879. Our results show increasing intergenera-
tional persistence across all socioeconomic positions. This increase is most pronounced
for occupations in the low SEP category. Our results are robust to a variety of extensions.
2.4 Conclusion
Nineteenth century Zurich was subject to important structural change. This change en-
compassed institutional advances on federal, cantonal, and municipal level, unprecedented
20In 1889, the number of citizens and registered residents was 21, 961 comparing to 6, 961 temporary
foreign residents including women and children (Schulthess and Meister, 1889). Thus, we lack information
on roughly 24 percent of the total population.
21For details, see Appendix 2C.
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population growth, industrialization, the development of the banking sector, the founda-
tion of the universities, and the development of a railway system with Zurich as one of
its hubs. We observe the changes in the labor market structure in our data featuring a
transition towards middle socioeconomic position (lower white-collar occupations). Con-
sequently, one might expect social mobility to be increasing during this time period for two
reasons. On the one hand, industrialization generated new opportunities and rendered
certain occupations obsolete (Kury, 2012). On the other hand, the political climate was
marked by a progressive democratization leading to a break of power among conservative
forces (Behrens, 2015; Illi and Ko¨nig, 2017).
Despite this expectation of increasing mobility, we find a decreasing level of both
absolute and relative mobility for Zurich citizens between 1819 and 1879. We provide first
evidence that this result prevails for the resident population of the city of Zurich. Upward
and downward mobility were about equal but downward mobility decreased more strongly.
We find that the intergenerational persistence was largest for low SEP occupations. These
occupations also exhibited the largest increase in persistence over the course of the century.
Potential candidates to explain this persistence are a poverty-trap mechanism, labor-
market imperfections due to guild regulations, or an inheritance mechanism specific to
low socioeconomic positions. Further, mid-century estimates suggest that the level of
social mobility in Zurich was comparable to the one in the United States in the late
nineteenth century. After the mentioned decrease in intergenerational mobility, Zurich
exhibited a similar level of mobility as Norway or the United Kingdom by the end of the
nineteenth century.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1. Population and citizenry of Zurich.
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Figure 2.2. Occupational structure over time.
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38
F
ig
u
r
e
2
.3
.
T
r
a
n
si
t
io
n
p
r
o
b
a
b
il
it
ie
s
o
v
e
r
t
im
e
.
0.2.4.6.8
Transition Prob.
18
19
18
21
18
27
18
30
18
32
18
34
18
40
18
45
18
51
18
58
18
61
18
64
18
72
18
75
18
79
Y
ea
r
Lo
w
 S
E
P
0.2.4.6.8
Transition Prob.
18
19
18
21
18
27
18
30
18
32
18
34
18
40
18
45
18
51
18
58
18
61
18
64
18
72
18
75
18
79
Y
ea
r
M
id
dl
e 
S
E
P
0.2.4.6.8
Transition Prob.
18
19
18
21
18
27
18
30
18
32
18
34
18
40
18
45
18
51
18
58
18
61
18
64
18
72
18
75
18
79
Y
ea
r
H
ig
h 
S
E
P
Lo
w
 S
E
P
M
id
dl
e 
S
E
P
H
ig
h 
S
E
P
N
o
te
:
T
h
es
e
ar
e
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
ie
s
of
so
n
s’
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
ar
ou
n
d
th
e
a
g
e
o
f
fo
rt
y
(l
in
es
)
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
th
e
fa
th
er
s’
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
(p
an
el
ti
tl
es
).
Y
ea
r
d
en
ot
es
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
ye
ar
of
th
e
fa
th
er
.
F
o
r
ex
a
m
p
le
,
th
e
u
p
p
er
-l
ef
t
p
a
n
el
d
is
p
la
y
s
th
e
tr
an
si
ti
on
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
ie
s
of
so
n
s
w
h
os
e
fa
th
er
s
h
ad
a
lo
w
S
E
P
o
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
in
th
e
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
ye
a
r.
39
Figure 2.4. Log-odds ratios over time.
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Note: These are the two-way log-odds ratios Θ2,i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} representing the
three SEPs (low, middle, and high). One can read this graph as follows: the son of a
father with a low SEP occupation in 1819 was approximately e1.54 = 4.7 times more
likely to enter a low SEP occupation compared to middle or high SEP occupations
than the son of a father with a middle or high SEP occupation.
Figure 2.5. Altham statistic controlled for age and age squared of both the son and
father over time.
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Note: This is the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of father’s and
son’s age following Modalsli (2015). The confidence intervals are calculated by the
same bootstrap technique as presented in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Figure 2.6. Correlation coefficient of the standardized HISCAM measure over time.
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Note: The solid (dashed) black line represents our estimate (confidence intervals) for
the year 1819. How we arrive at this correlation coefficient is explained in Section 2.3.
Table 2.1. Measures of mobility over time.
Year AS AS1819 M U D M’ U’ D’
1819 6.84∗∗∗ 0.00 48.06 21.81 26.25 48.06 21.81 26.25
1821 6.94∗∗∗ 0.58 48.47 22.61 25.86 48.19 22.10 26.09
1827 7.47∗∗∗ 1.00 47.53 22.45 25.07 47.36 21.67 25.69
1830 7.96∗∗∗ 1.77 47.77 22.48 25.29 47.06 21.77 25.29
1832 8.20∗∗∗ 2.19∗ 47.55 23.40 24.14 46.65 21.68 24.97
1834 7.84∗∗∗ 1.80 48.04 23.23 24.81 47.41 21.73 25.68
1840 8.30∗∗∗ 2.19∗ 46.92 24.85 22.07 46.42 21.37 25.05
1845 8.64∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗ 47.07 24.43 22.64 46.20 21.17 25.02
1851 9.24∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 45.60 23.31 22.28 44.50 20.03 24.48
1858 9.56∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗ 44.68 23.38 21.29 44.02 19.82 24.20
1861 9.66∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗ 43.73 22.69 21.04 43.31 19.42 23.90
1864 9.28∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗ 43.67 22.09 21.58 43.54 19.45 24.10
1872 9.42∗∗∗ 2.86∗ 43.48 22.21 21.26 43.56 19.84 23.72
1875 10.42∗∗∗ 4.00∗∗∗ 42.39 21.68 20.71 42.09 19.27 22.82
1879 10.69∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 41.70 20.94 20.76 41.29 18.72 22.57
Note: The mobility measures (based on SEP) are: (AS) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J)
showing distance from perfect mobility, (AS1819) Altham statistic comparing each year’s
transition matrix with the one from 1819 to show structural mobility changes, (M) share of
off-diagonal/share of mobile, (U) share of upward mobile, (D) share of downward mobile,
(M’) share of off-diagonal with marginal distribution adjusted to the transition matrix of
1819, (U’) share of upward mobile with marginal distribution adjusted to 1819, and (D’)
share of downward mobile with marginal distribution adjusted to 1819. The stars indicate
significance levels from the G2-test (∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗∗∗: 0.1 %). Degrees of freedom: 4.
41
Appendix
2A Transition Matrices
This Appendix contains all transition matrices referred to in Section 2.3.
Table 2A.1. Transition matrices of SEP.
(a). 1819.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 705 283 210 1,198
middle SEP (M) 286 562 298 1,146
high SEP (H) 140 231 298 669
Row sum 1,131 1,076 806 3,013
(b). 1821.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 570 237 177 984
middle SEP (M) 278 530 271 1,079
high SEP (H) 112 209 265 586
Row sum 960 976 713 2,649
(c). 1827.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 553 238 152 943
middle SEP (M) 291 598 279 1,168
high SEP (H) 97 211 249 557
Row sum 941 1,047 680 2,668
(d). 1830.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 507 187 141 835
middle SEP (M) 296 530 284 1,110
high SEP (H) 74 174 227 475
Row sum 877 891 652 2,420
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(e). 1832.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 508 178 137 823
middle SEP (M) 333 534 275 1,142
high SEP (H) 74 165 240 479
Row sum 915 877 652 2,444
(f). 1834.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 480 199 123 802
middle SEP (M) 316 545 274 1,135
high SEP (H) 76 166 223 465
Row sum 872 910 620 2,402
(g). 1840.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 451 171 96 718
middle SEP (M) 335 569 241 1,145
high SEP (H) 73 164 202 439
Row sum 859 904 539 2,302
(h). 1845.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 422 166 90 678
middle SEP (M) 326 557 251 1,134
high SEP (H) 64 157 206 427
Row sum 812 880 547 2,239
(i). 1851.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 402 156 75 633
middle SEP (M) 304 554 245 1,103
high SEP (H) 59 135 206 400
Row sum 765 845 526 2,136
(j). 1858.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 361 135 60 556
middle SEP (M) 257 552 223 1,032
high SEP (H) 52 150 173 375
Row sum 670 837 456 1,963
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(k). 1861.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 340 128 56 524
middle SEP (M) 231 554 212 997
high SEP (H) 50 146 165 361
Row sum 621 828 433 1,882
(l). 1864.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 303 126 55 484
middle SEP (M) 204 540 201 945
high SEP (H) 49 138 154 341
Row sum 556 804 410 1,770
(m). 1872.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 214 95 46 355
middle SEP (M) 148 434 149 731
high SEP (H) 33 122 123 278
Row sum 395 651 318 1,364
(n). 1875.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 186 80 40 306
middle SEP (M) 133 404 137 674
high SEP (H) 24 112 125 261
Row sum 343 596 302 1,241
(o). 1879.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 168 73 35 276
middle SEP (M) 113 357 121 591
high SEP (H) 21 97 118 236
Row sum 302 527 274 1,103
Note: These are the transition matrices of the C1820 sample by observation year of the
father. Sons’ occupations are categorized around the age of forty.
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2B Long-Ferrie Categorization
In this Appendix, we provide the results of our analysis with the Long-Ferrie categoriza-
tions instead of the SEP categorization. We still investigate intergenerational mobility
among citizens of Zurich families that already held the citizenship before 1820 (C1820
sample). This Appendix serves both as a robustness check for the main analysis and an
addition that enhances international comparability. We find that the results of the main
part of the paper are robust to these alternate categorizations.
Construction of Classifications The Long-Ferrie categorization distinguishes be-
tween farmers, white-collar occupations, skilled manual workers, and unskilled workers.
To construct the occupational categories we employ the HISCLASS (Van Leeuwen and
Maas, 2011) classification scheme and divide its classes into the four categories. We col-
lapsed HISCLASS 1–5 into the white-collar group, HISCLASS 6–7 into skilled workers,
and HISCLASS 9–12 into lower-skilled/unskilled workers. HISCLASS 8 contains farmers.
To investigate whether the number of categories affects our results, we follow Long and
Ferrie (2013) and Modalsli (2017) and further split the white-collar group into a lower and
higher white-collar group (for simplicity called lower and higher managers). Higher man-
agers consist of HISCLASS 1-2 and lower managers of HISCLASS 3–5. The most frequent
occupations in the higher managers group are priest, physician, and engineer. The lower
white-collar group is dominated by merchants followed by shop clerks and innkeepers.
Absolute Mobility Figures 2B.2 and 2B.3 show that the observed changes in abso-
lute mobility from Section 2.3 with the SEP classification are mirrored in the Long-Ferrie
categorizations. The corresponding transition matrices are displayed in Tables 2B.3 and
2B.4. Transition probabilities towards white-collar occupations increase over time from
75, 40, and 43 percent to 87, 50, and 53 percent for sons with a father in the white-collar,
skilled, and unskilled workers group, respectively. This observation reflects the increase
in the share of white-collar jobs due to the structural change depicted in Figure 2B.1.
The increase was concentrated on lower managers occupations (see Figure 2B.3). As with
the SEP classification, the change in the probabilities of entering the same occupational
category as the father did not change homogeneously. They decreased for manual workers
(from 47 to 40 percent for skilled and from 28 to 22 percent for unskilled workers) but
exhibited the increase mentioned before among white-collar occupations. As the distri-
bution across occupational classes is generally less even than with the SEP categories, we
observe a less pronounced diagonal overall.
Relative Mobility We can explore the two-way log-odds ratios depicted in Figure
2B.4 to correct the change in mobility for the structural change in the occupational
distribution. We find that all log-odds ratios in the baseline categorization increased over
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time. However, we see that the log-odds ratio of unskilled workers decline towards the
end of the century. Compared to our main results, the odds were more evenly distributed
across occupational categories. The path they followed was qualitatively the same. The
extended categorization allows to distinguish the white-collar occupations. Interestingly,
this split suggests a certain degree of permeability between the lower and higher managers
occupations because of two observations. First, the log-odds ratio for higher white-collar
occupations increased less pronounced than for white-collar occupations overall. Second,
the log-odds ratio for lower managers even decreased. Jointly, these observations indicate
the proximity of the two white-collar groups. Summarizing, we find similar patterns in
relative mobility as measured by two-way log-odds ratios with the SEP categorization
and the Long-Ferrie categorizations. The latter categorizations exhibit a slightly less
homogeneous decrease in intergenerational mobility.
Table 2B.1 contains the conventional Altham statistic and complementary measures
of mobility. Again, the numbers paint the familiar picture of decreasing mobility. The
three-way classification displays a less pronounced decrease (first column) and a struc-
turally insignificant difference between the transition matrices in most of the years and
the one in 1819 (second column). The second observation is overturned when employing
the extended categorization. Please note that the measures denoted by U, D, U’, and
D’ are not interpretable as upward and downward mobility in the nominal Long-Ferrie
specifications. We still present them for completeness but will not put emphasis on the
numbers as they merely distinguish between intergenerational movements from unskilled
towards (higher) white-collar occupations and those in the opposite direction. The mea-
sures of mobile individuals M (absolute) and M’ (relative) pose as the largest difference
to our main analysis. They still declined over time indicating decreasing absolute and
relative mobility. Nevertheless, they exhibit different levels. The estimates for the base-
line Long-Ferrie categorization (especially those of M) are much lower as the distribution
across occupational classes is less even. In the four-way classification, they are on a higher
level than the estimates based on SEP. This underlines that the level of the share of mo-
bile individuals is highly dependent on the specific classification employed. Comparisons
across categorizations should therefore be avoided. As all of the presented measures point
towards decreasing intergenerational mobility, we still conclude that our main results are
robust to different classifications.
Controlling the Altham statistic for a quadratic function of age of the father and
the son does not change the insights qualitatively. We still observe an increase of the
statistic’s point estimate in both the baseline and the extended Long-Ferrie classification
as depicted in Figure 2B.5. However, the change in the three-way categorization is not
statistically significant, which mirrors the insignificant Altham statistics (AS1819) in the
second column of Table 2B.1. Because of the increasing point estimates and the signifi-
46
cant increase in the extended classification’s Altham statistic, we interpret the results as
indication for an, at least weakly, diminishing level of social mobility.
Farmers We can extend our analysis even further by including the small fraction of
farmers. The resulting conventional Altham statistics employing all occupational catego-
rizations are summarized in Table 2B.2. We observe decreasing mobility irrespective of
the categorization employed. If anything, we find a more pronounced decrease in mobility
when including farmers, hinting that farming occupations might have been particularly
immobile. However, we do not want to put much emphasis on farmers and their level
of mobility because of the focus on a mostly urban population.22 Bottom line, we con-
clude that Zurich’s citizenry exhibited a significantly declining level of intergenerational
mobility over the century.
Figure 2B.1. Occupational structure over time with Long-Ferrie categorization.
(a). Baseline categorization with three categories.
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(b). Extended categorization with division of the white-collar group.
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Note: These figures include every citizen belonging to families that held Zurich citizen-
ship before 1820. The numbers above the columns denote the number of observations
by year.
22Comparing these numbers to those on the United Kingdom, the United States, Norway, and Argentina
reveals that Zurich’s citizenry exhibited a comparable level of intergenerational mobility as Norway and
the United Kingdom in the late nineteenth century, being significantly lower than the ones in the United
States or Argentina (Long and Ferrie, 2013; Modalsli, 2017; Pe´rez, 2019).
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Figure 2B.4. Log-odds ratios over time with Long-Ferrie categorization.
(a). Baseline categorization with three categories.
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(b). Extended categorization with division of the white-collar group.
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Note: These are the two-way log-odds ratios Θ2,i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3(, 4)} representing
the three/four occupational categories (white-collar (higher and lower), skilled workers,
and unskilled workers). One can read this graph as follows: the son of a father with
a white-collar occupation in 1819 was approximately e1.45 = 4.25 times more likely
to enter a white-collar occupation compared to non-white-collar occupations than the
son of a father with a non-white-collar occupation.
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Figure 2B.5. Altham statistic controlled for age and age squared of both the son and
father over time with Long-Ferrie categorizations.
(a). Baseline categorization with three categories.
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(b). Extended categorization with division of the white-collar group.
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Note: These are the Altham statistics controlled for a quadratic function of father’s
and son’s age following Modalsli (2015). The confidence intervals are calculated by the
same bootstrap technique as presented in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Table 2B.1. Measures of mobility over time with Long-Ferrie categorization.
(a). Baseline categorization with three categories.
Year AS AS1819 M U D M’ U’ D’
1819 6.76∗∗∗ 0.00 38.44 19.76 18.68 38.44 19.76 18.68
1821 7.36∗∗∗ 1.02 37.03 20.36 16.67 37.94 19.66 18.27
1827 7.02∗∗∗ 0.95 35.87 19.52 16.36 37.90 19.83 18.07
1830 7.33∗∗∗ 1.12 35.70 20.91 14.79 37.43 19.59 17.83
1832 7.73∗∗∗ 1.39 35.08 21.01 14.06 36.83 19.23 17.60
1834 7.62∗∗∗ 1.36 34.79 20.67 14.12 36.98 19.28 17.69
1840 8.25∗∗∗ 2.36 32.84 20.48 12.36 35.80 19.02 16.79
1845 7.80∗∗∗ 1.82 32.66 20.32 12.34 36.58 19.36 17.23
1851 8.68∗∗∗ 2.95∗ 32.16 19.71 12.45 36.24 19.22 17.02
1858 8.59∗∗∗ 2.37 30.77 18.87 11.90 35.67 18.65 17.02
1861 8.88∗∗∗ 2.84 30.30 17.78 12.51 35.84 18.48 17.36
1864 8.36∗∗∗ 2.21 29.87 17.25 12.62 36.58 18.75 17.83
1872 8.43∗∗∗ 1.75 27.25 15.80 11.45 34.96 18.17 16.79
1875 8.19∗∗∗ 1.98 26.73 15.20 11.53 35.89 18.64 17.25
1879 8.38∗∗∗ 1.89 25.59 14.35 11.24 34.65 17.87 16.79
(b). Extended categorization with division of the white-collar group.
Year AS AS1819 M U D M’ U’ D’
1819 13.07∗∗∗ 0.00 55.84 27.07 28.76 55.84 27.07 28.76
1821 14.13∗∗∗ 2.06 54.66 28.06 26.60 54.67 26.91 27.76
1827 13.90∗∗∗ 2.28 54.82 27.91 26.92 55.28 27.45 27.83
1830 14.38∗∗∗ 2.93 55.72 29.53 26.19 55.82 27.91 27.91
1832 14.63∗∗∗ 2.67 54.88 29.13 25.74 54.80 27.06 27.74
1834 14.17∗∗∗ 2.59 54.66 29.52 25.14 55.15 27.18 27.96
1840 15.06∗∗∗ 4.02 53.50 29.59 23.92 54.04 26.82 27.22
1845 14.92∗∗∗ 3.90 53.35 29.54 23.81 54.30 26.79 27.50
1851 16.00∗∗∗ 5.90∗∗ 53.03 28.13 24.90 53.35 26.18 27.17
1858 16.09∗∗∗ 5.31∗ 52.57 27.83 24.74 53.13 25.84 27.29
1861 16.36∗∗∗ 6.70∗∗∗ 51.87 26.18 25.69 52.59 24.60 27.99
1864 15.76∗∗∗ 6.20∗∗ 51.82 25.82 26.00 53.18 24.78 28.40
1872 17.05∗∗∗ 7.28∗∗∗ 52.75 25.57 27.18 53.49 25.12 28.37
1875 17.96∗∗∗ 8.54∗∗∗ 53.05 25.81 27.23 54.54 25.86 28.67
1879 18.58∗∗∗ 8.82∗∗∗ 51.65 24.55 27.10 53.08 25.19 27.89
Note: The mobility measures are: (AS) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) showing dis-
tance from perfect mobility, (AS1819) Altham statistic comparing each year’s transition
matrix with the one from 1819 to show structural mobility changes, (M) share of off-
diagonal/share of mobile, (U) share of upward mobile, (D) share of downward mobile, (M’)
share of off-diagonal with marginal distribution adjusted to the transition matrix of 1819,
(U’) share of upward mobile with marginal distribution adjusted to 1819, and (D’) share of
downward mobile with marginal distribution adjusted to 1819. The stars indicate signifi-
cance levels from the G2-test (∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗∗∗: 0.1 %). Degrees of freedom: 4 (a). and 5
(b)., respectively.
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Table 2B.2. Measures of mobility over time with(out) farmers.
Year AS(S) AS(SF) AS(L) AS(LF) AS(L+) AS(L+F)
1819 6.84∗∗∗ 12.35∗∗∗ 6.76∗∗∗ 18.08∗∗∗ 13.07∗∗∗ 26.07∗∗∗
1821 6.94∗∗∗ 11.69∗∗∗ 7.36∗∗∗ 18.56∗∗∗ 14.13∗∗∗ 27.13∗∗∗
1827 7.47∗∗∗ 11.66∗∗∗ 7.02∗∗∗ 18.16∗∗∗ 13.90∗∗∗ 26.26∗∗∗
1830 7.96∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗∗ 7.33∗∗∗ 18.84∗∗∗ 14.38∗∗∗ 26.77∗∗∗
1832 8.20∗∗∗ 13.57∗∗∗ 7.73∗∗∗ 22.17∗∗∗ 14.63∗∗∗ 30.40∗∗∗
1834 7.84∗∗∗ 13.60∗∗∗ 7.62∗∗∗ 23.21∗∗∗ 14.17∗∗∗ 31.54∗∗∗
1840 8.30∗∗∗ 13.57∗∗∗ 8.25∗∗∗ 20.70∗∗∗ 15.06∗∗∗ 29.63∗∗∗
1845 8.64∗∗∗ 15.68∗∗∗ 7.80∗∗∗ 20.83∗∗∗ 14.92∗∗∗ 30.50∗∗∗
1851 9.24∗∗∗ 15.70∗∗∗ 8.68∗∗∗ 22.50∗∗∗ 16.00∗∗∗ 31.30∗∗∗
1858 9.56∗∗∗ 17.57∗∗∗ 8.59∗∗∗ 25.30∗∗∗ 16.09∗∗∗ 34.77∗∗∗
1861 9.66∗∗∗ 17.62∗∗∗ 8.88∗∗∗ 27.03∗∗∗ 16.36∗∗∗ 36.58∗∗∗
1864 9.28∗∗∗ 17.04∗∗∗ 8.36∗∗∗ 26.60∗∗∗ 15.76∗∗∗ 36.04∗∗∗
1872 9.42∗∗∗ 17.51∗∗∗ 8.43∗∗∗ 24.33∗∗∗ 17.05∗∗∗ 34.98∗∗∗
1875 10.42∗∗∗ 17.78∗∗∗ 8.19∗∗∗ 21.80∗∗∗ 17.96∗∗∗ 34.93∗∗∗
1879 10.69∗∗∗ 17.87∗∗∗ 8.38∗∗∗ 24.26∗∗∗ 18.58∗∗∗ 36.67∗∗∗
Note: The mobility measures are: (AS(S)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with SEP
categorization excluding farmers, (AS(SF)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with SEP
categorization including farmers, (AS(L)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with baseline
Long-Ferrie categorization excluding farmers, (AS(LF)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J)
with baseline Long-Ferrie categorization including farmers, (AS(L+)) conventional Altham
statistic d(P, J) with extended Long-Ferrie categorization excluding farmers, and (AS(L+F))
conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with extended Long-Ferrie categorization including
farmers. The stars indicate significance levels from the G2-test (∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗∗∗: 0.1 %).
Degrees of freedom: 4 (L) and (S), 5 (SF), (LF), and (L+), and 6 (L+F), respectively.
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Transition Matrices We present the transition matrices of the C1820 sample following
the Long-Ferrie categorizations below.
Table 2B.3. Transition matrices of the baseline Long-Ferrie categorization.
(a). 1819.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,346 317 161 1,824
Skilled Workers (S) 301 368 106 775
Unskilled Workers (U) 150 101 105 356
Row sum 1,797 786 372 2,955
(b). 1821.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,248 292 146 1,686
Skilled Workers (S) 243 286 91 620
Unskilled Workers (U) 118 72 102 292
Row sum 1,609 650 339 2,598
(c). 1827.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,320 287 136 1,743
Skilled Workers (S) 232 282 89 603
Unskilled Workers (U) 128 69 80 277
Row sum 1,680 638 305 2,623
(d). 1830.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,185 289 131 1,605
Skilled Workers (S) 189 264 75 528
Unskilled Workers (U) 102 59 73 234
Row sum 1,476 612 279 2,367
(e). 1832.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,211 302 131 1,644
Skilled Workers (S) 180 262 69 511
Unskilled Workers (U) 97 59 78 234
Row sum 1,488 623 278 2,389
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(f). 1834.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,204 296 127 1,627
Skilled Workers (S) 178 259 63 500
Unskilled Workers (U) 98 56 70 224
Row sum 1,480 611 260 2,351
(g). 1840.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,204 289 112 1,605
Skilled Workers (S) 147 242 58 447
Unskilled Workers (U) 88 42 59 189
Row sum 1,439 573 229 2,241
(h). 1845.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,194 291 98 1,583
Skilled Workers (S) 148 228 54 430
Unskilled Workers (U) 78 43 46 167
Row sum 1,420 562 198 2,180
(i). 1851.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,153 272 92 1,517
Skilled Workers (S) 151 204 46 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 76 32 54 162
Row sum 1,380 508 192 2,080
(j). 1858.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,101 236 88 1,425
Skilled Workers (S) 132 173 36 341
Unskilled Workers (U) 63 32 47 142
Row sum 1,296 441 171 1,908
(k). 1861.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,069 222 76 1,367
Skilled Workers (S) 137 157 26 320
Unskilled Workers (U) 59 32 44 135
Row sum 1,265 411 146 1,822
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(l). 1864.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,026 193 75 1,294
Skilled Workers (S) 132 131 26 289
Unskilled Workers (U) 54 29 38 121
Row sum 1,212 353 139 1,704
(m). 1872.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 832 122 59 1,013
Skilled Workers (S) 89 93 26 208
Unskilled Workers (U) 41 20 28 89
Row sum 962 235 113 1,310
(n). 1875.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 779 117 43 939
Skilled Workers (S) 80 77 22 179
Unskilled Workers (U) 36 22 21 79
Row sum 895 216 86 1,197
(o). 1879.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 695 96 38 829
Skilled Workers (S) 70 77 18 165
Unskilled Workers (U) 30 19 16 65
Row sum 795 192 72 1,059
Note: These are the transition matrices of the C1820 sample by observation year of the
father. Sons’ occupations are categorized around the age of forty.
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Table 2B.4. Transition matrices of the extended Long-Ferrie categorization.
(a). 1819.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 412 216 135 68 831
Lower Managers (L) 298 420 182 93 993
Skilled Workers (S) 193 108 368 106 775
Unskilled Workers (U) 89 61 101 105 356
Row sum 992 805 786 372 2,955
(b). 1821.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 384 200 107 60 751
Lower Managers (L) 258 406 185 86 935
Skilled Workers (S) 156 87 286 91 620
Unskilled Workers (U) 66 52 72 102 292
Row sum 864 745 650 339 2,598
(c). 1827.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 359 220 102 45 726
Lower Managers (L) 277 464 185 91 1,017
Skilled Workers (S) 140 92 282 89 603
Unskilled Workers (U) 71 57 69 80 277
Row sum 847 833 638 305 2,623
(d). 1830.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 305 204 95 42 646
Lower Managers (L) 270 406 194 89 959
Skilled Workers (S) 117 72 264 75 528
Unskilled Workers (U) 63 39 59 73 234
Row sum 755 721 612 279 2,367
(e). 1832.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 315 194 102 43 654
Lower Managers (L) 279 423 200 88 990
Skilled Workers (S) 108 72 262 69 511
Unskilled Workers (U) 57 40 59 78 234
Row sum 759 729 623 278 2,389
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(f). 1834.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 290 208 103 42 643
Lower Managers (L) 259 447 193 85 984
Skilled Workers (S) 97 81 259 63 500
Unskilled Workers (U) 55 43 56 70 224
Row sum 701 779 611 260 2,351
(g). 1840.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 286 204 90 40 620
Lower Managers (L) 259 455 199 72 985
Skilled Workers (S) 76 71 242 58 447
Unskilled Workers (U) 48 40 42 59 189
Row sum 669 770 573 229 2,241
(h). 1845.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 287 201 85 32 605
Lower Managers (L) 250 456 206 66 978
Skilled Workers (S) 74 74 228 54 430
Unskilled Workers (U) 35 43 43 46 167
Row sum 646 774 562 198 2,180
(i). 1851.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 292 175 78 25 570
Lower Managers (L) 259 427 194 67 947
Skilled Workers (S) 73 78 204 46 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 32 44 32 54 162
Row sum 656 724 508 192 2,080
(j). 1858.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 274 171 73 22 540
Lower Managers (L) 245 411 163 66 885
Skilled Workers (S) 62 70 173 36 341
Unskilled Workers (U) 30 33 32 47 142
Row sum 611 685 441 171 1,908
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(k). 1861.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 274 153 73 21 521
Lower Managers (L) 240 402 149 55 846
Skilled Workers (S) 51 86 157 26 320
Unskilled Workers (U) 24 35 32 44 135
Row sum 589 676 411 146 1,822
(l). 1864.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 264 146 63 23 496
Lower Managers (L) 228 388 130 52 798
Skilled Workers (S) 50 82 131 26 289
Unskilled Workers (U) 20 34 29 38 121
Row sum 562 650 353 139 1,704
(m). 1872.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 217 128 38 15 398
Lower Managers (L) 206 281 84 44 615
Skilled Workers (S) 32 57 93 26 208
Unskilled Workers (U) 16 25 20 28 89
Row sum 471 491 235 113 1,310
(n). 1875.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 206 127 35 9 377
Lower Managers (L) 188 258 82 34 562
Skilled Workers (S) 30 50 77 22 179
Unskilled Workers (U) 13 23 22 21 79
Row sum 437 458 216 86 1,197
(o). 1879.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 192 108 27 7 334
Lower Managers (L) 168 227 69 31 495
Skilled Workers (S) 27 43 77 18 165
Unskilled Workers (U) 12 18 19 16 65
Row sum 399 396 192 72 1,059
Note: These are the transition matrices of the C1820 sample by observation year of the
father. Sons’ occupations are categorized around the age of forty.
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2C Census Sample
In this section, we conduct an analysis of social mobility in the second sub-sample men-
tioned in Section 2.2. We combine the registered residents’ data with data on citizens
that lived in the city of Zurich (henceforth called census sample). Consequently, we ex-
clude all geographically mobile individuals. This extension addresses a separate research
question. It quantifies the level of mobility in the city of Zurich for a changing population
rather than the level of mobility in a homogeneous population irrespective of its location.
The presented results might be better comparable with existing (international) studies
on intergenerational mobility due to a similar sample selection (excluding emigrants and
including residents). Note that we are not able to replicate the entire resident population
of Zurich as we lack information on temporary foreign residents. Moreover, the collection
of the registered residents’ data is still ongoing. Thus, we only have the full count of res-
idents and citizens available in the historical sources for the years 1819, 1830, 1840, and
1889. The census sample in the remainder of the analyzed years consists predominantly
of citizens residing in the city. We still show the full set of observation years to get a first
continuous estimate of intergenerational occupational mobility in the city of Zurich for
the entire nineteenth century.23
Descriptive Statistics Figure 2C.1 entails the occupational distribution employing
both the SEP and the Long-Ferrie categorizations. We see a similar structural change as
in the C1820 sample in the main part of this paper. The relative share of middle SEP
occupations and (lower) white-collar occupations increases over time. Overall the distri-
bution across categories is shifted towards lower SEP and more manual work as compared
to the C1820 sample. We can compare our distribution in panel (B) of Figure 2C.1 to
the numbers from Norway and the United States displayed in Modalsli (2017, Figure 1).
We find that (excluding the negligible share of farmers) Zurich’s population exhibited a
higher fraction of white-collar occupations and fewer unskilled manual occupations. This
seems reasonable considering that Zurich as a city is compared to the entire country of
Norway and the United States consisting of both rural and urban areas. Interestingly, we
still observe the same trend towards white-collar occupations in all locations. This is most
likely due to the common industrialization process in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
Absolute Mobility A first glance at absolute social mobility is provided in Figures
2C.2, 2C.3, and 2C.4 displaying the transition probabilities based on the transition ma-
trices presented in in Tables 2C.3, 2C.4, and 2C.5. Again, we find a very similar picture
to our main analysis. We observe high occupational persistence (a strong diagonal) and
23More precisely, we present results for all intersecting years of residents’ and citizens’ information. In
the intergenerational analyses, we focus again on 1819–1879.
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increasing probabilities to enter middle SEP and (lower) white-collar occupations. For a
similar period (1860–1910), Modalsli (2017, Figure 2) infers weakly increasing transition
probabilities between categories. This result is not mirrored in Zurich. However, the
transition probabilities remain relatively flat over time as in the analysis on Norway.
Relative Mobility Figure 2C.5 provides the two-way log-odds ratios accounting for
structural changes in the occupational distribution. We find that the ratios are overall
flatter but higher (less mobile) than the ratios of our citizens’ sample. If anything, rela-
tive mobility seems to have been weakly decreasing. The odds increased for middle and
high SEP, (higher) white-collar, skilled, and unskilled manual occupations whereas they
decreased for low SEP and lower white-collar occupations. Interestingly, we observe that
the log-odds ratio of unskilled workers exhibited a kink increasing strongly until 1872 and
decreasing thereafter. This kink hints towards a change in the trend of mobility for the
group of unskilled workers by the end of the nineteenth century. Modalsli (2017, Figure
3) depicts that, in Norway, white-collar occupations exhibited a pronounced increase in
mobility in a similar period. If anything, we observe the opposite of weakly decreasing
mobility. Overall, the level of immobility as measured by two-way log-odds ratios was
weakly lower in Zurich than in Norway.
The conventional Altham statistics in the first column of Table 2C.1 suggest that
mobility decreased in the first part of the period. For the second half of the period,
the SEP and the baseline Long-Ferrie classification exhibit some fluctuations and a small
increase in intergenerational mobility. The extended Long-Ferrie categorization displays
fluctuations as well but indicates a weakly decreasing level of social mobility for the same
period. Interestingly, the transition matrices seem to be structurally similar over the
course of the entire period as none of the comparisons with 1819 (displayed in the second
column (AS1819) of Table 2C.1) are statistically significant on the 1 percent level. Figure
2C.6 shows that controlling for a quadratic function of age for both fathers and sons
does not change the results’ patterns. Both M and M’ displayed in Table 2C.1 (third
and sixth column) paint a picture of decreasing mobility over the entire period across all
categorizations. The drop in absolute mobility appears to be driven by a reduction in
both downward and upward mobility as outlined in panel (a).24 Overall, upward mobility
was more prevalent than downward mobility.
Correlation Coefficient The evolution of our measure of intergenerational correlation
employing standardized HISCAM scores is displayed in Figure 2C.7. We find no clear
pattern over time but only insignificant fluctuations between approximately 0.35 and
0.40. The level of the estimates is comparable to the ones in our main analysis and thus
24Remember: only when employing the SEP categorization, one can interpret a change towards “higher
occupations” (in this case higher SEP) as upward mobility.
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to existing estimates of earnings and education correlation coefficients. We are not able
to observe the pattern of weakly decreasing mobility in our census sample that most other
measures suggest.
Farmers Table 2C.2 presents the conventional Altham statistics when including farmers
into all categorizations and compares the results to the baseline without farmers. On the
one hand, we find qualitatively very similar results when including and excluding farmers
employing the SEP classification. On the other hand, the inclusion of farmers in the
Long-Ferrie classifications implies a much stronger decrease in occupational mobility in
the second half of the period and an overall higher level of immobility. Firstly, the higher
levels might be partially driven by the small relative share of both unskilled manual
and farming occupations in the sample. Because of the small sizes, transitions between
the two categories are unlikely over the entire course of the century. Hence, we are not
able to estimate the Altham statistic over the entire period (only possible for 1834–1851
and 1864–1879). Secondly, the contrasting results regarding the level indicate that the
transition between farming occupations and other occupations was not evenly distributed,
especially in the manual sector. Apparently, transitions between farming occupations
and unskilled occupation were less likely and becoming even less likelier over time than
transitions between farming occupations and low SEP occupations. Thus, our results
differ to some extent for the different classifications, while they still agree on weakly
declining occupational mobility.
We can compare the fourth and the last column of Table 2C.2 with the estimates
provided by Long and Ferrie (2013), Modalsli (2017), and Pe´rez (2019). Our estimates
for 1834 are roughly comparable to the estimates Long and Ferrie (2013) provide for the
United States between 1850 and 1900. After the decrease in mobility (e.g. in 1879),
our estimates are better comparable to the ones of Long and Ferrie (2013) for the United
Kingdom between 1851 and 1881 and the ones of Modalsli (2017) for Norway between 1865
and 1900. Pe´rez (2019) finds a much higher level of mobility for Argentina between 1869
and 1895. We can conclude, that the city of Zurich experienced a decline in occupational
mobility that was comparable to the difference in the level of mobility between the United
States and the United Kingdom or Norway around the same time. Of course, one has
to account for the fact that Zurich was only a city and thus a lot smaller regarding
the number of individuals and also more homogeneous with respect to the occupational
sectors. Thus, this comparison is merely illustrative and does not allow for too thorough
interpretations.
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Figure 2C.1. Occupational structure over time in the census sample.
(a). SEP categories.
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(b). Baseline Long-Ferrie categorization.
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(c). Extended Long-Ferrie categorization.
89
0
20
64
16
01
22
96
28
90
16
25
17
26
17
25
17
63
19
03
19
02
16
90
16
63
21
27
22
13
32
97
37
47
84
48
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
S
ha
re
 (%
)
18
08
18
19
18
21
18
27
18
30
18
32
18
34
18
40
18
45
18
51
18
58
18
61
18
64
18
72
18
75
18
79
18
85
18
89
Unskilled Workers Skilled Workers Lower Managers Higher Managers
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observations per year.
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Figure 2C.5. Log-odds ratios over time—census sample.
(a). SEP categories.
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(b). Baseline Long-Ferrie categorization.
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(c). Extended Long-Ferrie categorization.
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Note: These are the log-odds ratios Θ2,i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, (4)} representing the three
SEPs (low, middle, and high) or three/four Long-Ferrie categories (white-collar (higher
and lower), skilled workers, and unskilled workers). One can read panel (a). as follows:
e.g. the son of a father with a low SEP occupation in 1819 was approximately e1.75 =
5.75 times more likely to enter a low SEP occupation compared to middle or high SEP
occupations than the son of a father with a middle or high SEP occupation.
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Figure 2C.6. Altham statistic controlled for age and age squared of both the son and
father over time—census sample.
(a). SEP categories.
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(b). Baseline Long-Ferrie categorization.
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(c). Extended Long-Ferrie categorization.
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Note: These are the Altham statistics controlled for a quadratic function of father’s
and son’s age following Modalsli (2015). The confidence intervals are calculated by the
same bootstrap technique as presented in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Figure 2C.7. Correlation coefficient of the standardized HISCAM measure over
time—census sample.
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Note: The solid (dashed) black line represents our estimate (confidence intervals) for
the year 1819. How we arrive at this correlation coefficient is explained in Section 2.3.
Table 2C.1. Measures of mobility over time—census sample.
(a). SEP categories.
Year AS AS1819 M U D M’ U’ D’
1819 8.90∗∗∗ 0.00 44.07 26.13 17.94 44.07 26.13 17.94
1821 8.42∗∗∗ 0.88 45.99 26.26 19.73 44.83 26.24 18.59
1827 9.14∗∗∗ 1.13 44.52 24.99 19.53 43.99 25.66 18.33
1830 10.16∗∗∗ 1.44 42.82 24.04 18.78 42.91 25.44 17.47
1832 9.32∗∗∗ 0.88 46.08 26.50 19.58 44.67 26.45 18.21
1834 9.59∗∗∗ 1.61 45.49 25.43 20.06 44.45 25.97 18.48
1840 10.64∗∗∗ 2.05 43.30 25.87 17.43 43.10 25.81 17.30
1845 10.41∗∗∗ 1.76 42.77 26.44 16.33 41.57 25.26 16.32
1851 11.78∗∗∗ 3.32∗ 41.75 24.72 17.02 40.20 24.11 16.09
1858 11.14∗∗∗ 2.37 41.23 23.81 17.42 40.49 24.42 16.06
1861 10.44∗∗∗ 1.84 41.33 24.59 16.74 40.84 24.68 16.16
1864 10.37∗∗∗ 2.42 40.99 24.34 16.65 41.20 24.88 16.32
1872 10.04∗∗∗ 1.53 40.90 24.26 16.65 41.57 25.09 16.48
1875 11.28∗∗∗ 2.66 39.95 23.98 15.97 40.44 24.56 15.89
1879 10.82∗∗∗ 2.49 41.02 25.02 15.99 41.84 25.20 16.64
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(b). Baseline Long-Ferrie categorization.
Year AS AS1819 M U D M’ U’ D’
1819 7.16∗∗∗ 0.00 40.18 24.02 16.16 40.18 24.02 16.16
1821 7.91∗∗∗ 0.94 37.14 22.98 14.16 38.79 23.55 15.24
1827 7.58∗∗∗ 1.47 36.10 21.65 14.45 39.27 24.02 15.25
1830 7.70∗∗∗ 1.53 38.30 23.74 14.56 39.34 24.05 15.29
1832 7.85∗∗∗ 1.11 36.12 23.36 12.76 38.75 23.65 15.10
1834 7.89∗∗∗ 1.49 35.03 22.47 12.55 38.27 23.46 14.81
1840 8.18∗∗∗ 2.12 35.09 22.21 12.88 37.85 23.45 14.40
1845 8.60∗∗∗ 2.06 34.21 23.02 11.19 37.22 23.11 14.11
1851 9.07∗∗∗ 2.95 32.99 21.25 11.74 37.02 23.06 13.95
1858 8.63∗∗∗ 2.12 32.27 20.24 12.04 37.49 22.92 14.56
1861 8.42∗∗∗ 1.91 33.12 20.81 12.31 38.30 23.11 15.20
1864 8.63∗∗∗ 3.07 32.20 19.59 12.60 38.76 23.22 15.54
1872 9.05∗∗∗ 2.87 31.12 19.54 11.57 38.05 23.32 14.73
1875 8.55∗∗∗ 1.90 30.84 20.00 10.84 38.13 23.45 14.68
1879 7.59∗∗∗ 0.49 33.84 21.91 11.92 39.12 23.58 15.55
(c). Extended Long-Ferrie categorization.
Year AS AS1819 M U D M’ U’ D’
1819 14.41∗∗∗ 0.00 55.04 32.38 22.65 55.04 32.38 22.65
1821 15.24∗∗∗ 2.29 53.46 32.44 21.02 53.41 31.97 21.44
1827 14.72∗∗∗ 3.26 53.44 31.80 21.65 54.27 32.69 21.58
1830 15.70∗∗∗ 4.02 54.97 32.46 22.51 55.30 32.92 22.38
1832 15.02∗∗∗ 3.56 54.10 32.20 21.90 54.18 32.27 21.91
1834 16.28∗∗∗ 6.41 52.66 32.21 20.45 53.44 31.84 21.60
1840 17.60∗∗∗ 7.60∗ 53.10 31.75 21.35 54.01 32.44 21.57
1845 17.63∗∗∗ 6.01 52.08 32.92 19.16 52.82 32.10 20.72
1851 17.95∗∗∗ 6.50 51.66 30.28 21.37 52.33 31.61 20.73
1858 16.86∗∗∗ 4.47 50.97 28.32 22.65 52.11 31.04 21.07
1861 16.67∗∗∗ 5.21 51.54 28.56 22.98 52.93 30.73 22.20
1864 15.84∗∗∗ 5.47 50.84 27.36 23.48 52.76 30.51 22.25
1872 17.38∗∗∗ 5.64 52.34 28.54 23.80 53.50 31.76 21.74
1875 19.58∗∗∗ 7.55 51.63 29.82 21.81 53.64 32.14 21.50
1879 18.51∗∗∗ 6.12 51.60 29.59 22.01 53.47 31.46 22.01
Note: The mobility measures are: (AS) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) showing dis-
tance from perfect mobility, (AS1819) Altham statistic comparing each year’s transition
matrix with the one from 1819 to show structural mobility changes, (M) share of off-
diagonal/share of mobile, (U) share of upward mobile, (D) share of downward mobile, (M’)
share of off-diagonal with marginal distribution adjusted to the transition matrix of 1819,
(U’) share of upward mobile with marginal distribution adjusted to 1819, and (D’) share of
downward mobile with marginal distribution adjusted to 1819. The stars indicate signifi-
cance levels from the G2-test (∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗∗∗: 0.1 %). Degrees of freedom: 4 (a). and
(b)., and 5 (c)., respectively.
70
Table 2C.2. Measures of mobility over time with(out) farmers—census sample.
Year AS(S) AS(SF) AS(L) AS(LF) AS(L+) AS(L+F)
1819 8.90∗∗∗ 14.65∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 14.41∗∗∗
1821 8.42∗∗∗ 12.85∗∗∗ 7.91∗∗∗ 15.24∗∗∗
1827 9.14∗∗∗ 12.85∗∗∗ 7.58∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗
1830 10.16∗∗∗ 14.10∗∗∗ 7.70∗∗∗ 15.70∗∗∗
1832 9.32∗∗∗ 13.15∗∗∗ 7.85∗∗∗ 15.02∗∗∗
1834 9.59∗∗∗ 13.08∗∗∗ 7.89∗∗∗ 15.02∗∗∗ 16.28∗∗∗ 26.03∗∗∗
1840 10.64∗∗∗ 14.38∗∗∗ 8.18∗∗∗ 17.39∗∗∗ 17.60∗∗∗ 29.27∗∗∗
1845 10.41∗∗∗ 14.78∗∗∗ 8.60∗∗∗ 17.87∗∗∗ 17.63∗∗∗ 30.00∗∗∗
1851 11.78∗∗∗ 16.67∗∗∗ 9.07∗∗∗ 19.14∗∗∗ 17.95∗∗∗ 29.45∗∗∗
1858 11.14∗∗∗ 16.10∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗ 16.86∗∗∗
1861 10.44∗∗∗ 15.60∗∗∗ 8.42∗∗∗ 16.67∗∗∗
1864 10.37∗∗∗ 17.58∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗ 25.59∗∗∗ 15.84∗∗∗ 37.56∗∗∗
1872 10.04∗∗∗ 16.09∗∗∗ 9.05∗∗∗ 23.96∗∗∗ 17.38∗∗∗ 34.26∗∗∗
1875 11.28∗∗∗ 18.39∗∗∗ 8.55∗∗∗ 26.02∗∗∗ 19.58∗∗∗ 38.94∗∗∗
1879 10.82∗∗∗ 16.66∗∗∗ 7.59∗∗∗ 25.79∗∗∗ 18.51∗∗∗ 39.63∗∗∗
Note: The mobility measures are: (AS(S)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with SEP
categorization excluding farmers, (AS(SF)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with SEP
categorization including farmers, (AS(L)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with baseline
Long-Ferrie categorization excluding farmers, (AS(LF)) conventional Altham statistic d(P, J)
with baseline Long-Ferrie categorization including farmers, (AS(L+)) conventional Altham
statistic d(P, J) with extended Long-Ferrie categorization excluding farmers, and (AS(L+F))
conventional Altham statistic d(P, J) with extended Long-Ferrie categorization including
farmers. The empty entries suggest that there were empty entries in the transition matrices
preventing the estimation of the Altham statistic. In 1819 for example, none of the sons of
a farmer entered an unskilled manual occupation. The stars indicate significance levels from
the G2-test (∗: 5 %, ∗∗: 1 %, ∗∗∗: 0.1 %). Degrees of freedom: 4 (S) and (L), 5 (SF), (LF),
and (L+), and 6 (L+F), respectively.
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Transition Matrices We present the transition matrices of our census sample accord-
ing to all categorizations below.
Table 2C.3. Transition matrices of SEP—census sample.
(a). 1819.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 556 170 45 771
middle SEP (M) 255 369 118 742
high SEP (H) 82 148 113 343
Row sum 893 687 276 1,856
(b). 1821.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 393 162 40 595
middle SEP (M) 208 369 118 695
high SEP (H) 77 141 114 332
Row sum 678 672 272 1,622
(c). 1827.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 384 177 30 591
middle SEP (M) 207 449 119 775
high SEP (H) 65 145 93 303
Row sum 656 771 242 1,669
(d). 1830.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 537 183 36 756
middle SEP (M) 259 443 138 840
high SEP (H) 60 138 107 305
Row sum 856 764 281 1,901
(e). 1832.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 405 155 38 598
middle SEP (M) 275 428 152 855
high SEP (H) 60 132 117 309
Row sum 740 715 307 1,762
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(f). 1834.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 377 168 31 576
middle SEP (M) 239 423 137 799
high SEP (H) 61 126 113 300
Row sum 677 717 281 1,675
(g). 1840.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 529 179 31 739
middle SEP (M) 311 477 131 919
high SEP (H) 54 141 103 298
Row sum 894 797 265 1,956
(h). 1845.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 436 127 33 596
middle SEP (M) 290 469 129 888
high SEP (H) 51 127 108 286
Row sum 777 723 270 1,770
(i). 1851.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 405 130 23 558
middle SEP (M) 278 475 141 894
high SEP (H) 48 101 126 275
Row sum 731 706 290 1,727
(j). 1858.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 396 139 27 562
middle SEP (M) 260 528 139 927
high SEP (H) 42 115 105 262
Row sum 698 782 271 1,751
(k). 1861.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 398 141 31 570
middle SEP (M) 286 570 133 989
high SEP (H) 46 116 101 263
Row sum 730 827 265 1,822
73
(l). 1864.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 350 153 29 532
middle SEP (M) 275 583 108 966
high SEP (H) 42 107 95 244
Row sum 667 843 232 1,742
(m). 1872.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 320 151 27 498
middle SEP (M) 248 628 113 989
high SEP (H) 41 135 85 261
Row sum 609 914 225 1,748
(n). 1875.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 320 146 21 487
middle SEP (M) 249 628 108 985
high SEP (H) 34 130 86 250
Row sum 603 904 215 1,722
(o). 1879.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 438 205 25 668
middle SEP (M) 357 760 119 1,236
high SEP (H) 46 143 89 278
Row sum 841 1,108 233 2,182
Note: These are the transition matrices of the census sample by observation year of the
father. Sons’ occupations are categorized around the age of forty.
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Table 2C.4. Transition matrices of the baseline Long-Ferrie categorization—census
sample.
(a). 1819.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 724 233 119 1,076
Skilled Workers (S) 136 245 70 451
Unskilled Workers (U) 76 72 82 230
Row sum 936 550 271 1,757
(b). 1821.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 730 207 98 1,035
Skilled Workers (S) 108 189 57 354
Unskilled Workers (U) 61 54 71 186
Row sum 899 450 226 1,575
(c). 1827.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 798 203 91 1,092
Skilled Workers (S) 107 181 58 346
Unskilled Workers (U) 77 51 60 188
Row sum 982 435 209 1,626
(d). 1830.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 800 232 108 1,140
Skilled Workers (S) 127 231 87 445
Unskilled Workers (U) 73 62 79 214
Row sum 1,000 525 274 1,799
(e). 1832.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 831 238 105 1,174
Skilled Workers (S) 107 199 56 362
Unskilled Workers (U) 63 48 61 172
Row sum 1,001 485 222 1,708
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(f). 1834.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 812 222 94 1,128
Skilled Workers (S) 96 199 51 346
Unskilled Workers (U) 63 46 50 159
Row sum 971 467 195 1,633
(g). 1840.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 894 233 104 1,231
Skilled Workers (S) 114 249 75 438
Unskilled Workers (U) 74 51 61 186
Row sum 1,082 533 240 1,855
(h). 1845.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 855 236 96 1,187
Skilled Workers (S) 99 214 61 374
Unskilled Workers (U) 53 39 54 146
Row sum 1,007 489 211 1,707
(i). 1851.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 859 214 92 1,165
Skilled Workers (S) 107 201 47 355
Unskilled Workers (U) 61 27 53 141
Row sum 1,027 442 192 1,661
(j). 1858.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 908 211 93 1,212
Skilled Workers (S) 120 195 39 354
Unskilled Workers (U) 55 29 45 129
Row sum 1,083 435 177 1,695
(k). 1861.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 936 220 104 1,260
Skilled Workers (S) 135 189 41 365
Unskilled Workers (U) 51 30 48 129
Row sum 1,122 439 193 1,754
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(l). 1864.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 923 209 94 1,226
Skilled Workers (S) 133 176 25 334
Unskilled Workers (U) 54 24 36 114
Row sum 1,110 409 155 1,674
(m). 1872.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 947 215 77 1,239
Skilled Workers (S) 132 167 34 333
Unskilled Workers (U) 42 19 35 96
Row sum 1,121 401 146 1,668
(n). 1875.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 948 220 70 1,238
Skilled Workers (S) 118 170 42 330
Unskilled Workers (U) 37 25 30 92
Row sum 1,103 415 142 1,660
(o). 1879.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,123 286 122 1,531
Skilled Workers (S) 146 233 57 436
Unskilled Workers (U) 60 47 48 155
Row sum 1,329 566 227 2,122
Note: These are the transition matrices of the census sample by observation year of the
father. Sons’ occupations are categorized around the age of forty.
77
Table 2C.5. Transition matrices of the extended Long-Ferrie categorization—census
sample.
(a). 1819.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 155 147 77 41 420
Lower Managers (L) 114 308 156 78 656
Skilled Workers (S) 50 86 245 70 451
Unskilled Workers (U) 21 55 72 82 230
Row sum 340 596 550 271 1,757
(b). 1821.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 167 149 72 37 425
Lower Managers (L) 108 306 135 61 610
Skilled Workers (S) 44 64 189 57 354
Unskilled Workers (U) 22 39 54 71 186
Row sum 341 558 450 226 1,575
(c). 1827.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 151 165 65 32 413
Lower Managers (L) 117 365 138 59 679
Skilled Workers (S) 40 67 181 58 346
Unskilled Workers (U) 26 51 51 60 188
Row sum 334 648 435 209 1,626
(d). 1830.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 154 157 68 33 412
Lower Managers (L) 143 346 164 75 728
Skilled Workers (S) 38 89 231 87 445
Unskilled Workers (U) 25 48 62 79 214
Row sum 360 640 525 274 1,799
(e). 1832.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 177 151 75 36 439
Lower Managers (L) 156 347 163 69 735
Skilled Workers (S) 38 69 199 56 362
Unskilled Workers (U) 26 37 48 61 172
Row sum 397 604 485 222 1,708
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(f). 1834.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 163 159 74 29 425
Lower Managers (L) 129 361 148 65 703
Skilled Workers (S) 22 74 199 51 346
Unskilled Workers (U) 26 37 46 50 159
Row sum 340 631 467 195 1,633
(g). 1840.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 162 177 61 31 431
Lower Managers (L) 157 398 172 73 800
Skilled Workers (S) 22 92 249 75 438
Unskilled Workers (U) 27 47 51 61 186
Row sum 368 714 533 240 1,855
(h). 1845.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 161 169 63 25 418
Lower Managers (L) 136 389 173 71 769
Skilled Workers (S) 25 74 214 61 374
Unskilled Workers (U) 19 34 39 54 146
Row sum 341 666 489 211 1,707
(i). 1851.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 181 150 57 21 409
Lower Managers (L) 160 368 157 71 756
Skilled Workers (S) 27 80 201 47 355
Unskilled Workers (U) 19 42 27 53 141
Row sum 387 640 442 192 1,661
(j). 1858.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 188 137 60 19 404
Lower Managers (L) 180 403 151 74 808
Skilled Workers (S) 40 80 195 39 354
Unskilled Workers (U) 18 37 29 45 129
Row sum 426 657 435 177 1,695
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(k). 1861.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 180 136 68 23 407
Lower Managers (L) 187 433 152 81 853
Skilled Workers (S) 33 102 189 41 365
Unskilled Workers (U) 16 35 30 48 129
Row sum 416 706 439 193 1,754
(l). 1864.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 176 130 60 23 389
Lower Managers (L) 182 435 149 71 837
Skilled Workers (S) 34 99 176 25 334
Unskilled Workers (U) 16 38 24 36 114
Row sum 408 702 409 155 1,674
(m). 1872.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 190 150 60 16 416
Lower Managers (L) 204 403 155 61 823
Skilled Workers (S) 40 92 167 34 333
Unskilled Workers (U) 13 29 19 35 96
Row sum 447 674 401 146 1,668
(n). 1875.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 188 163 63 10 424
Lower Managers (L) 182 415 157 60 814
Skilled Workers (S) 34 84 170 42 330
Unskilled Workers (U) 9 28 25 30 92
Row sum 413 690 415 142 1,660
(o). 1879.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 218 163 77 18 476
Lower Managers (L) 214 528 209 104 1,055
Skilled Workers (S) 42 104 233 57 436
Unskilled Workers (U) 11 49 47 48 155
Row sum 485 844 566 227 2,122
Note: These are the transition matrices of the census sample by observation year of the
father. Sons’ occupations are categorized around the age of forty.
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Chapter 3
Bias in Social Mobility Estimates with Historical Data
Evidence from Swiss Microdata
Abstract: This paper explores a variety of potential issues one has to address when estimating
intergenerational mobility with historical data. Many studies are potentially affected by bias
originating from individuals emigrating and thus dropping out of the sample, missing informa-
tion on the life-cycle, and imperfectly linking data sets. Unique panel data on Zurich’s citizenry
between 1799 and 1926 entail information on true intergenerational links, and allow to follow
individuals across the globe and time. This enables me to explore how father-son mobility esti-
mates are affected by excluding emigrating individuals, occupational patterns over the life-cycle,
and linking procedures. The results suggest that focusing on geographically immobile individu-
als might decrease the estimated level of social mobility. The estimated level of mobility depends
on both the father’s and the son’s age at classification without a monotone trend in the direc-
tion of the bias. Most recent linking procedures do not generate significant bias in the sample
of Zurich citizens due to the high level of detail of the data combined with a small population size.
JEL classification: J62, J61, N33, N34.
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3.1 Introduction
Does everyone have an equal chance of being economically successful? Or is socioeconomic
status transmitted from one generation to the other such that the under-privileged are
forever excluded from money and power? These questions are generally discussed in the
literature on intergenerational mobility. Unique panel data of Zurich’s citizenry between
1799 and 1926 allow me to contribute to the existing literature in another dimension
by addressing the question: how large are the deviations in social mobility estimates
originating from geographic mobility, life-cycle patterns, and data linkage?
Usually, studies on social mobility depend on linking census data or birth registers to
retrieve intergenerational links and thus obtain information on two or more generations
(e.g. Ferrie, 2005; Bourdieu et al., 2009; Long, 2013; Long and Ferrie, 2013; Dribe et al.,
2015; Barone and Mocetti, 2016; Collins and Wanamaker, 2017; Modalsli, 2017; Feigen-
baum, 2018; Pe´rez, 2019). A similar procedure is necessary to follow individuals over the
course of their life or to track emigrants to their host country1 (e.g. Abramitzky et al.,
2012; Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Thus, most studies omit emigrants and are not
able to address potential life patterns in occupations.
The data at hand allow to estimate intergenerational mobility taking all of these
potential sources of bias into consideration (as in Chapter 2). Even more importantly, it
is possible to quantify the magnitude and direction of the mentioned distortions as the
employed data set includes true intergenerational links, allows me to track individuals
over the course of their lives, and even provides information after emigration. I employ
different measures of intergenerational mobility to control for the variety of measures in
the existing literature. Hence, the main research questions in this paper are: (1) How are
social mobility estimates affected by the in- and exclusion of migrants, life-cycle patterns
in occupational outcomes, and the linking procedure, and (2) what is the relative size
of the resulting deviations across different measures of mobility? By answering these
questions, this paper also contributes to the literature on geographic mobility, life-cycle
bias, and linking procedures.
The bulk of the literature on the economics of (international) migration tackles the as-
similation of immigrants in their host countries (Hatton and Williamson, 1994b; Constant
and Zimmermann, 2013), which is directly linked to the intergenerational persistence of
1Throughout this article, host and destination country/continent will be used interchangeably.
83
socioeconomic status.2 Fewer researchers have focused on the selection of international
migrants in their country of origin, particularly in a historical context. Notable excep-
tions are Wegge (1999, 2002, 2010), who finds that emigrants in mid-nineteenth century
Germany were intermediately selected with respect to their socioeconomic positions, and
Abramitzky et al. (2012, 2013), who provide evidence on negative selection among mi-
grants from Norway to the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century.3
This paper’s contribution to the scarce literature on selection of international migrants in
a historical context is twofold. First, I will provide suggestive evidence on the selection
of international migrants in nineteenth century Switzerland and the effect on estimates
of social mobility. Second, I investigate whether the selection of migrants differed across
host countries grouped by continent.
What are potential issues when employing non-longitudinal data sets? Income, wealth,
occupation, and to some extent even education change over an individual’s course of
life. Hence, a person’s socioeconomic status at one specific point in time might not be
representative of the “lifetime” socioeconomic status. This results in life-cycle bias.4 In
this paper, I will investigate whether individuals also exhibit a life pattern with respect
to occupational categories in a historical context. Further, I will explore whether implied
father-son mobility differs across different ages at classification of both the father’s and
the son’s generation.
Record linkage is widely applied in both historical and contemporaneous research con-
texts (Ruggles et al., 2018 provide an overview). Consequently, many researchers aim at
automating and improving linking procedures5 or evaluating existing mechanisms (Eriks-
son, 2017; Massey, 2017; Bailey et al., 2019). The latter strand of literature compares
different record linking procedures with “ground truth” data featuring the highest achiev-
able matching rates. Both Bailey et al. (2019) and Eriksson (2017) investigate the effect
2See e.g. Borjas (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995), Hammarstedt and Palme (2006), and Ward (2017) on
historical migration waves or Card (2005), Bauer and Riphahn (2007), Bratsberg et al. (2010, 2014), and
Favre et al. (2018) on more recent migration waves.
3See Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) on a review of migration flows to the United States and Hatton
and Williamson (1994b), Hatton and Williamson (2005), or Ferrie and Hatton (2014) for further research
on the selection of international migrants in a historical context.
4Solon (1999) surveys some research on life-cycle bias in intergenerational mobility estimates. Life-
cycle bias is found to be large and of varying direction (Jenkins, 1987; Grawe, 2006; Nybom and Stuhler,
2016a). Thus, one strand of the literature has focused on correcting for this bias (Haider and Solon, 2006;
Bo¨hlmark and Lindquist, 2006; Nybom and Stuhler, 2016b; Gregg et al., 2017).
5See e.g. Scheuren and Winkler (1993), Ferrie (1996, 2004), Christen and Goiser (2007), Herzog et al.
(2007), Goeken et al. (2011), Baskerville et al. (2014), Abowd (2017), Bailey et al. (2017), Abramitzky
et al. (2012, 2014, 2019).
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of record linkage on estimates of historical social mobility. They establish their bench-
mark “ground truth” data employing additional information on ancestors, which is not
contained in other studies’ data, resulting in matched data sets with higher quality. This
paper, on the other hand, is the first to evaluate linking precision of linking procedures
and the related bias in intergenerational mobility estimates in a historical context based
on observable intergenerational links.
I find that Swiss emigrants were on average intermediately selected in the nineteenth
century, and that this selection differed strongly by destination continent. Individuals mi-
grating within Europe were more positively selected than those emigrating to the United
States or Canada. This selection translates into different estimates of intergenerational
mobility. Emigrants were, on average, more mobile than geographically immobile indi-
viduals. Further, individuals in the data exhibited occupational life patterns suggesting
that they experienced upward intragenerational mobility. The older a citizen, the more
likely he was to obtain a higher socioeconomic position. These life patterns affect the
point estimates of intergenerational mobility to some extent. However, these biases do
not exhibit a monotone trend nor do the patterns agree across measures of occupational
mobility. Finally, state-of-the-art automated linking procedures perform neatly. They are
able to match around 77 to 95 percent of all father-son pairs with rates of false matches
in the single-digit per mille range. This is mostly caused by the small sample size and
the high quality of the data. Still, linked samples do not exhibit structurally different
estimates of intergenerational mobility in this sample of Zurich citizens in the nineteenth
century.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the employed
data. The main results are presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data Source The data originate from the same twenty-five editions of the directory of
citizens of the city of Zurich between 1799 and 1926 as described in Chapter 2. This source
contains the universe of Zurich’s adult male citizenry. Every edition of the directory of
citizens includes references to individuals’ direct male relatives. As citizenship is inherited
for men (jus sanguinis), the son of a citizen is a citizen as well, irrespective of his place of
residence. Hence, the data feature observable intergenerational links of the male lineages.
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The information on individuals includes the first name, middle names, the last name,
the place of family origin6, the year of birth, the year of death, the place of residence,
occupations, the number of houses owned, the military rank, and public offices (e.g.
member of the municipality council) for several points in time. Information on women is
scarcer. Daughters of citizens are indirectly referred to through their father with name
and year of birth (unmarried) or with information on the husband (married). Wives are
also indirectly referred to through their husbands by name, year of birth, and place of
origin.
The key features of the data I exploit in this paper are threefold. First, the data
contain information on the occupation and place of residence of citizens living abroad.
As explained in Chapter 2, the information on emigrants was partially acquired through
foreign authorities and partially by mail-in forms. If no current information was available,
the directory contains the latest available characteristics including their date and a note
that the corresponding citizen was currently untraceable.7 Hence, the data allow to track
citizens across the globe and to observe their occupation. Second, the frequent release of
a new citizens’ directory (every two to eleven years) and its cross-section character allow
to track citizens over time. Thus, I am able to observe the life pattern of occupations
for all citizens. Third, the data contain observable intergenerational links through the
cross-reference to all male relatives of a citizen. Consequently, there is no need for linking
fathers to sons in an automated procedure.
Classifications of Occupations I employ the same set of occupational classifications
as described in Chapter 2. For the main part of the analysis, I divide occupations into low,
middle, and high socioeconomic positions (SEP). This division is based on the categoriza-
tion introduced by Schu¨ren (1989) for occupations in nineteenth century Germany. The
most prevalent occupations in the low SEP category are locksmith, mechanic, and baker.
Merchants dominate the middle SEP category, but also engineer and teacher are frequent
occupations with middle SEP. Lastly, the high SEP category’s most frequent occupations
are priest, physician, and professor. The upside of this categorization is that one can
interpret the classes in an ordinal manner. Most of the mobility measures employed do
6This information conveys the origin of the family before it was naturalized in Zurich dating back to
even before the thirteenth century.
7The data lack information on emigrant citizens in only 0.63 percent of all entries (across all observation
years).
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not rely on this feature but the ordinal distinction of occupations allows to shed light
on e.g. the selection of migrants in greater detail. Farmers are excluded throughout the
entire analysis as their share in Zurich’s citizenry is negligible.
For better international comparability, I employ an alternative categorization simi-
lar to Long and Ferrie (2013), Modalsli (2017), and Pe´rez (2019). Occupations are first
divided into manual and non-manual labor. The manual workers are subsequently split
into an unskilled workers group (requires little to no training) and into a skilled workers
group (requires some training or education). The non-manual workers are classified as
white-collar workers. In a more detailed classification the white-collar workers can be
split into lower and higher managers.8 This classification is based on the Historical In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO) according to Van Leeuwen
et al. (2002) that allows to map occupations into the Historical International Social Class
Scheme (HISCLASS, Van Leeuwen and Maas, 2011).9 Throughout the paper, this classi-
fication is referred to as Long-Ferrie (three groups) or extended Long-Ferrie (four groups)
categorization.
Samples and Descriptive Statistics To analyze the three potential sources of bias,
the data have to be split accordingly. On the one hand, one needs to generate a baseline
sample that should capture the “true” level of mobility. On the other hand, one has to
get a hold of each source of bias through separate sub-samples. Below, I describe each of
the samples separately.
The baseline sample in this paper consists of all father-son pairs that are available in
Zurich’s citizenry between 1799 and 1926. In contrast to Chapter 2, I do not divide the
sample across time as the focus does not lie on changes in the level of mobility over time
but on the size and direction of bias. Every individual is categorized according to his
occupation around the age of forty with respect to both the SEP and Long-Ferrie classi-
fications.10 Some descriptive statistics on the baseline sample are provided in Table 3.1.
There are over 11,000 father-son pairs whereby one father may have several sons. Due to
8The most frequent occupations per category are: priest, physician, and engineer (higher white-collar
group), merchant, shop clerk, and innkeeper (lower white-collar group), mechanic, baker, and blacksmith
(skilled workers), and mercenary, upholsterer, and glazier (unskilled workers).
9The HISCLASS groups are distributed across occupational categories as follows: HISCLASS 1–2
(higher white-collar), HISCLASS 3–5 (lower white-collar), HISCLASS 6–7 (skilled workers), HISCLASS
9–12 (unskilled workers), and HISCLASS 8 (farmers—omitted).
10I exclude all individuals that are younger than sixteen or older than sixty-fivet at the time of obser-
vation closest to their fortieth birthday.
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the structure of the data, fathers are on average older than sons at the observed occu-
pation. There are some fathers in the early directories of citizens that are already older
than forty. Similarly, some sons are younger than forty in the last available directories.
The distribution across occupational categories is similar across the two generations.
The investigation of bias through geographic mobility requires a split of the data
according to the emigration status of individuals. In this paper, I focus on international
geographic mobility of sons. Thus, sons are divided into geographically immobile (“Stay”),
return migrants (“Return”), and emigrants (“Emigrated”). Immobile sons may move
away from the city of Zurich but remain in Switzerland. Return migrants spend some
years away from Switzerland but return thereafter. Emigrants migrate to a different
country and stay abroad. Both return migrants and emigrants may migrate repeatedly.
To shed more light on the selection of migrants, I further split the geographically mobile
group (emigrants and return migrants) by host continent (Europe, North America (NA),
South America (SA), Africa (Af), Asia (As), and Australia(Au)).11 Table 3.2 describes
the three broad migrant groups and Table 3.3 contains further details on individuals by
host.12 Roughly, 70 percent of all sons never lived abroad. The remaining 30 percent
leave the country, and just over 11 percent remain abroad (emigrants).
One has to categorize individuals at different ages in order to evaluate how the age
at classification affects estimates of intergenerational mobility. Thus, I categorize sons
according to their occupation around twenty, thirty, and forty and fathers according to
their occupation around thirty, forty, and fifty.13 Different from the baseline sample, I
only allow for a deviation from the specific classification age by five years.14 This allows to
construct mobility measures for father-son pairs for every combination of son’s and father’s
age at the observed occupation. In order not to encounter issues with comparability, I
exclude every father-son pair that lacks an observation around any of the corresponding
ages. Table 3.4 entails descriptive statistics of the resulting sample of 1,476 father-son
pairs.
11As only few individuals moved to South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia, I combine the four in
one group (SA/Af/As/Au). Migrants are categorized into more than one host continent if they migrate
repeatedly.
12Table 3B.1 in Appendix 3B splits the group emigrating to South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia.
13I choose this set of classification ages by generation to balance the remaining sample size and age
spread.
14So, an individual that is categorized around the age of forty has to be between thirty-five and forty-
five.
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Lastly, the evaluation of automated linking mechanisms requires splitting the data
into fathers and sons by ignoring the observable intergenerational link and re-matching
the two. First, I construct a “fathers sample” that contains all of the information on
the father and only the first name, last name, and year of birth of the son. Second,
I construct a “sons sample” that contains all sons as a pool of potential matches with
information on the first name, middle names, last name, year of birth, and the family’s
place of origin. Third, I employ automated linking procedures to join the fathers with
their conjectural sons. There exist many possible mechanisms to perform this kind of
record linkage (for a review, see e.g. Ruggles et al., 2018). To narrow the focus down to
two of the most promising linking methods, I follow the recommendations by Bailey et al.
(2019) and evaluate the mechanism introduced by Ferrie (1996) and the one developed by
Abramitzky et al. (2012, 2014).15 In general, both mechanisms rely on a similar procedure.
Based on first name, last name, (implied) age, and state of birth, they link individuals
across time. In order to correct for orthographic differences in the spelling of names,
both (may) employ phonetic corrections (NYSIIS, Soundex, or None)16. The basic steps
of Ferrie (1996) can be condensed as follows: (1—optional) correct names phonetically,
(2—optional) truncate first name after fourth letter, (3) match and discard if not born
in same state, (4) allow for age differences of up to two years among matches, and (5)
choose matched link with smallest difference in age. In this application, I employ the
family’s place of origin instead of state of birth and observe the year of birth rather than
the age of individuals. The procedure of Abramitzky et al. (2012) can be wrapped up as
follows: (1—optional) correct names phonetically, (2) search for exact and unique matches
with respect to specified characteristics (here: first name, last name, year of birth, place
of family origin), (3) if (2) was not successful, search for a match with one year of age
difference, and (4) repeat (3) with a bandwidth of two years. The resulting sub-samples
are described in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
15Abramitzky et al. (2014) provide their code on https://ranabr.people.stanford.edu/matching-codes.
A detailed description of the mechanisms can be found in Ferrie (1996) and Abramitzky et al. (2014).
In this paper, I employ the same code as Bailey et al. (2019) who kindly provided me with their Stata
script (Bailey and Cole, 2019).
16See e.g. Atack et al. (1992) for information on phonetic corrections.
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3.3 Results
In this section, I present the results of the main analysis that can be split into four parts:
geographic mobility (discussed in Section 3.3.1), life patterns (presented in Section 3.3.2),
linking mechanisms (summarized in Section 3.3.3), and relative size of bias (analyzed in
Section 3.3.4). In the first three parts, I will shed light on the three potential sources
of bias in detail. The fourth part provides insights into how strongly each source of
bias affects social mobility estimates compared to the others. Appendix 3A contains all
transition matrices, on which the measures of mobility are based in this section.
3.3.1 Geographic Mobility
Distribution across Occupational Categories Table 3.2 reveals differences between
migrants and non-migrants. The fathers of migrating individuals exhibit a shifted dis-
tribution across occupational categories towards higher SEP (white-collar) occupations
as compared to fathers of non-migrating individuals. This might partially be caused by
migration barriers to lower SEP individuals due to limited resources, which have been
indicated in the previous literature on intercontinental migration in the early nineteenth
century (Hatton and Williamson, 1994a; Baines, 1994; Faini and Venturini, 1994). The
migrating sons predominantly entered middle SEP (lower white-collar) occupations, ob-
taining low or high SEP (skilled and unskilled worker) occupations less often than geo-
graphically immobile sons. These results are similar to the findings for nineteenth century
Germany regarding the intermediate selection of emigrants (Wegge, 1999, 2002, 2010).
Furthermore, sons typically migrated for the first time in their mid-twenties, which is
in line with the findings of Hatton and Williamson (1994b). Interestingly, Table 3.3
suggests large differences of migrants’ occupational categories by destination continent.17
Apparently, sons with European host countries were more positively selected than those
with non-European host countries. The fathers of migrants within Europe exhibited the
largest share in higher SEP and white-collar occupations across all groups. Similarly,
the corresponding sons were even more likely to enter high SEP occupations than the
geographically immobile. This picture partially reverts for father-son pairs with sons that
migrated to North America. These individuals appear to have been negatively selected
17Table 3B.1 in Appendix 3B contains details on individuals moving to South America, Africa, Asia,
and Australia.
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with respect to the SEP they entered but were still positively selected with respect to
their fathers’ SEPs. However, the large fraction of emigrants to North America with low
SEP fathers indicates that the previously mentioned migration barriers might not have
been an issue for Zurich citizens irrespective of their SEP after all. Lastly, migrants to
South America, Africa, Asia, or Australia appear to have been intermediately selected
with respect to SEP of both the fathers and the sons. The average age at first migration
was similar across host continents with slightly higher average values for North America.18
Absolute Mobility I introduce a measure of absolute mobility, the fraction of mobile
individuals, to start the analysis of the bias in intergenerational mobility estimates due
to migration. Absolute mobility captures the experienced level of social mobility given
the occupational distribution across categories. Transition matrices pose as basis for this
measure of absolute mobility.19 They contain the absolute frequency of intergenerational
transitions between all possible categories. The fraction of mobile individuals can be
calculated by dividing the number of sons of occupational category i ∈ {1, ..., N} fathers
that enter a different occupational category ¬i by the total number of sons, where N
denotes the number of categories.20 If the absolute frequency of sons with category i
fathers who enter occupational category j (a different category ¬i) is denoted by Xij
(Xi¬i), the fraction of socially mobile individuals M is given by
M =
∑N
i=1 Xi¬i∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 Xij
=
N∑
i=1
pi¬i, (3.1)
where pij (pi¬i) denotes the probability that the son of an occupation i father enters
category j (a different category ¬i).
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 display the fraction of mobile father-son pairs by migration
status and host continent. A distinction between upward (sons move towards higher SEP,
18A full analysis of changes in the selection of migrants over the century lies beyond the scope of
this article. Especially quantifying changes in the bias by host continent becomes increasingly difficult
with finer granulation of the data across time due to small sample sizes. Splitting the data mid-century
reveals that overall geographic mobility increased substantially over the course of the century with a more
pronounced increase of intercontinental migration. Further, migrants entered middle SEP occupations
more frequently in the late than in the early nineteenth century irrespective of the host continent.
19Transition matrices also pose as foundation for many measures of relative mobility as presented
subsequently.
20With both the SEP categorization and the basic Long-Ferrie categorization N is equal to three (low,
middle, and high SEP and unskilled workers, skilled workers, and white-collar). In the extended Long-
Ferrie categorization with a distinction between higher and lower white-collar occupations N is equal to
four.
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or white-collar occupations) and downward (sons move towards lower SEP, or unskilled
workers occupations) mobility allows to analyze whether the sons that were socially mo-
bile profited from this mobility or suffered from it. Note that the distinction between
upward and downward mobility is more involved with the Long-Ferrie categorizations as
they are not meant to be interpreted in an ordinal way. Hence, I only interpret the ra-
tio of upward vs downward mobility employing the SEP categorization. The difference
in the share of mobile individuals across migration status is small in all of the applied
occupational categorizations. Shifting the focus to the continents of destination exhibits
some evidence on differential rates of mobility depending on the host country. Especially
with respect to the baseline Long-Ferrie categorization, there appears to be a difference
between individuals that emigrated to Europe and those that emigrated to North Amer-
ica. Sons migrating within Europe exhibited less intergenerational mobility than those
that migrated between Europe and Northern America. The split between upward and
downward mobility in Figure 3.1 displays that geographically immobile sons (Stay) expe-
rienced upward mobility 1.3 times more often than downward mobility, whereas this ratio
is 0.99 for emigrants. This might indicate that even if the level of absolute mobility only
differed marginally between geographically mobile and immobile individuals, there were
differences in the structure of social mobility. Apparently, sons migrating to European
countries were also positively selected with respect to the chances of upward mobility as
compared to sons that preferred North America. The former were 1.12 times more likely
to experience upward mobility vs downward mobility while this ratio was 0.63 for the
latter.21
Relative Mobility Measures of relative mobility allow to correct for the different sizes
of occupational categories in the labor market.22 Two-way log-odds ratios are one of the
easiest methods to quantify relative mobility. Log-odds ratios Θ2,i quantify the “advan-
tage” sons of category i fathers had to enter the same category vs all other categories over
sons of categories ¬i fathers. They are defined as
Θ2,i = log
[
pii/(1− pii)
p¬ii/(1− p¬ii)
]
. (3.2)
21Sons that migrated to other continents (South America, Africa, Asia, or Australia) experienced the
highest chances of upward mobility as this group exhibited a ratio of 1.46.
22See Chapter 2 for a more detailed introduction into measures of relative mobility.
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Two-way log-odds ratios by occupational category and migration status are displayed
in Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. The figures provide further evidence that focusing the analysis
of intergenerational mobility on stayers might lead to selection of socially less mobile in-
dividuals. For example, geographically immobile sons of high SEP fathers were 6.0 times
more likely to enter high SEP occupations as well vs other occupations than sons of mid-
dle or low SEP fathers. In the baseline sample including return migrants and emigrants,
this number is 4.7. Emigrating sons were only 3.5 times more likely to follow their father
into a high SEP occupation vs other occupations than emigrating sons of low or middle
SEP fathers. The Long-Ferrie categorizations produce qualitatively similar but quanti-
tatively less pronounced differences. All three categorizations reveal major differences
when splitting geographically mobile sons by destination. This provides further evidence
on heterogeneous selection of migrants by destination continent—also with respect to the
level of relative intergenerational mobility.
The two-way log-odds ratios provide evidence on differences in the level of relative
intergenerational mobility by migration status when focusing on the diagonal in transition
matrices, i.e. differntiating between father-son pairs with the same and those with different
occupational categories. The Altham (1970b) statistic allows to retrieve a more complete
analysis of the transition matrix (see also Altham and Ferrie, 2007; Long and Ferrie,
2013; Modalsli, 2015, 2017; Pe´rez, 2019).23 This statistic quantifies the distance of a
transition matrix P with dimension N from perfect mobility represented by a matrix of
ones J . Following Modalsli (2015, 2017), one can calculate (controlled) Altham statistics
by employing multinomial logistic regressions. One can regress the occupational outcome
osq of a son s in the father-son pair q on a set of dummies Dq = {D1, ..., DN} indexing
the father’s occupation and a set of control variables (such as age) Xq and estimate the
Altham statistic by aggregating the coefficient estimates of the dummies. The set of N−1
equations (indexed by k) that have to be estimated can be denoted by
log
[
Pr(osq = k)
Pr(osq = 1)
]
= αk + β
′
kDq + γ
′
kXq + k,q, k = 2, 3, ..., N, (3.3)
where αk is the estimated constant, γ
′
k are the coefficients of the controls, and β
′
k =
{β1k , ..., βN−1k } is the parameter vector of interest. The controlled Altham statistic is then
23The value of the Altham statistic lies between zero and infinity (Altham, 1970b,a). This explains
that the imputed confidence intervals are asymmetric in some incidences.
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given by
d(P, J) =
[
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
N∑
m=1
{(βij − βim)− (βlj − βlm)}2
]1/2
. (3.4)
Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 provide the resulting Altham statistics controlled for a
quadratic function of both the son’s and father’s age.24 The estimates of the Altham
statistic support the insights provided by the two-way log-odds ratios: geographically
immobile individuals were also socially less mobile. All occupational classifications agree
with respect to the direction of the bias whereas they do not regarding the size of bias.
The relatively small sample sizes when splitting geographically mobile sons by destina-
tion complicates statements about significance.25 However, there are patterns in the point
estimates. The point estimates suggest that sons migrating within Europe exhibited a
lower level of mobility than e.g. migrants to North America. Overall, the estimates of
relative mobility indicate that one might structurally underestimate the level of father-son
mobility when excluding emigrating sons from the analysis.
Correlation Coefficient The relation between fathers’ and sons’ occupations can not
only be classified by transition matrices but also by correlation coefficients of cardinal
measures. Most studies employing intergenerational correlation coefficients focus on in-
come, education, or elite status outcomes as a basis for the coefficients (see e.g. Black
and Devereux, 2011 or Clark, 2014). The cardinal measure employed in this paper is
based on occupations once again. I standardize the Historical Cambridge social interac-
tion and stratification scales (HISCAM, Lambert et al., 2013) measure associated with
each occupation’s HISCO code.26 One can regress the standardized measure of the son
(s) HISCAM stdqs in the father-son pair q on the corresponding father’s (f ) standardized
measure HISCAM stdqf according to
HISCAM stdqs = βHISCAM
std
qf + εq, (3.5)
24I provide the uncontrolled Altham statistics in Figures 3B.1–3B.3 in Appendix 3B.
25It is not possible to calculate the Altham statistic for the migrant group to South America, Africa,
Asia, and Australia when employing the extended Long-Ferrie categorization because of no transitions
from higher white-collar fathers to unskilled worker sons.
26The resulting measure has zero mean and a standard deviation of one instead of a range from 0 to
100. See also Section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
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which yields the correlation coefficient β.
The correlation coefficient by migration status is depicted in Figure 3.10. The dif-
ferences between the baseline sample and the sub-groups by migration status exhibit
the same pattern as the previous measures of relative mobility. Emigrating sons show a
lower intergenerational correlation indicating a higher level of social mobility than stayers.
As with all of the previous measures, there are differences in the level of implied social
mobility by host continent of the son. Irrespective of the host, all father-son pairs of
geographically mobile sons exhibit higher social mobility with respect to the standardized
HISCAM than father-son pairs of the baseline sample.27
Overall, the analysis of geographic mobility can be boiled down to three observations.
First, there was selection of (temporary) international migrants with respect to the oc-
cupational category of the father and the son. Fathers of geographically mobile sons
exhibited higher socioeconomic positions than those of geographically immobile, while
these migrating sons tended to attain intermediate socioeconomic positions more often
than geographically immobile. Second, this selection translates into different levels of
intergenerational mobility. Across most measures, geographically immobile sons exhib-
ited significantly lower levels of intergenerational mobility. Third, there are differences in
both selection and the implied level of social mobility across destination continents. Mi-
grants within Europe tended to be better situated than e.g. migrants to North America.
Moreover, the former experienced more upward mobility than the latter. The evidence
on the direction of differences in overall intergenerational mobility across host continents
is inconclusive.
3.3.2 Life Pattern
Distribution across Occupational Categories Table 3.4 highlights that of originally
11,384 father-son pairs merely 13 percent remain in the life pattern sample. This means
that only 1,476 father-son pairs feature categorizable observations of sons around the age
of twenty, thirty, and forty and categorizable observations of fathers around the age of
thirty, forty, and fifty. This is caused by timely death28, naturalization after a certain
27The difference is not statistically significant for sons relocating to South America, Africa, Asia, or
Australia.
28The average age at death was fifty-eight in the Zurich data.
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age29, and gaps in the observation years. The remaining father-son pairs are positively
selected as their SEPs are, on average, higher than in the baseline sample.30 Table
3.4 further shows that the fraction of middle SEP, high SEP, and (higher) white-collar
individuals increased with age whereas the share of low SEP and (un)skilled individuals
decreased with age. This upward intragenerational mobility seems natural as careers
usually start at a lower socioeconomic position than they end. Further analyses are
required to evaluate whether sample selection with respect to the age is a concern when
estimating occupational mobility.
Absolute Mobility I start the analysis of life-cycle patterns in social mobility esti-
mates with a measure of absolute mobility. The shares of (upward and downward) mobile
individuals according to all classifications are presented in Figures 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13.
Overall, there are differences in the estimates on the share of mobile ranging from 42
percent to 46 percent in the SEP categorization and from 31 (51) to 34 (54) percent in
the (extended) Long-Ferrie categorization. Nevertheless, the evidence on the direction of
the bias due to different ages at categorization of both the father and the son is incon-
clusive. On average, a higher age at classification of the son induces larger estimates of
social mobility in the SEP classification. The Long-Ferrie categorizations do not exhibit
such a monotone trend. With respect to the father’s age at classification, the Long-Ferrie
categorizations suggest (weakly) decreasing mobility whereas the SEP categorization does
not feature a monotone trend. Not surprisingly, the prevalence of upward and downward
mobility exhibits the same trend across all categorizations. The age of the father nega-
tively (positively) correlates with upward (downward) mobility. The reverse is true for
son’s age at classification. This finding is predominantly caused by individuals exhibiting
upward intragenerational mobility as is depicted in Table 3.4. If a father is ranked in a
“higher” situated occupational category when he is older, the son is less likely to experi-
ence upward mobility with respect to that position himself. Similarly, if a sons have, on
average, a lower socioeconomic position at lower ages, they are less likely to have already
entered an occupation that is “higher” ranked than the one of their fathers. In summary,
29If an individual acquires the citizenship of Zurich after the age of e.g. thirty-five, there is no infor-
mation on occupations at earlier ages, i.e. around thirty.
30This is partially caused by lower ages at death of lower SEP individuals. The average age at death for
individuals with low, middle, and high SEP as highest occupational outcome was fifty-seven, fifty-nine,
and sixty-two, respectively.
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there are differences in the estimates of absolute intergenerational mobility. Evidence on
the direction depending on the age of both the father and the son is mixed.
Relative Mobility Similar to the results on absolute mobility, the measures of relative
mobility do not show a conclusive trend with respect to the age at classification of the
father or the son. Even though the two-way log-odds ratios in Figures 3.14–3.16 exhibit
fluctuations, they do not agree on a clear pattern with respect to categorization ages. The
SEP categorization suggests that the classification age of the father affects mobility esti-
mates in a u-shaped way if sons are classified around thirty or forty and in a positive way
if sons are classified around twenty. This pattern is not mirrored in the Long-Ferrie cate-
gorizations. The Long-Ferrie categorizations do not even exhibit a homogeneous pattern
with respect to the father’s classification age across occupational categories. If anything,
they propose that sons that are categorized at younger ages exhibit lower levels of occu-
pational mobility. Apart from these observations, there is no monotone or homogeneous
pattern observable with respect to the ages at classification.
The Altham statistics do not exhibit strong trends either (see Figures 3.17–3.19).31
The Altham statistic of the SEP categorization suggests that mobility was lowest if the
sons are classified around 40 and highest if the sons are classified around 20. The point
estimates diverge more with higher ages at classification of the father. However, these
differences are statistically insignificant. The Long-Ferrie categorizations indicate only a
small effect of the age at classification of both the father and the son. All in all, measures
of relative mobility indicate that the age at classification may affect the point estimate of
intergenerational mobility estimates, but they do not exhibit a clear trend in the direction
of the deviations.
Correlation Coefficient Interestingly, the correlation coefficient of the standardized
HISCAM measure depicts (insignificant) trends in both father’s and son’s age at clas-
sification. Figure 3.20 hints at a negative correlation of intergenerational mobility with
both the father’s and the son’s categorization age.32 There are several potential expla-
nations for these patterns. First, occupations at later ages might be more representative
of the lifetime occupational potential. This explanation would imply that life-cycle bias
31Estimates of the uncontrolled Altham statistics are presented in Figures 3B.4–3B.6 in Appendix 3B
32The trend in the son’s age at classification mirrors the trend suggested by the SEP-based Altham
statistic.
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might, in fact, be a concern when estimating occupational mobility with the HISCAM
correlation coefficient. Second, the older the father at the age of classification the closer
the son was to an actual occupational choice. Whether this choice was made by him
(positively influenced by father) or arranged by the father could not be investigated with
the data at hand. Third, the older the son the more likely the father was to be deceased.
Consequently, especially sons of self-employed fathers might have inherited the father’s
business. All of these hypotheses are possible explanations for the observed trends but
cannot be tested with the data at hand. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient is the
only measure of occupational mobility exhibiting such clear and monotone trends with
respect to the classification ages. Hence, the evidence on the direction of bias due to
life-cycle patterns is inconclusive.
3.3.3 Linking Procedures
Performance and Distribution across Occupational Categories In this section,
I present the results from applying automated linking procedures to the artificially sep-
arated father-son data. Table 3.7 contains an evaluation of the linking procedures. The
match rates are very high at between 77 and 95 percent correct matches. Similarly, the
share of type I errors (wrongly linked father-son pairs) is negligible with values below
three per mille. The procedure of Ferrie (1996) produces marginally higher rates of type
I errors and does not exhibit strong differences across phonetic name cleaning methods.
The highest match rate both with respect to total and correct matches and lowest rate
of type I error is achieved with the procedure by Abramitzky et al. (2012, 2014) with
Soundex name cleaning. Not surprisingly, Bailey et al. (2019) find much higher error
rates. Their estimates for the match rate (1 – type II error rate) lie between 20 and
40 percent for the same procedures. Similarly, they find a share of type I errors (false
positives) between 22 and 43 percent. This depicts nicely that the sample I employ in this
paper is not representative as the pool for potential matches is small and easily separable
with respect to the linking characteristics (name, year of birth, place of origin).33 Con-
sequently, the conclusions from this paper can only be extended to the performance of
linking mechanisms in data with similar quality and quantity. Still, it is interesting to gain
33In other words, there have to be two individuals in the pool of potential son matches with very similar
names, year of birth, and exact same place of family origin to induce type I and II errors. As there is no
misspelling in names nor errors in the year of birth, the automated linking procedures perform neatly.
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first insights into performance differences when several linking procedures are employed
to such detailed ground truth data.34
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that the high match rates and small fraction of false links
translate into small differences with respect to the distribution across occupational cate-
gories and average age. Apparently, middle SEP and (lower) white-collar individuals were
more likely to be matched both among fathers and sons. This skews the occupational dis-
tribution marginally in that direction. Similarly, younger individuals were matched more
frequently. Nevertheless, the deviations are minimal (especially compared to the results
from Bailey et al., 2019). Based on these findings, one would not expect that any of the
intergenerational mobility estimates is significantly biased in the linked samples.
Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility As the solid performance of all automated
linking procedures suggests, none of the measures of absolute and relative mobility exhibit
large nor significant bias as compared to the baseline sample. Interestingly, employing
Ferrie (1996) without name cleaning gets closest to the baseline sample with respect to
mobility estimates even though it is outperformed with respect to match rates and false
matches by Abramitzky et al. (2012, 2014) with Soundex name cleaning. Figures 3.21,
3.22, and 3.23 show that the share of mobile individuals is stable across mechanisms.
There are minor differences with respect to the prevalence of upward vs downward mo-
bility. The linked samples are somewhat more likely to contain upward mobile father-son
pairs.
The two-way log-odds ratios depicted in Figures 3.24–3.26 point out minor differences
too. Most linking mechanisms estimate higher log-odds ratios for the groups of high SEP
and unskilled workers, whereas they estimate lower odds ratios for skilled workers and
the lower white-collar group. Again, these differences are small. For example, the base-
line estimate suggests that sons of high SEP fathers were 5.20 times more likely to enter
the same occupational category vs another category than sons of low or middle SEP fa-
thers. The corresponding estimate in the Abramitzky (NYSIIS) sample lies close at 5.45.
Aggregating all log-odds ratios into the Altham statistic does not change the picture.
Figures 3.27–3.29 depict that the point estimates vary somewhat but are always close to
34In this paper, I do not artificially impair the data to analyze the effect on performance as any
impariment would induce the data to be simulated. This would undermine the motivation to evaluate
linking procedures with the high-quality Zuirch data with observable father-son pairs.
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the baseline estimate.35 The occupational categorizations do not agree with respect to
the direction of the bias based on the point estimates. The SEP categorization and the
extended Long-Ferrie classification imply that linked samples marginally underestimate
mobility whereas the three-category Long-Ferrie classification points towards overestima-
tion of mobility in linked samples. Finally, the HISCAM correlation coefficient (Figure
3.30) further solidifies the impression that the employed linking procedures do not lead
to significantly biased estimates of intergenerational mobility in the data at hand as the
point estimates are virtually the same across all samples.
3.3.4 Relative Size of Bias
In this section, I evaluate the relative size of bias due to the three different sources. The
previous sections have already lined out that one should expect migration to have the
largest or at least most consistent impact. The expectation on the impact of different
classification ages is unclear whereas automated linking procedures should not exhibit
relatively large deviations. Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 display the direction of the bias due
to each source and the relative size in percent of the baseline sample’s estimate for all
of the employed measures of intergenerational mobility. Figure 3.31 depicts the results
for the correlation coefficient based on HISCAM to provide a representative graphical
illustration. In order to boil down the results from the previous sections, I only present
the bias in selected sub-samples. Namely, I compare all estimates of six samples: (1)
the baseline sample including all father-son pairs, (2) the sample with geographically
immobile sons36, (3) the linked sample employing the procedure of Ferrie (1996) without
name cleaning, and (4)–(6) three combinations of father’s and son’s age at classification
(son at twenty and father at fifty (4), both at forty (5), and son at forty and father
at thirty (6)). Note that the estimated level of mobility in the last three sub-samples
are not as easily comparable to the baseline sample as the former two. Of course, one
can see which of the selected ages produce estimates closest to the baseline sample but
I excluded all father-son pairs that were not observable at all ages in these sub-samples.
Consequently, comparing the three with each other gives better insights in the relative
size of the bias.
35The uncontrolled Altham statistics are presented in Appendix 3B (Figures 3B.7–3B.9).
36This poses as direct comparison to the most prevalent scenario in the existing literature on social
mobility, as most analyses are restricted to the non-migrating population.
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The results suggest that restricting the sample to geographically immobile individuals
consistently biases the estimate of intergenerational mobility downwards by between 1
and 10 percent. The bias due to employing linking procedures is comparably negligible.
It is between four and eighty-five times smaller than the migration bias and never exceeds
1 percent of the baseline estimate. The life pattern estimates differ substantially from
the baseline sample as well. These differences between the life pattern samples and the
baseline sample are both due to sample selection (excluding all individuals not observable
at every age) and differences in the level of social mobility caused by differences in age.
Consequently, the comparison with the other sources of bias is to be taken with a grain of
salt. Comparing the three life pattern samples among each other seems more appropriate.
This comparison reveals that the deviations between the three samples’ estimates usually
range up to 10 percent of the baseline sample. This suggests that the relative size of bias
due to life patterns may be roughly comparable to the relative size of migration bias.
However, there is no apparent ordering of the three classification age combinations across
different occupational categorizations or measures of mobility.
All in all, the results on bias due to each of the three sources can be summarized
as follows. Firstly, narrowing the analysis down to geographically immobile individuals
underestimates the level of intergenerational mobility with deviations between 1 and 10
percent (depending on the measure of mobility). Secondly, life patterns or the age at
classification affect the estimated level of occupational mobility but the results are incon-
clusive with respect to trends, direction, and relative size of the bias. Thirdly, automated
linking procedures do not generate significant bias in social mobility estimates in the data
base of Zurich’s male citizenry in the nineteenth century.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature related to the topic of intergen-
erational mobility such as migration, life-cycle bias, and record linkage by employing data
on Zurich’s citizenry between 1799 and 1926. The data are unique because they contain
observable intergenerational links, and allow to track individuals over the course of their
lives and to follow them after emigration. These features enable me to evaluate potential
biases in estimates of social mobility. I explore the direction and size of distortions due to
the following sources: (1) migration, (2) life-cycle patterns in occupational outcomes, and
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(3) record linkage. Each bias can be set into relation in order to highlight where future
research has to be particularly careful. In addition, the analysis is based on a broad set
of measures for absolute and relative occupational mobility.
The results can be boiled down to four main findings. First, emigrants were interme-
diately selected with differences by country of destination. Zurich emigrants to European
countries were more positively selected as compared to emigrants to the United States
and Canada in the nineteenth century. Second, Zurich citizens exhibited an occupational
life pattern indicating that individuals experienced non-negligible levels of intragenera-
tional (upward) mobility. The older a male citizen was the higher his socioeconomic
position. Third, state-of-the-art record linkage procedures perform well due to the detail
of information and the small size of the populations to match. On average, around 85
percent of father-son pairs could be matched and less than three per mille of matches
were wrongly assigned. Fourth, excluding emigrating individuals underestimates the level
of social mobility of all father-son pairs by an average of 4 percent. Life patterns in the
occupational distribution affect estimates of intergenerational mobility on a comparable
scale but do not exhibit a monotone pattern with respect to age of the father or the son.
Due to their neat performance, linking procedures do not induce social mobility estimates
to deviate significantly from “true” estimates in non-linked data. Consequently, future
research should aim at addressing all of the raised issues depending on the quality and
number of the data at hand.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1. Share of (upward and downward) mobile according to SEP categories by
migration status.
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Note: The height of the bars displays the share of mobile sons that did not enter the same
occupational category as their father (off-diagonal in the transition matrices). Upward mobile
individuals enter higher SEP than their father. The numbers above the bars denote the ratio
of upward to downward mobility. The dashed horizontal line marks the share of mobile in the
baseline sample (All). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically
mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
Figure 3.2. Share of (upward and downward) mobile according to Long-Ferrie
categories by migration status.
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Note: The height of the bars displays the share of mobile sons that did not enter the same
occupational category as their father (off-diagonal in the transition matrices). Upward mobility
denotes individuals that move closer to white-collar occupations. The numbers above the bars
denote the ratio of upward to downward mobility. The dashed horizontal line marks the share
of mobile in the baseline sample (All). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are
geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
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Figure 3.3. Share of (upward and downward) mobile according to extended
Long-Ferrie categories by migration status.
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Note: The height of the bars displays the share of mobile sons that did not enter the same
occupational category as their father (off-diagonal in the transition matrices). Upward mobility
denotes individuals that move closer to higher white-collar occupations. The numbers above the
bars denote the ratio of upward to downward mobility. The dashed horizontal line marks the
share of mobile in the baseline sample (All). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line
are geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
Figure 3.4. Two-way log-odds ratios according to SEP categories by migration status.
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Note: The dashed lines denote the levels of the log-odds ratios in the baseline sample (All, color-
coded). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically mobile (Return
and Emigrated) split by destination.
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Figure 3.5. Two-way log-odds ratios according to Long-Ferrie categories by migration
status.
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Note: The dashed lines denote the levels of the log-odds ratios in the baseline sample (All, color-
coded). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically mobile (Return
and Emigrated) split by destination.
Figure 3.6. Two-way log-odds ratios according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by
migration status.
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Note: The dashed lines denote the levels of the log-odds ratios in the baseline sample (All, color-
coded). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically mobile (Return
and Emigrated) split by destination.
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Figure 3.7. Altham statistic according to SEP categories by migration status.
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Note: This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the father’s
and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed)
for the baseline sample (All). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are
geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
Figure 3.8. Altham statistic according to Long-Ferrie categories by migration status.
4
6
8
10
A
lth
am
 s
ta
tis
tic
All Stay Return Emigrated Europe NA SA/Af/As/Au 
Note: This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the father’s
and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed)
for the baseline sample (All). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are
geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
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Figure 3.9. Altham statistic according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by
migration status.
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Note: This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the father’s
and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed)
for the baseline sample (All). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are
geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
Figure 3.10. Correlation coefficient of the standardized HISCAM measure by
migration status.
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Note: The solid (dashed) horizontal line represents the estimate (confidence intervals) for the
baseline sample (All). The groups to the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically
mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by destination.
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Figure 3.17. Altham statistic according to SEP categories by age at classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color coded, the father’s age at classification is on
the x-axis. This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the
father’s and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals
(dashed) of the 40-40 sample (both son and father categorized at age 40). Confidence intervals
are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
Figure 3.18. Altham statistic according to Long-Ferrie categories by age at
classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color coded, the father’s age at classification is on
the x-axis. This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the
father’s and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals
(dashed) of the 40-40 sample (both son and father categorized at age 40). Confidence intervals
are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Figure 3.19. Altham statistic according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by age at
classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color coded, the father’s age at classification is on
the x-axis. This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the
father’s and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals
(dashed) of the 40-40 sample (both son and father categorized at age 40). Confidence intervals
are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
Figure 3.20. Correlation coefficient of the standardized HISCAM measure by age at
classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color coded, the father’s age at classification is on
the x-axis. The solid (dashed) horizontal line represents the estimate (confidence intervals) of
the 40-40 sample (both son and father categorized at age 40).
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Figure 3.21. Share of (upward and downward) mobile according to SEP categories by
linking procedure.
1.15 1.23 1.22 1.17 1.21 1.21 1.21
0
10
20
30
40
50
S
ha
re
 o
f M
ob
ile
 [p
ct
]
True Ferrie (NY) Ferrie (SX) Ferrie (NN) Abramitzky (NY) Abramitzky (SX) Abramitzky (NN)
Downward Upward
Note: The height of the bars displays the share of mobile sons that did not enter the same
occupational category as their father (off-diagonal in the transition matrices). Upward mobile
individuals enter higher SEP than their father. The numbers above the bars denote the ratio
of upward to downward mobility. The horizontal line marks the share of mobile in the baseline
sample (True).
Figure 3.22. Share of (upward and downward) mobile according to Long-Ferrie
categories by linking procedure.
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Note: The height of the bars displays the share of mobile sons that did not enter the same
occupational category as their father (off-diagonal in the transition matrices). Upward mobility
denotes individuals that move closer to white-collar occupations. The numbers above the bars
denote the ratio of upward to downward mobility. The horizontal line marks the share of mobile
in the baseline sample (True).
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Figure 3.23. Share of (upward and downward) mobile according to extended
Long-Ferrie categories by linking procedure.
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Note: The height of the bars displays the share of mobile sons that did not enter the same
occupational category as their father (off-diagonal in the transition matrices). Upward mobility
denotes individuals that move closer to higher white-collar occupations. The numbers above the
bars denote the ratio of upward to downward mobility. The horizontal line marks the share of
mobile in the baseline sample (True).
Figure 3.24. Two-way log-odds ratios according to SEP categories by linking
procedure.
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Note: The dashed lines denote the level of the log-odds ratios in the baseline sample (color-coded,
True).
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Figure 3.25. Two-way log-odds ratios according to Long-Ferrie categories by linking
procedure.
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Note: The dashed lines denote the level of the log-odds ratios in the baseline sample (color-coded,
True).
Figure 3.26. Two-way log-odds ratios according to extended Long-Ferrie categories
by linking procedure.
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Note: The dashed lines denote the level of the log-odds ratios in the baseline sample (color-coded,
True).
Figure 3.27. Altham statistic according to SEP categories by linking procedure.
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Note: This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the father’s
and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed)
for the baseline sample (True). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
124
Figure 3.28. Altham statistic according to Long-Ferrie categories by linking
procedure.
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Note: This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the father’s
and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed)
for the baseline sample (True). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
Figure 3.29. Altham statistic according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by linking
procedure.
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Note: This figure contains the Altham statistic controlled for a quadratic function of the father’s
and the son’s age. The horizontal lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed)
for the baseline sample (True). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Figure 3.30. Correlation coefficient of the standardized HISCAM measure by linking
procedure.
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Note: The solid (dashed) horizontal line represents the estimate (confidence intervals) for the
baseline sample (“True”).
Figure 3.31. Relative size of bias with the standardized HISCAM measure.
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Note: The solid horizontal line represents 0 percent bias (baseline sample). The vertical dashed
line separates migration and linking procedure as sources of bias on the left-hand side from
life pattern differences on the right-hand side. The dashed gray horizontal line marks the level
of bias when only including father-son pairs within a five year range around the age of 40.
Stay denotes the sample with geographically immobile sons. Ferrie (None) is the linked sample
employing Ferrie (1996) without name cleaning. LP is short for life pattern. These samples
include father-son pairs that contain information at every age between 20 and 40 (son) and 30
and 50 (father). LP (Sx/Fy) classifies the LP father-son pairs around the age of x (son) and y
(father).
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics of the baseline sample.
Characteristic Son Father
Number of observations 11,384
Age 35.53 47.17
Low SEP [pct] 37.87 40.72
Middle SEP [pct] 46.56 42.33
High SEP [pct] 15.57 16.95
Unskilled workers [pct] 11.47 14.25
Skilled workers [pct] 24.40 25.39
White-collar [pct] 64.13 60.36
Lower managers [pct] 39.81 33.01
Higher managers [pct] 24.32 27.35
Note: The number of observations refers to the number of father-son pairs. Age is the age
at observed occupation closest to forty. The remainder of the table describes the distri-
bution across occupational classes in percent. Lower managers and higher managers are
encompassed in the white-collar group.
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of father-son pairs by migration status.
Characteristic Stay Return Emigrated
Number of observations 8,002 2,126 1,256
Age 35.25 37.21 34.60
Age at Migration 25.50 26.23
Low SEP [pct] 38.54 39.42 30.94
Middle SEP [pct] 44.93 46.84 56.56
High SEP [pct] 16.53 13.75 12.50
Unskilled workers [pct] 12.28 10.12 8.64
Skilled workers [pct] 24.41 26.80 20.23
White-collar [pct] 63.31 63.08 71.13
Lower managers [pct] 38.12 39.42 51.21
Higher managers [pct] 25.18 23.66 19.92
Age (f) 48.47 44.59 44.19
Low SEP [pct] (f) 42.42 37.27 35.31
Middle SEP [pct] (f) 41.81 43.18 44.33
High SEP [pct] (f) 15.77 19.55 20.36
Unskilled workers [pct] (f) 15.52 11.12 11.20
Skilled workers [pct] (f) 25.84 25.66 22.03
White-collar [pct] (f) 58.63 63.22 66.77
Lower managers [pct] (f) 32.23 33.71 36.87
Higher managers [pct] (f) 26.41 29.51 29.90
Note: The number of observations refers to the number of father-son pairs by migration
status. Age is the age at observed occupation closest to forty. Age at Migration denotes
the sons’ age at first migration. The remainder of the table describes the distribution across
occupational classes in percent. Lower managers and higher managers are encompassed in
the white-collar group. Tables 3.3 and 3B.1 split the migrants by destination. Rows with an
(f) capture the values for the fathers, those without an (f) capture the values for the sons.
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of father-son pairs by destination continent.
Characteristic Europe NA SA/Af/As/Au
Number of observations 2,088 453 315
Age 36.46 36.44 35.23
Age at Migration 26.29 27.10 25.91
Low SEP [pct] 21.23 40.85 21.91
Middle SEP [pct] 61.59 51.49 69.14
High SEP [pct] 17.19 7.66 8.95
Unskilled workers [pct] 5.27 9.81 5.03
Skilled workers [pct] 14.36 29.21 14.47
White-collar [pct] 80.37 60.98 80.50
Lower managers [pct] 51.93 46.70 67.92
Higher managers [pct] 28.44 14.29 12.58
Age (f) 44.51 43.71 44.69
Low SEP [pct] (f) 27.70 38.40 34.12
Middle SEP [pct] (f) 49.63 41.91 49.26
High SEP [pct] (f) 22.68 19.69 16.62
Unskilled workers [pct] (f) 8.55 13.14 11.90
Skilled workers [pct] (f) 18.36 24.71 21.13
White-collar [pct] (f) 73.08 62.16 66.96
Lower managers [pct] (f) 39.53 32.75 40.77
Higher managers [pct] (f) 33.55 29.41 26.19
Note: The number of observations refers to the number of father-son pairs by destination
continent. Note that one father-son pair may be included in more than one sub-sample
because of multiple migration. Age is the age at observed occupation closest to forty. Age at
Migration denotes the sons’ age at first migration. The remainder of the table describes the
distribution across occupational classes in percent. Lower managers and higher managers
are encompassed in the white-collar group. Table 3B.1 splits the SA/Af/As/Au sample in
separate parts (South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia). Rows with an (f) capture the
values for the fathers, those without an (f) capture the values for the sons.
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Table 3.4. Descriptive statistics by age at classification.
Characteristic 20 30 40 50
Number of ovservations 1,476
Age 20.30 30.31 39.95
Low SEP [pct] 36.86 32.99 28.66
Middle SEP [pct] 44.38 50.75 53.12
High SEP [pct] 18.77 16.26 18.22
Unskilled workers [pct] 7.04 7.11 7.25
Skilled workers [pct] 28.22 24.07 19.63
White-collar [pct] 64.74 68.82 73.12
Lower managers [pct] 42.22 42.93 44.26
Higher managers [pct] 22.52 25.90 28.85
Age (f) 30.60 40.29 50.01
Low SEP [pct] (f) 37.20 34.82 32.72
Middle SEP [pct] (f) 41.12 42.07 42.55
High SEP [pct] (f) 21.68 23.10 24.73
Unskilled workers [pct] (f) 10.27 9.22 7.53
Skilled workers [pct] (f) 27.73 25.97 24.77
White-collar [pct] (f) 62.00 64.81 67.70
Lower managers [pct] (f) 33.99 34.34 34.27
Higher managers [pct] (f) 28.01 30.47 33.43
Note: The numbers in the columns refer to the approximate age at which I classify the
occupations of individuals. The number of observations refers to the number of father-son
pairs. Age is the age at observed occupation closest to 20, 30, 40, or 50. The remainder of
the table describes the distribution across occupational classes in percent. Lower managers
and higher managers are encompassed in the white-collar group. Rows with an (f) capture
the values for the fathers, those without an (f) capture the values for the sons.
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Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics by linking mechanism.
Mechanism Nobs Gen Age L [pct] M [pct] H [pct]
Ferrie (NYSIIS) 9,492
Son 34.55 37.59 47.93 14.48
Father 47.00 41.58 42.99 15.43
Ferrie (Soundex) 9,473
Son 34.54 37.55 47.94 14.50
Father 47.00 41.56 43.00 15.44
Ferrie (None) 9,492
Son 34.55 37.59 47.93 14.48
Father 47.00 41.58 42.99 15.43
Abramitzky (NYSIIS) 8,950
Son 34.21 37.74 48.22 14.05
Father 47.10 41.85 43.30 14.85
Abramitzky (Soundex) 10,806
Son 35.42 37.87 46.78 15.36
Father 47.08 40.97 42.38 16.65
Abramitzky (None) 8,979
Son 34.21 37.74 48.24 14.02
Father 47.07 41.81 43.30 14.89
Note: Mechanism denotes the linking mechanism employed. The number of observations
(Nobs) refers to the number of father-son pairs (matches). Gen refers to generation and
denotes whether the captured values are for fathers or sons. Age is the age at observed
occupation closest to forty. L, M, and H are the fraction of individuals with low, middle,
and high SEP occupations, respectively. The distribution across Long-Ferrie categories is
displayed in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6. Descriptive statistics by linking mechanism—distribution across Long-Ferrie
categories.
Mechanism Gen U [pct] S [pct] W [pct] LW [pct] HW [pct]
Ferrie (NYSIIS)
Son 11.53 23.80 64.66 41.19 23.47
Father 14.55 25.83 59.62 34.24 25.38
Ferrie (Soundex)
Son 11.54 23.74 64.72 41.23 23.48
Father 14.55 25.77 59.67 34.27 25.40
Ferrie (None)
Son 11.53 23.80 64.66 41.19 23.47
Father 14.55 25.83 59.62 34.24 25.38
Abramitzky (NYSIIS)
Son 11.53 23.86 64.61 41.39 23.22
Father 14.70 25.87 59.44 34.48 24.96
Abramitzky (Soundex)
Son 11.53 24.24 64.24 40.03 24.21
Father 14.34 25.46 60.20 33.33 26.87
Abramitzky (None)
Son 11.54 23.84 64.62 41.41 23.21
Father 14.67 25.86 59.48 34.47 25.00
Note: Mechanism denotes the linking mechanism employed. The number of observations
and average age is displayed in Table 3.5. Gen refers to generation and denotes whether the
captured values are for fathers or sons. U, S, W, LW, and HW are the fraction of individuals
in the occupational group of unskilled workers, skilled workers, white-collar, lower managers,
and higher managers.
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Table 3.7. Evaluation of linking procedures.
Procedure Nobs Matches Correct Type I
Ferrie (NYSIIS)
12,791
10,551 (82.49) 10,548 (82.46) 2.84
Ferrie (Soundex) 10,526 (82.29) 10,523 (82.27) 2.85
Ferrie (None) 10,551 (82.49) 10,548 (82.46) 2.84
Abramitzky (NYSIIS) 9,922 (77.57) 9,920 (77.55) 2.02
Abramitzky (Soundex) 12,082 (94.46) 12,080 (94.44) 1.66
Abramitzky (None) 9,955 (77.83) 9,953 (77.81) 2.01
Note: Procedure denotes the linking mechanism employed. Nobs denotes the number of
observations in the baseline sample (without excluding farmers). Matches is the absolute
number of matched father-son pairs (share of total observations [pct] in brackets). Correct
is the absolute number of correct matches (share of total observations [pct] in brackets
corresponding to 1 – type II error rate). Type I is the share of type I errors per mille.
Table 3.8. Relative size of bias—SEP classification.
Sample M IC AS Θ2,1 Θ2,2 Θ2,3
Baseline 0.43 0.36 9.44 1.57 1.03 1.63
Stay -1.37 5.97 10.05 0.59 1.95 10.42
Ferrie (None) -0.27 -0.04 0.59 0.10 0.53 0.12
LP (S20/F50) 2.76 -11.14 -14.53 11.98 10.20 -22.24
LP (S40/F40) 1.05 -3.31 -3.14 17.39 11.13 -16.57
LP (S40/F30) 4.01 -14.32 -6.12 13.80 0.59 -21.95
Note: Baseline marks the estimates of the mobility measures in the baseline sample. Stay
denotes the sample of geographically immobile sons. Ferrie (None) is the linked sample
employing Ferrie (1996) without name cleaning. LP is short for life pattern. These samples
include father-son pairs that contain information at every age between 20 and 40 (son) and
30 and 50 (father). LP (Sx/Fy) classifies the LP father-son pairs around the age of x (son)
and y (father). M is the share of mobile individuals, IC is the intergenerational correlation
coefficient based on HISCAM, AS the controlled Altham statistic, and Θ2,x the two-way
log-odds ratio of category x ∈ {1, 2, 3} corresponding to low, middle, and high SEP. The
relative size of the deviation is denoted in percent of the baseline.
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Table 3.9. Relative size of bias—Long-Ferrie classification.
Sample M IC AS Θ2,1 Θ2,2 Θ2,3
Baseline 0.37 0.36 7.49 1.43 1.35 1.58
Stay 1.59 5.97 3.85 3.46 -0.37 1.36
Ferrie (None) 0.05 -0.04 0.59 0.75 0.08 0.09
LP (S20/F50) -13.35 -11.14 4.83 8.02 22.32 4.90
LP (S40/F40) -13.54 -3.31 4.37 3.33 14.91 8.94
LP (S40/F30) -9.41 -14.32 2.88 0.99 13.67 6.76
Note: Baseline marks the estimates of the mobility measures in the baseline sample. Stay
denotes the sample of geographically immobile sons. Ferrie (None) is the linked sample
employing Ferrie (1996) without name cleaning. LP is short for life pattern. These samples
include father-son pairs that contain information at every age between 20 and 40 (son) and
30 and 50 (father). LP (Sx/Fy) classifies the LP father-son pairs around the age of x (son)
and y (father). M is the share of mobile individuals, IC is the intergenerational correlation
coefficient based on HISCAM, AS the controlled Altham statistic, and Θ2,x the two-way
log-odds ratio of category x ∈ {1, 2, 3} corresponding to unskilled, skilled, and white-collar
workers. The relative size of the deviation is denoted in percent of the baseline.
Table 3.10. Relative size of bias—extended Long-Ferrie classification.
Sample M IC AS Θ2,1 Θ2,2 Θ2,3 Θ2,4
Baseline 0.54 0.36 15.82 1.43 1.35 0.98 1.40
Stay -0.56 5.97 5.47 3.46 -0.37 1.06 7.99
Ferrie (None) -0.05 -0.04 0.27 0.75 0.08 0.72 -1.00
LP (S20/F50) -4.07 -11.14 -6.67 8.02 22.32 9.65 -13.95
LP (S40/F40) -2.77 -3.31 -4.11 3.33 14.91 12.58 -20.64
LP (S40/F30) -0.55 -14.32 -5.57 0.99 13.67 7.96 -27.52
Note: Baseline marks the estimates of the mobility measures in the baseline sample. Stay
denotes the sample of geographically immobile sons. Ferrie (None) is the linked sample
employing Ferrie (1996) without name cleaning. LP is short for life pattern. These samples
include father-son pairs that contain information at every age between 20 and 40 (son) and
30 and 50 (father). LP (Sx/Fy) classifies the LP father-son pairs around the age of x (son)
and y (father). M is the share of mobile individuals, IC is the intergenerational correlation
coefficient based on HISCAM, AS the controlled Altham statistic, and Θ2,x the two-way log-
odds ratio of category x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} corresponding to unskilled, skilled, lower, and higher
white-collar workers. The relative size of the deviation is denoted in percent of the baseline.
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Appendix
3A Transition Matrices
This section contains all transition matrices referred to in the main section of this chapter.
Table 3A.1. Transition matrices of SEP—baseline sample.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,764 1,138 405 4,307
middle SEP (M) 1,610 2,946 753 5,309
high SEP (H) 309 731 728 1,768
Row sum 4,683 4,815 1,886 11,384
Note: The baseline sample conveys all father-son pairs available in the data.
Table 3A.2. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—baseline sample.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 5,199 1,226 681 7,106
Skilled Workers (S) 957 1,269 477 2,703
Unskilled Workers (U) 464 335 449 1,248
Row sum 6,620 2,830 1,607 11,057
Note: The baseline sample conveys all father-son pairs available in the data.
Table 3A.3. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—baseline sample.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 1,341 793 382 182 2,698
Lower Managers (L) 1,037 2,028 844 499 4,408
Skilled Workers (S) 414 543 1,269 477 2,703
Unskilled Workers (U) 187 277 335 449 1,248
Row sum 2,979 3,641 2,830 1,607 11,057
Note: The baseline sample conveys all father-son pairs available in the data.
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Table 3A.4. Transition matrices of SEP—by geographic mobility.
(a). Stayers (geographically immobile).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,030 799 250 3,079
middle SEP (M) 1,161 1,999 441 3,601
high SEP (H) 241 537 544 1,322
Row sum 3,432 3,335 1,235 8,002
(b). Return migrants.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 502 231 105 838
middle SEP (M) 256 564 180 1,000
high SEP (H) 44 125 119 288
Row sum 802 920 404 2,126
(C.) Emigrants.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 232 108 50 390
middle SEP (M) 193 383 132 708
high SEP (H) 24 69 65 158
Row sum 449 560 247 1,256
Note: The sample name refers to the emigration status of the son in the father-son pair.
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Table 3A.5. Transition matrices of SEP—migrants by destination.
(a). Europe.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 237 143 68 448
middle SEP (M) 304 739 241 1,284
high SEP (H) 45 159 152 356
Row sum 586 1,041 461 2,088
(b). North America.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 107 53 25 185
middle SEP (M) 59 126 48 233
high SEP (H) 8 13 14 35
Row sum 174 192 87 453
(c). South America, Africa, Asia, or Australia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 42 19 8 69
middle SEP (M) 63 129 27 219
high SEP (H) 4 12 11 27
Row sum 109 160 46 315
Note: These tables only contain father-son pairs with geographically mobile sons. The
sample name refers to the destination continent(s).
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Table 3A.6. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—by geographic mobility.
(a). Stayers (geographically immobile).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 3,530 871 509 4,910
Skilled Workers (S) 637 898 358 1,893
Unskilled Workers (U) 325 243 366 934
Row sum 4,492 2,012 1,233 7,737
(b). Return migrants.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 998 219 101 1,318
Skilled Workers (S) 217 265 75 557
Unskilled Workers (U) 92 59 58 209
Row sum 1,307 543 234 2,084
(c). Emigrants.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 671 136 71 878
Skilled Workers (S) 103 106 44 253
Unskilled Workers (U) 47 33 25 105
Row sum 821 275 140 1,236
Note: The sample name refers to the emigration status of the son in the father-son pair.
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Table 3A.7. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—migrants by destination.
(a). Europe.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 1,305 228 111 1,644
Skilled Workers (S) 130 128 41 299
Unskilled Workers (U) 53 27 27 107
Row sum 1,488 383 179 2,050
(b). North America.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 204 44 25 273
Skilled Workers (S) 54 55 23 132
Unskilled Workers (U) 24 10 10 44
Row sum 282 109 58 449
(c). South America, Africa, Asia, or Australia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 184 40 23 247
Skilled Workers (S) 17 20 8 45
Unskilled Workers (U) 6 6 4 16
Row sum 207 66 35 308
Note: These tables only contain father-son pairs with geographically mobile sons. The
sample name refers to the destination continent(s).
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Table 3A.8. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—by geographic
mobility.
(a). Stayers (geographically immobile).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 976 554 280 147 1,957
Lower Managers (L) 657 1,343 591 362 2,953
Skilled Workers (S) 257 380 898 358 1,893
Unskilled Workers (U) 126 199 243 366 934
Row sum 2,016 2,476 2,012 1,233 7,737
(b). Return migrants.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 239 156 75 22 492
Lower Managers (L) 222 381 144 79 826
Skilled Workers (S) 100 117 265 75 557
Unskilled Workers (U) 43 49 59 58 209
Row sum 604 703 543 234 2,084
(c). Emigrants.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 126 83 27 13 249
Lower Managers (L) 158 304 109 58 629
Skilled Workers (S) 57 46 106 44 253
Unskilled Workers (U) 18 29 33 25 105
Row sum 359 462 275 140 1,236
Note: The sample name refers to the emigration status of the son in the father-son pair.
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Table 3A.9. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—migrants by
destination.
(a). Europe.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 300 190 72 22 584
Lower Managers (L) 278 537 156 89 1,060
Skilled Workers (S) 67 63 128 41 299
Unskilled Workers (U) 29 24 27 27 107
Row sum 674 814 383 179 2,050
(b). North America.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 28 17 9 9 63
Lower Managers (L) 63 96 35 16 210
Skilled Workers (S) 26 28 55 23 132
Unskilled Workers (U) 11 13 10 10 44
Row sum 128 154 109 58 449
(c). South America, Africa, Asia, or Australia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 21 16 2 0 39
Lower Managers (L) 47 100 38 23 208
Skilled Workers (S) 7 10 20 8 45
Unskilled Workers (U) 1 5 6 4 16
Row sum 76 131 66 35 308
Note: These tables only contain father-son pairs with geographically mobile sons. The
sample name refers to the destination continent(s).
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Table 3A.10. Transition matrices of SEP—by age at classification.
(a). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 350 121 73 544
middle SEP (M) 151 379 125 655
high SEP (H) 48 107 122 277
Row sum 549 607 320 1,476
(b). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 331 130 83 544
middle SEP (M) 139 383 133 655
high SEP (H) 44 108 125 277
Row sum 514 621 341 1,476
(c). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 310 146 88 544
middle SEP (M) 129 378 148 655
high SEP (H) 44 104 129 277
Row sum 483 628 365 1,476
(d). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 312 107 68 487
middle SEP (M) 197 411 141 749
high SEP (H) 40 89 111 240
Row sum 549 607 320 1,476
(e). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 299 110 78 487
middle SEP (M) 179 424 146 749
high SEP (H) 36 87 117 240
Row sum 514 621 341 1,476
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(f). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 284 127 76 487
middle SEP (M) 164 418 167 749
high SEP (H) 35 83 122 240
Row sum 483 628 365 1,476
(g). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 283 85 55 423
middle SEP (M) 221 412 151 784
high SEP (H) 45 110 114 269
Row sum 549 607 320 1,476
(h). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 275 87 61 423
middle SEP (M) 199 429 156 784
high SEP (H) 40 105 124 269
Row sum 514 621 341 1,476
(i). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 261 101 61 423
middle SEP (M) 181 430 173 784
high SEP (H) 41 97 131 269
Row sum 483 628 365 1,476
Note: Sons are categorized around the age of 20 (between 16 and 25), 30 (between 25 and
35), or 40 (between 35 and 45). Fathers are categorized around the age of 30, 40, and 50
+/-5.
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Table 3A.11. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—by age at classification.
(a). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 703 158 59 920
Skilled Workers (S) 134 211 56 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 44 25 31 100
Row sum 881 394 146 1,421
(b). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 723 146 51 920
Skilled Workers (S) 151 197 53 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 47 26 27 100
Row sum 921 369 131 1,421
(c). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 741 132 47 920
Skilled Workers (S) 170 195 36 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 51 25 24 100
Row sum 962 352 107 1,421
(d). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 723 182 73 978
Skilled Workers (S) 113 185 44 342
Unskilled Workers (U) 45 27 29 101
Row sum 881 394 146 1,421
(e). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 745 171 62 978
Skilled Workers (S) 128 172 42 342
Unskilled Workers (U) 48 26 27 101
Row sum 921 369 131 1,421
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(f). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 771 154 53 978
Skilled Workers (S) 140 171 31 342
Unskilled Workers (U) 51 27 23 101
Row sum 962 352 107 1,421
(g). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 755 208 76 1,039
Skilled Workers (S) 85 154 40 279
Unskilled Workers (U) 41 32 30 103
Row sum 881 394 146 1,421
(h). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 785 190 64 1,039
Skilled Workers (S) 92 148 39 279
Unskilled Workers (U) 44 31 28 103
Row sum 921 369 131 1,421
(i). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 809 174 56 1,039
Skilled Workers (S) 104 148 27 279
Unskilled Workers (U) 49 30 24 103
Row sum 962 352 107 1,421
Note: Sons are categorized around the age of 20 (between 16 and 25), 30 (between 25 and
35), or 40 (between 35 and 45). Fathers are categorized around the age of 30, 40, and 50
+/-5.
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Table 3A.12. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—by age at
classification.
(a). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 147 104 49 20 320
Lower Managers (L) 155 297 109 39 600
Skilled Workers (S) 72 62 211 56 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 24 20 25 31 100
Row sum 398 483 394 146 1,421
(b). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 157 102 41 20 320
Lower Managers (L) 171 293 105 31 600
Skilled Workers (S) 81 70 197 53 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 24 23 26 27 100
Row sum 433 488 369 131 1,421
(c). Son categorized around 20, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 177 89 36 18 320
Lower Managers (L) 186 289 96 29 600
Skilled Workers (S) 84 86 195 36 401
Unskilled Workers (U) 28 23 25 24 100
Row sum 475 487 352 107 1,421
(d). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 164 115 65 24 368
Lower Managers (L) 149 295 117 49 610
Skilled Workers (S) 61 52 185 44 342
Unskilled Workers (U) 24 21 27 29 101
Row sum 398 483 394 146 1,421
(e). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 177 110 60 21 368
Lower Managers (L) 161 297 111 41 610
Skilled Workers (S) 69 59 172 42 342
Unskilled Workers (U) 26 22 26 27 101
Row sum 433 488 369 131 1,421
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(f). Son categorized around 30, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 200 96 54 18 368
Lower Managers (L) 177 298 100 35 610
Skilled Workers (S) 67 73 171 31 342
Unskilled Workers (U) 31 20 27 23 101
Row sum 475 487 352 107 1,421
(g). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 30.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 178 129 77 26 410
Lower Managers (L) 152 296 131 50 629
Skilled Workers (S) 46 39 154 40 279
Unskilled Workers (U) 22 19 32 30 103
Row sum 398 483 394 146 1,421
(h). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 40.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 197 124 65 24 410
Lower Managers (L) 162 302 125 40 629
Skilled Workers (S) 51 41 148 39 279
Unskilled Workers (U) 23 21 31 28 103
Row sum 433 488 369 131 1,421
(i). Son categorized around 40, father categorized around 50.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 220 110 61 19 410
Lower Managers (L) 178 301 113 37 629
Skilled Workers (S) 51 53 148 27 279
Unskilled Workers (U) 26 23 30 24 103
Row sum 475 487 352 107 1,421
Note: Sons are categorized around the age of 20 (between 16 and 25), 30 (between 25 and
35), or 40 (between 35 and 45). Fathers are categorized around the age of 30, 40, and 50
+/-5.
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Table 3A.14. Transition matrices of SEP—by name cleaning procedure (Ferrie).
(a). Ferrie (NYSIIS).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,312 974 283 3,569
middle SEP (M) 1,422 2,541 591 4,554
high SEP (H) 245 575 549 1,369
Row sum 3,979 4,090 1,423 9,492
(b). Ferrie (Soundex).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,307 971 282 3,560
middle SEP (M) 1,416 2,538 591 4,545
high SEP (H) 245 574 549 1,368
Row sum 3,968 4,083 1,422 9,473
(c). Ferrie (None).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,312 974 283 3,569
middle SEP (M) 1,422 2,541 591 4,554
high SEP (H) 245 575 549 1,369
Row sum 3,979 4,090 1,423 9,492
Note: The sample name refers to the linking procedure employed to match fathers and sons.
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Table 3A.15. Transition matrices of SEP—by name cleaning procedure (Abramitzky).
(a). Abramitzky (NYSIIS).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,196 916 266 3,378
middle SEP (M) 1,360 2,414 548 4,322
high SEP (H) 218 546 486 1,250
Row sum 3,774 3,876 1,300 8,950
(b). Abramitzky (Soundex).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,638 1,080 376 4,094
middle SEP (M) 1,540 2,813 706 5,059
high SEP (H) 293 687 673 1,653
Row sum 4,471 4,580 1,755 10,806
(c). Abramitzky (None).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2,202 920 267 3,389
middle SEP (M) 1,364 2,422 552 4,338
high SEP (H) 218 547 487 1,252
Row sum 3,784 3,889 1,306 8,979
Note: The sample name refers to the linking procedure employed to match fathers and sons.
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Table 3A.16. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—by name cleaning
procedure (Ferrie).
(a). Ferrie (NYSIIS).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 4,299 1,074 576 5,949
Skilled Workers (S) 761 1,039 393 2,193
Unskilled Workers (U) 376 280 390 1,046
Row sum 5,436 2,393 1,359 9,188
(b). Ferrie (Soundex).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 4,297 1,071 573 5,941
Skilled Workers (S) 758 1,034 393 2,185
Unskilled Workers (U) 376 278 390 1,044
Row sum 5,431 2,383 1,356 9,170
(c). Ferrie (None).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 4,299 1,074 576 5,949
Skilled Workers (S) 761 1,039 393 2,193
Unskilled Workers (U) 376 280 390 1,046
Row sum 5,436 2,393 1,359 9,188
Note: The sample name refers to the linking procedure employed to match fathers and sons.
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Table 3A.17. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—by name cleaning
procedure (Abramitzky).
(a). Abramitzky (NYSIIS).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 4,042 1,008 548 5,598
Skilled Workers (S) 714 979 377 2,070
Unskilled Workers (U) 349 271 364 984
Row sum 5,105 2,258 1,289 8,652
(b). Abramitzky (Soundex).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 4,923 1,173 646 6,742
Skilled Workers (S) 893 1,199 453 2,545
Unskilled Workers (U) 445 317 434 1,196
Row sum 6,261 2,689 1,533 10,483
(c). Abramitzky (None).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 4,056 1,012 549 5,617
Skilled Workers (S) 717 981 377 2,075
Unskilled Workers (U) 350 273 365 988
Row sum 5,123 2,266 1,291 8,680
Note: The sample name refers to the linking procedure employed to match fathers and sons.
150
Table 3A.18. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—by name
cleaning procedure (Ferrie).
(a). Ferrie (NYSIIS).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 1,025 662 328 144 2,159
Lower Managers (L) 844 1,768 746 432 3,790
Skilled Workers (S) 296 465 1,039 393 2,193
Unskilled Workers (U) 134 242 280 390 1,046
Row sum 2,299 3,137 2,393 1,359 9,188
(b). Ferrie (Soundex).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 1,025 661 328 142 2,156
Lower Managers (L) 844 1,767 743 431 3,785
Skilled Workers (S) 294 464 1,034 393 2,185
Unskilled Workers (U) 134 242 278 390 1,044
Row sum 2,297 3,134 2,383 1,356 9,170
(c). Ferrie (None).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 1,025 662 328 144 2,159
Lower Managers (L) 844 1,768 746 432 3,790
Skilled Workers (S) 296 465 1,039 393 2,193
Unskilled Workers (U) 134 242 280 390 1,046
Row sum 2,299 3,137 2,393 1,359 9,188
Note: The sample name refers to the linking procedure employed to match fathers and sons.
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Table 3A.19. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—by name
cleaning procedure (Abramitzky).
(a). Abramitzky (NYSIIS).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 956 622 297 136 2,011
Lower Managers (L) 783 1,681 711 412 3,587
Skilled Workers (S) 269 445 979 377 2,070
Unskilled Workers (U) 125 224 271 364 984
Row sum 2,133 2,972 2,258 1,289 8,652
(b). Abramitzky (Soundex).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 1,243 758 369 175 2,545
Lower Managers (L) 972 1,950 804 471 4,197
Skilled Workers (S) 385 508 1,199 453 2,545
Unskilled Workers (U) 173 272 317 434 1,196
Row sum 2,773 3,488 2,689 1,533 10,483
(c). Abramitzky (None).
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 959 623 298 136 2,016
Lower Managers (L) 787 1,687 714 413 3,601
Skilled Workers (S) 271 446 981 377 2,075
Unskilled Workers (U) 125 225 273 365 988
Row sum 2,142 2,981 2,266 1,291 8,680
Note: The sample name refers to the linking procedure employed to match fathers and sons.
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3B Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure 3B.1. Raw Altham statistic according to SEP categories by migration status.
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Note: This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal lines mark the level
(solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) for the baseline sample (All). Confidence intervals are
calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8). The groups to
the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by
destination.
Figure 3B.2. Raw Altham statistic according to Long-Ferrie categories by migration
status.
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Note: This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal lines mark the level
(solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) for the baseline sample (All). Confidence intervals are
calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8). The groups to
the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by
destination.
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Figure 3B.3. Raw Altham statistic according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by
migration status.
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Note: This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal lines mark the level
(solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) for the baseline sample (All). Confidence intervals are
calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8). The groups to
the RHS of the vertical dashed line are geographically mobile (Return and Emigrated) split by
destination.
Figure 3B.4. Raw Altham statistic according to SEP categories by age at
classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color-coded (see legend); the father’s age at classi-
fication is on the x-axis. This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal
lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) of the 40-40 sample (both son and
father categorized at age 40). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Figure 3B.5. Raw Altham statistic according to Long-Ferrie categories by age at
classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color-coded (see legend); the father’s age at classi-
fication is on the x-axis. This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal
lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) of the 40-40 sample (both son and
father categorized at age 40). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
Figure 3B.6. Raw Altham statistic according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by
age at classification.
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Note: The age at classification of the son is color-coded (see legend); the father’s age at classi-
fication is on the x-axis. This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal
lines mark the level (solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) of the 40-40 sample (both son and
father categorized at age 40). Confidence intervals are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure
as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
155
Figure 3B.7. Raw Altham statistic according to SEP categories by linking procedure.
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Note: This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal lines mark the level
(solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) for the baseline sample (True). Confidence intervals
are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
Figure 3B.8. Raw Altham statistic according to Long-Ferrie categories by linking
procedure.
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Note: This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal lines mark the level
(solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) for the baseline sample (True). Confidence intervals
are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Figure 3B.9. Raw Altham statistic according to extended Long-Ferrie categories by
linking procedure.
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Note: This figure contains the uncontrolled Altham statistic. The horizontal lines mark the level
(solid) and confidence intervals (dashed) for the baseline sample (True). Confidence intervals
are calculated by a bootstrapping procedure as explained in Modalsli (2015, p. 8).
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Table 3B.1. Descriptive statistics of father-son pairs with sons migrating to South
America, Africa, Asia, and Australia.
Characteristic SA Australia Asia Africa
Number of observations 146 50 106 21
Age 35.68 34.27 35.40 34.22
Age at Migration 26.59 26.09 25.25 24.64
Low SEP [pct] 31.33 19.23 10.28 13.04
Middle SEP [pct] 62.00 69.23 80.37 69.57
High SEP [pct] 6.67 11.54 9.35 17.39
Unskilled workers [pct] 5.41 9.80 1.92 4.35
Skilled workers [pct] 21.62 7.84 7.69 8.70
White-collar [pct] 72.97 82.35 90.38 86.96
Lower managers [pct] 62.84 64.71 76.92 73.91
Higher managers [pct] 10.14 17.65 13.46 13.04
Age (f) 44.35 45.29 43.87 49.26
Low SEP [pct] (f) 35.67 26.92 34.78 33.33
Middle SEP [pct] (f) 49.68 50.00 47.83 52.38
High SEP [pct] (f) 14.65 23.08 17.39 14.29
Unskilled workers [pct] (f) 11.46 9.62 13.16 9.52
Skilled workers [pct] (f) 24.84 15.38 20.18 14.29
White-collar [pct] (f) 63.69 75.00 66.67 76.19
Lower managers [pct] (f) 39.49 46.15 38.60 42.86
Higher managers [pct] (f) 24.20 28.85 28.07 33.33
Note: The number of observations refers to the number of father-son pairs by destination
continent. Note that one father-son pair may be included in more than one sub-sample
because of multiple migration. Age is the age at observed occupation closest to forty. Age at
Migration denotes the sons’ age at first migration. The remainder of the table describes the
distribution across occupational classes in percent. Lower managers and higher managers
are encompassed in the white-collar group. Rows with an (f) capture the values for the
fathers, those without an (f) capture the values for the sons.
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Table 3B.2. Transition matrices of SEP—migrants to South America, Africa, Asia, and
Australia.
(a). South America.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 28 13 4 45
middle SEP (M) 22 60 10 92
high SEP (H) 3 2 4 9
Row sum 53 75 18 146
(b). Africa.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 2 1 0 3
middle SEP (M) 5 8 2 15
high SEP (H) 0 2 1 3
Row sum 7 11 3 21
(c). Asia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 6 2 3 11
middle SEP (M) 30 46 9 85
high SEP (H) 1 5 4 10
Row sum 37 53 16 106
(d). Australia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation L M H sum
low SEP (L) 6 3 1 10
middle SEP (M) 8 19 7 34
high SEP (H) 0 3 3 6
Row sum 14 25 11 50
Note: These tables only contain father-son pairs with geographically mobile sons. The
sample name refers to the destination continent(s).
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Table 3B.3. Transition matrices of Long-Ferrie categories—migrants to South
America, Africa, Asia, and Australia.
(a). South America.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 78 18 9 105
Skilled Workers (S) 10 15 6 31
Unskilled Workers (U) 3 4 1 8
Row sum 91 37 16 144
(b). Africa.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 15 1 2 18
Skilled Workers (S) 1 1 0 2
Unskilled Workers (U) 0 1 0 1
Row sum 16 3 2 21
(c). Asia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 64 18 10 92
Skilled Workers (S) 4 3 1 8
Unskilled Workers (U) 1 0 1 2
Row sum 69 21 12 102
(d). Australia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation W S U sum
White-Collar (W) 33 5 2 40
Skilled Workers (S) 2 1 1 4
Unskilled Workers (U) 2 1 2 5
Row sum 37 7 5 49
Note: These tables only contain father-son pairs with geographically mobile sons. The
sample name refers to the destination continent(s).
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Table 3B.4. Transition matrices of extended Long-Ferrie categories—migrants to
South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia.
(a). South America.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 7 6 1 0 14
Lower Managers (L) 20 45 17 9 91
Skilled Workers (S) 4 6 15 6 31
Unskilled Workers (U) 1 2 4 1 8
Row sum 32 59 37 16 144
(b). Africa.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 1 2 0 0 3
Lower Managers (L) 6 6 1 2 15
Skilled Workers (S) 0 1 1 0 2
Unskilled Workers (U) 0 0 1 0 1
Row sum 7 9 3 2 21
(c). Asia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 9 4 1 0 14
Lower Managers (L) 16 35 17 10 78
Skilled Workers (S) 2 2 3 1 8
Unskilled Workers (U) 0 1 0 1 2
Row sum 27 42 21 12 102
(d). Australia.
Father’s occupation Column
Son’s occupation H L S U sum
Higher Managers (H) 5 4 0 0 9
Lower Managers (L) 8 16 5 2 31
Skilled Workers (S) 1 1 1 1 4
Unskilled Workers (U) 0 2 1 2 5
Row sum 14 23 7 5 49
Note: These tables only contain father-son pairs with geographically mobile sons. The
sample name refers to the destination continent(s).
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Chapter 4
Offsetting the Cliff?
A Sufficient Statistics Approach to Measuring the Wel-
fare Effects of Work Incentives in Disability Insurance
Joint with Andreas Haller and Stefan Staubli
Abstract: In most disability insurance (DI) programs, DI recipients lose their entire cash
benefits if they have labor earnings beyond a certain income threshold. Introducing a benefit
offset program reduces DI cash benefits gradually beyond this threshold. This has two opposing
effects: (1) the most able DI beneficiaries are incentivized to increase their labor supply (labor
supply effect), reducing program costs, and (2) DI becomes more attractive for potential ap-
plicants, which might cause more DI take-up (induced entry effect), increasing program costs.
This paper develops robust sufficient statistics formulas to evaluate the welfare effects of such
a reform. We show that the welfare effects crucially depend on two sufficient statistics: (1) the
earnings elasticity of DI recipients (capturing the labor supply effect), and (2) the DI benefit
take-up elasticity (capturing the induced entry effect). In an empirical application of our model,
we plan to estimate these two sufficient statistics using policy reforms in Canada. Using exist-
ing estimates from previous studies on the United States, we find that it is unlikely that the
introduction of a benefit offset reduces program expenditures. However, it can still be welfare
improving for reasonable values of risk aversion.
JEL classification: J14, H21, I30, D14.
Keywords: Disability Insurance, Cash Cliff, Benefit Offset, Induced Entry.
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4.1 Introduction
In many countries, the share of individuals receiving disability insurance (DI) has in-
creased significantly over the past few decades. Autor et al. (2018) line out that, in the
United States, the number of DI recipients has quintupled to over 5 percent and that
European countries such as Norway exhibit an even stronger increase over the past five
decades. The rapid expansion of the beneficiary population has generated substantial
interest by policy makers and economists in measures that reduce growth in program
caseloads and expenditures. Autor and Duggan (2006) discuss three ways to limit the
expansion of DI programs: (1) provide incentives to return to work, (2) reduce incentives
to seek DI benefits, and (3) adopt more rigorous eligibility standards. This paper focuses
on the first approach, the optimal financial work incentives in DI.
DI programs are known for their strong work disincentives (Autor and Duggan, 2003;
Bound et al., 2010). Most DI programs feature so-called “cash cliffs”: If DI beneficiaries
supply work above a certain income threshold (the earnings disregard), they lose their
entire cash benefits. Instead, a benefit offset program reduces DI cash benefits gradually
for individuals with an income above the earnings disregard. Figure 4.1 (on p. 170) il-
lustrates a stylized budget set of DI beneficiaries under a cash cliff and a benefit offset
regime. Intuitively, the introduction of a benefit offset scheme has two opposing effects.
On the one hand, it can mitigate the inclusion error in DI. The most able DI beneficiaries
are incentivized to increase their labor supply (labor supply effect). This reduces pro-
gram costs without reducing the insurance value of DI. Empirical evidence on substantial
remaining work capacity of some DI recipients1 underlines the potential importance of
this effect. On the other hand, the introduction of a benefit offset scheme makes DI more
attractive for potential applicants. This might cause more DI take-up (induced entry
effect), which increases program costs.
This paper formalizes the trade-off between labor supply and induced entry effect in
a sufficient statistics model. For welfare analyses, we develop robust sufficient statistics
formulas that capture the insurance value and incentive costs of benefit offset schemes.
These formulas are functions of high-level elasticities that can be estimated using design-
based empirical methods. We show that the welfare effects of moving from a cash cliff
to a benefit offset regime crucially depend on two sufficient statistics: (1) the earnings
1See for instance Maestas et al. (2013) and Autor et al. (2015).
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elasticity of DI recipients, and (2) the DI benefit take-up elasticity.2 The earnings elasticity
captures the labor supply effect. The DI benefit take-up elasticity is a sufficient statistic
for induced entry in a broad class of models. The contribution of our theoretical analysis
is twofold. First, it provides simple yet robust sufficient statistics formulas to evaluate
the welfare effects of introducing a benefit offset. Second, it sheds light on the potential
size of the induced entry effect based on credible reduced form estimates. Estimating
the induced entry effect is a key challenge. While the labor supply effect of a $ 1 for $ 2
benefit offset has been tested recently in the large benefit offset national demonstration
(BOND) field experiment, the induced entry effect cannot be studied in a randomized
controlled trial. The size of the induced entry is usually estimated by structural models
(e.g. Hoynes and Moffitt, 1999 or Benitez-Silva et al., 2010). Our approach shows that in
a broad class of models the DI benefit take-up elasticity is informative on the size of the
induced entry effect.
We currently work on estimating both the benefit take-up elasticity and the earnings
elasticity for Canada with data from the Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD).
Canada operates distinct DI programs for Quebec and the Rest of Canada (RoC). We
exploit two policy reforms that provide exogenous variation in the DI benefit level and
the earnings disregard in RoC but not in Quebec. This allows us to estimate the causal
effects of the two reforms employing a difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strat-
egy. Further, the earnings disregard allows us to estimate the earnings elasticity with a
bunching estimator. This is work in progress. For the time being, we use estimates from
previous studies to evaluate the welfare effects of introducing a benefit offset scheme. For
the United States, we find that it is unlikely that the introduction of a benefit offset
scheme reduces program expenditures. However, replacing the cash cliff with an offset
can be welfare improving for reasonable values of risk aversion depending on the benefit
take-up elasticity. The estimates for the benefit take-up elasticity in the literature range
from 0.1 to 0.9. For the smallest value, our sufficient statistic formula suggests that the
introduction of a benefit offset is welfare improving. For the largest reported elasticity, it
is better to keep the cash cliff, which acts as guard against undesirable DI applications.
We hope to provide credible estimates of the benefit take-up elasticity with our empirical
approach employing Canadian data.
2The DI benefit take-up elasticity denotes the elasticity of DI claiming with respect to benefit gen-
erosity, i.e. by how many percent DI claiming increases if DI benefits increase by 1 percent.
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There is a growing empirical literature studying the effects of DI on labor market out-
comes (e.g. Autor and Duggan, 2003; de Jong et al., 2011; Staubli, 2011; Maestas et al.,
2013; French and Song, 2014; Moore, 2015; Gelber et al., 2017; Deshpande et al., 2019) but
empirical evidence on benefit offset schemes is scarce. A few countries tested the effects
of benefit offset schemes on the labor supply of DI beneficiaries. In the United States,
the Social Security Administration recently ran a field experiment to test a benefit offset
policy that reduces benefits by $ 1 for every $ 2 of earnings above the earnings disregard
(in the United States: substantial gainful activity (SGA)). Gubits et al. (2018) provide
the final evaluation of this field experiment. They report that the probability of employ-
ment increased by 2 percent (0.4 percentage points) in the entire DI population and by
4 percent (2 percentage points) in a volunteer population, which is thought most likely
to use the offset.3 Moreover, they document a 7 percent (0.4 percentage points) increase
in the share of individuals whose earnings exceed the SGA in the DI population and a
corresponding increase of 25 percent (4 percentage points) in the volunteer population.
They conclude that the small estimated increases in earnings (not statistically significant)
were not sufficient to offset the deadweight loss from increases in taxes needed to fund
larger DI benefit payments.4 Switzerland also conducted a field experiment on the intro-
duction of a conditional cash program that incentivizes work but exhibited a low take-up
rate of 0.5 percent (Bu¨tler et al., 2015). Campolieti and Riddell (2012) evaluate a shift in
the earnings disregard in Canada. They report an increase in the extensive labor supply
margin but no effect on program entry or exit. Kostol and Mogstad (2014) estimate the
labor supply effects of a benefit offset scheme in Norway. In 2005, Norway introduced a
benefit offset program that allowed DI beneficiaries to keep NOK 0.40 of every NOK 1.00
earned above an earning threshold. Because only DI beneficiaries who were already on DI
before January 1 of 2004 became eligible for this benefit offset, they can use a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the labor supply effects. They find substantial positive
impacts on labor supply. Three years after implementation, this benefit offset increased
labor force participation by 8.5 percentage points for DI recipients under age 50. Ruh and
Staubli (forthcoming) exploit bunching at the earnings disregard to identify the earnings
elasticity of DI recipients in Austria and report an elasticity of 0.27. Gelber et al. (2017)
3Gubits et al. (2018) explain the two treatment groups in greater detail.
4DI benefit payments increased by roughly 1 percent ($ 12 per month) in the entire DI population and
by roughly 4 percent ($ 37 per month) in the volunteer population.
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study how differences in benefit levels reduce labor supply through an income effect of
DI recipients in the United States documenting that this income effect accounts for a
majority of DI-induced reductions in earnings. However, these studies and experiments
can only identify the labor supply effect of individuals already on DI. The induced entry
effect of benefit offset schemes is difficult to estimate with reduced form methods. There-
fore, structural models have been used to estimate the induced entry effect. Hoynes and
Moffitt (1999) simulate the potential effects of a benefit offset for the United States in
a calibrated model. More recently, Benitez-Silva et al. (2010) simulate the effect of the
United States $ 1 for $ 2 offset in a structural model.
To our knowledge, there is very little theoretical research on work incentives in DI.
Parsons (1996) shows that in a model with two-sided classification errors and two ability
types, it is desirable to provide work incentives if there are no application fees. With
application fees, a system without work incentives can be more efficient. Inderbitzin
and Wallimann (2013) study the optimal work incentives with a distribution of ability
types and an extensive margin labor supply choice. They find that the efficiency of work
incentives depends on the relative size of labor supply and induced entry effects. In this
sense, we generalize their model to include the intensive margin, which is the main target
of work incentives in DI, and derive implementable sufficient statistics formulas.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes our theoret-
ical model. Section 4.3 discusses the welfare implications of our model employing existing
estimates from the literature. Section 4.4 previews our empirical approach to estimating
the labor supply and the benefit take-up elasticity for Canada. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
In this section, we present a simple model of disability insurance (DI) based on the
seminal work of Diamond and Sheshinski (1995). This model allows us to derive optimality
conditions in terms of behavioral parameters that serve as sufficient statistics to evaluate
the (local) optimality of work incentives in DI. Importantly, these behavioral parameters
can be estimated empirically. We employ this model to study two questions: (1) Given a
benefit offset scheme, what is the optimal offset rate r, i.e. what share of income above
the earnings disregard should DI beneficiaries be allowed to keep? And (2) what are the
fiscal and the welfare effects of replacing a cash cliff regime with a benefit offset scheme?
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One key finding is that the answers to these two questions are closely related. We show
that a cash cliff system can be modeled as a specific form of a benefit offset regime. Hence,
shifting from a cash cliff to a benefit offset program is a special case of adjusting the offset
rate under a benefit offset system. In Section 4.2.1, we describe the model setup. Section
4.2.2 discusses the optimal offset rate, and Section 4.2.3 discusses the welfare effects of
replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset. In Section 4.2.4, we discuss various extensions.
4.2.1 Setup
We expand the seminal DI model of Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) by introducing an
intensive labor supply choice and a two period structure. In the first period, the agent
works, earns a wage w, and pays lump-sum taxes τ to finance the DI program. She does
not save, does not make any other choices in the first period, and yields utility u(w− τ).
In the second period, the agent suffers a disability shock θ, drawn from a continuous
distribution F (θ).5 After the agent observes the disability shock, she can choose whether
to apply to DI and how much to work in either case.6
Labor Supply Decision Individuals with disability type θ choose their labor supply
z(θ) ≥ 0 by maximizing
z(θ) := argmax
z≥0
u(c(z))− h(z, θ), (4.1)
where h(z, θ) denotes the disutility of labor of type θ when earning z, and c(z) denotes
disposable income. The wage rate is normalized to one for simplicity. We assume that
uz > 0, uzz < 0, hz > 0, hzz > 0, hθ > 0, hzθ > 0, and u(0) = h(0, θ) = 0 such
that u is concave and h is convex. This implies a unique optimal labor supply, z(θ), for
every θ, declining optimal labor supply in θ (z′(θ) ≤ 0), and convex indifference curves in
consumption and labor income.7
5We consider θ ∈ [0,∞) as disability or “disutility of work”. Thus, a higher θ corresponds to a more
severe disability and higher disutility of work.
6For ease of exposition, we present the simplest possible model in the main text. In Section 4.2.4 and
the Appendix, we discuss various extensions and show that our results hold in a broad class of models.
7Moreover, individuals with higher θ have steeper indifference curves, guaranteeing single crossing of
indifference curves. Our theoretical insights do not rely on the specification with separable utility. Our
insights apply for all specifications with convex preferences and single crossing of indifference curves for
different θ-types. We present this specification for notational simplicity.
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Disposable Income For simplicity, we assume there are no taxes in the second period
for non-DI recipients. Thus, their disposable labor income is given by c(z) = z. DI
recipients face labor income taxes. We consider two tax regimes: a cash cliff and a benefit
offset regime.
A benefit offset scheme consists of three parameters (b, r, SGA). b denotes the base
DI benefits, i.e. the benefits an individual receives if she works less than the threshold
SGA. r is the marginal tax rate of labor income above SGA. Hence, r is the rate at
which benefits are reduced for every dollar earned beyond SGA. An individual who earns
labor income zB(θ) has disposable income
cB(θ) =
b+ z
B(θ), if zB(θ) ≤ SGA,
b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θ)− SGA), if zB(θ) > SGA,
(4.2)
under a benefit offset scheme. With r = 1, benefits would be reduced one by one for
labor income above SGA. With r = 0 benefits are independent of earnings. A lower r,
therefore, corresponds to higher work incentives and a lower benefit offset.
DI with a cash cliff is characterized by two parameters (b, SGA), where b is the DI
benefits an individual receives as long as she earns a labor income below the earnings
disregard SGA. If she earns above SGA she loses all her benefits. Hence, under a cash
cliff an individual with optimal labor supply zC(θ) has disposable income
cC(θ) =
b+ z
C(θ), if zC(θ) ≤ SGA,
zC(θ), if zC(θ) > SGA.
(4.3)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the budget set of individuals under the cash cliff vs the benefit
offset scheme. The black dotted line represents the budget set of non-DI recipients.
DI Application Decision There exists a unique marginal DI applicant θA. Individuals
with a lower disability level than the marginal applicant (θ < θA) do not apply for DI
benefits, work according to their optimal labor supply choice z(θ), and receive utility
u(z(θ)) − h(z(θ), θ). Individuals with a higher degree of disability than the marginal
applicant (θ ≥ θA) apply for DI benefits. As in Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), a
DI application is accepted with probability p(θ), where p increases in θ. An accepted
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Figure 4.1. Budget sets under cash cliff vs benefit offset scheme.
(a). Cash cliff. (b). Benefit offset.
Note: b denotes the base DI benefits, SGA the earnings disregard, and r the offset rate.
applicant chooses her optimal labor supply zi(θ), yielding second-period utility u(ci(θ))−
h(zi(θ), θ) where i ∈ {B,C}, depending on whether there is a benefit offset (B) or cash
cliff (C) regime in place. A rejected applicant goes back to work and gets second-period
utility u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ).
4.2.2 Optimal Benefit Offset
Under a benefit offset regime with parameters (b, r, SGA), social welfare is given by
W =u(w − τ) +
∫ θA
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)[u(cB(θ))− h(zB(θ), θ)]dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θA
[1− p(θ)][u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ). (4.4)
The government budget constraint corresponds to
τ =
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)
( {zB(θ) ≤ SGA}b+ {zB(θ) > SGA} [b− r(zB(θ)− SGA)]) dF (θ)
=
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)(b− ry(θ))dF (θ), (4.5)
where y is defined as income above the earnings disregard, i.e.
y(θ) =
z
B(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA
0, if zB(θ) < SGA.
(4.6)
170
The marginal applicant θA is unique and determined by8
u(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA), (4.7)
where zB(θA) solves
(1− r)u′(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA)) = hz(zB(θA), θA), (4.8)
and z(θA) solves
u′(z(θA)) = hz(z(θA), θA). (4.9)
Moreover, we have SGA ≤ zB(θA) < zK , where zK is the intersection of the benefit
offset and the regular budget set, and zB(θA) < z(θA).9
A marginal change in the offset rate r has a welfare effect of
∂W
∂r
= −u′(w − τ)∂τ
∂r
−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θ))y(θ)dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in insurance value
, (4.10)
where
∂τ
∂r
=−∂θ
A
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
induced entry effect
[
b− ry(θA)]− r ∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor supply effect
dF (θ) (4.11)
−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical costs
.
Intuitively, lowering the offset rate r increases the insurance value for DI recipients,
who earn above SGA, i.e. have y(θ) > 0. All behavioral responses, such as more labor
supply and more applications, do not have first order welfare effects because of the enve-
lope theorem. The behavioral responses only enter through the fiscal effects ∂τ/∂r. The
fiscal effects consist of three components. First, a lower benefit offset increases expendi-
8Note that this is an interior solution in the sense that the marginal applicant supplies more labor
than SGA. In case the marginal applicant would actually want to work less than or at SGA, the benefit
offset would not be effective. Hence, the scenario would correspond to the one discussed in Section 4.2.3.
Thus, we only consider benefit offset schemes with interior solutions, i.e. 1− r ≥ hz(SGA,θA)u′(b+SGA) , throughout
this section.
9For proof, see Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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tures mechanically through lower taxes on labor incomes above the earnings disregard.
Second, the labor supply incentives change, which causes a behavioral response of DI re-
cipients’ labor supply. Third, DI becomes more attractive for individuals with disability
levels just below the previous marginal applicant, which leads to more entry into DI.
From equation (4.10), it follows immediately that providing more work incentives,
i.e. reducing r, is always welfare improving if this reduces program expenditures, i.e.
∂τ/∂r > 0. In this case, decreasing the benefit offset, r, is a Pareto improvement.
However, ∂τ/∂r > 0 is rather unlikely to hold. Even in the absence of induced entry, i.e.
−∂θA
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)
[
b− ry(θA)] = 0, the labor supply effect would have to compensate the
mechanical costs in order to reduce program expenditures. If there is induced entry, the
labor supply effect needs to be even stronger. This means, we would, at least, need that
1 < −
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)
r∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
=: ε, (4.12)
where ε is the earnings elasticity of DI recipients who earn above the earnings disregard.
Hence, for an expenditure reduction, we need, at least, an earnings elasticity above one.
If there is a positive induced entry effect on top, i.e. −∂θA
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)
[
b− ry(θA)] < 0,
the earnings elasticity needs to be even larger. Earnings elasticities are estimated to be
rather low, especially for DI recipients, ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 (Kostol and Mogstad
(2014); Koning and van Sonsbeek (2017); Ruh and Staubli (forthcoming)). Therefore, it
appears unlikely that higher work incentives reduce program expenditures. 10
Nevertheless, decreasing r can still have positive welfare effects even with increasing
expenditures (since the insurance value increases in 1 − r). To obtain a money metric of
the welfare derivative, we divide equation (4.10) by u′(w − τ) to get
∂W˜
∂r
=
∂W/∂r
u′(w − τ) =∆τ −
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) dF (θ), (4.13)
where
10The evaluation of the BOND experiment by Gubits et al. (2018) confirm as much. Even without
induced entry, program expenditures increased.
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∆τ ≡ ∂θ
A
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)
[
b− ry(θA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
induced entry effect
+
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)r
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆labor supply
. (4.14)
As long as individuals are not fully insured already, i.e. w − τ > cB(θA), it holds
that u′(w − τ) < u′(cB(θA)). Hence, providing higher work incentives (decreasing r) is
welfare improving (∂W˜/∂r < 0) if the labor supply effect compensates for the induced
entry effect.
In general, we can rewrite (4.13) to see that the sign of the welfare effect ∂W˜/∂r Q 0
is equivalent to11
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] R −ε+ ν
(
b− ry(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI]
)
, (4.15)
where ν is the DI take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r defined as
ν = −∂
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
∂r
1∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
=
∂θA
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)
1∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.16)
and E[y(θ)|DI] denotes the average earnings of DI recipients above SGA, defined by
E[y(θ)|DI] =
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.17)
and
E[y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) |DI] =
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
. (4.18)
The LHS of (4.15) captures the consumption smoothing benefit of higher work incen-
tives. To implement the LHS, we need to parametrize the utility function or use a Taylor
approximation to obtain an expression only depending on the coefficient of relative risk
aversion.
The RHS of (4.15) captures the fiscal effects. In principle, the RHS consists of es-
timable quantities. The only challenge is the DI take-up semi-elasticity ν. Therefore, we
implicitly differentiate equation (4.7), which characterizes the marginal applicant, using
11Note that the sign of the inequality switches. That is ∂W˜/∂r < 0 if the left-hand side (LHS) of
(4.15) is larger than the right-hand side (RHS).
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the equalities from (4.8) and 4.9) to show that
∂θA
∂r
=
u′(cB(θA))y(θA)
hθ(z(θA), θA)− hθ(zB(θA), θA) = −
∂θA
∂b
y(θA) = − ∂θ
A
∂SGA
y(θA)
r
. (4.19)
Therefore, we can rewrite (4.15) as
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] R −ε+ µ
(
b− ry(θA)
b
)
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] , (4.20)
where µ is the benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b
µ =
∂
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
∂b
b∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
= −∂θ
A
∂b
f(θA)p(θA)
b∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
. (4.21)
Therefore, the benefit take-up elasticity µ is a sufficient statistic for the induced entry
effect. This elasticity is easier to estimate with reduced form methods since one does not
rely on policies that change the benefit offset but only the DI benefit level. Consequently,
increasing (decreasing) the offset rate increases welfare if the LHS of equation (4.20) is
larger (smaller) than the RHS.
4.2.3 Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset
Section 4.2.2 developed a sufficient statistic formula to evaluate the local optimality of the
offset rate r. However, most DI programs feature cash cliffs and not benefit offset schemes.
The relevant policy discussion, therefore, is whether a cash cliff should be replaced by a
benefit offset. The key idea to our approach is that a cash cliff can be modelled as a
benefit offset.
Figure 4.2 illustrates how we construct a hypothetical benefit offset that mirrors a
cash cliff. The black line represents the budget set of a DI recipient. The black dotted
line marks the budget set of non-recipients. The red line is the indifference curve of
the marginal DI applicant in the cash cliff regime with disability θAC . Every individual
with a lower θ does not apply for DI. Everyone with a higher θ works at or below the
earnings exempt SGA. The blue line marks the budget set of a hypothetical benefit offset
regime.The hypothetical benefit offset has an offset rate 1 − rm, which is equivalent to
the slope of the indifference curve of the marginal applicant at the cash cliff. Hence, this
hypothetical benefit offset system has the same marginal applicant as the cash cliff regime
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(i.e. θAm = θ
A
C). For types with higher disability degree θ than the marginal applicant, the
incentives to work and apply to DI are exactly the same. For types with lower θ than the
marginal applicant, there is no difference between the two DI programs either.
Figure 4.2. Equivalence between cash cliff and benefit offset.
Note: This figure illustrates the benefit offset scheme which is equivalent to the cash cliff system.
The benefit offset is determined by 1− rm = hz(SGA,θ
A
C)
u′(b+SGA) . C denotes disposable income and z is
labor income.
Replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset is, therefore, equivalent to increasing labor
supply incentives starting from this hypothetical benefit offset. To evaluate the welfare
effects of a benefit offset introduction, we conduct the opposite thought experiment of
moving from a benefit offset to cash cliff scheme, i.e. moving from a benefit offset with
work incentives r < rm closer to rm. This way we can start with r = rm −  (with  > 0)
and consider the limiting case → 0. For all  > 0, we have an interior marginal applicant
supplying more labor than SGA and can use the analysis from Section 4.2.2. That is, we
need to evaluate (4.20) for r → rm. This yields a much simpler sufficient statistic formula.
Condition (4.20) becomes
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ)  −ε+ µ. (4.22)
This is a powerful result. First, equation (4.22) implies that welfare increases with the
introduction of a benefit offset regime with minimal labor incentives whenever the LHS is
larger than the RHS. Second, this test might even be informative on whether there exists
a welfare-improving benefit offset at all, if the welfare function was concave in r.
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Derivation We lined out the key idea and result. Subsequently, we show these insights
formally. Welfare under a cash cliff system is given by
WC =u(w − τC) +
∫ θAC
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) (4.23)
+
∫ ∞
θAC
p(θ)
[
u(cC(θ))− h(zC(θ), θ)] dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θAC
[1− p(θ)] [u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)] dF (θ).
The government’s budget constraint is denoted by
τC =
∫ ∞
θAC
p(θ)b1{zC(θ) ≤ SGA}dF (θ) =
∫ ∞
θAC
p(θ)bdF (θ). (4.24)
Consumption is given by
cC(θ) =
b+ z
C(θ), if zC(θ) ≤ SGA
zC(θ), if zC(θ) > SGA.
(4.25)
The marginal applicant θAC is unique and determined by
u(b+ SGA)− h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θAC))− h(z(θAC), θAC), (4.26)
where z(θAC) solves
u′(z(θAC)) = hz(z(θ
A
C), θ
A
C). (4.27)
Proposition 1. The introduction of a benefit offset scheme with offset r either i) has no
effect at all or ii) incentivizes more labor supply of DI recipients but also induces more
entry into DI. Hence, a benefit offset scheme with a positive labor supply effect always
induces entry.
i) If 1−r ≤ I¯K where ¯IK is the slope of the indifference curve of the marginal applicant
under the cash cliff at the SGA, i.e. I¯K :=
hz(SGA,θAC)
u′(b+SGA) , there is no labor supply effect
and no induced entry effect of introducing a benefit offset scheme.
ii) If 1− r > ¯IK, there is a positive labor supply effect but also a positive induced entry
effect.
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Proof. see Appendix 4A
Figure 4.3. Induced entry and labor supply effects
(a). Cash cliff. (b). Benefit offset without entry.
(c). Benefit offset with entry—induced
entry effect.
(d). Benefit offset with entry—labor
supply effect.
Note: This figure illustrates Proposition 1. Panel 4.3c depicts the induced entry effect by
showing that the marginal applicant changes. Panel 4.3d depicts the labor supply effect of the
previous marginal applicant, increasing labor supply from SGA to zB(θAC).
Lemma 1. Equivalence between benefit offset and cash cliff
i) There exists a benefit offset schedule (b, rm, SGA) with 1 − rm = hz(SGA,θ
A
C)
u′(b+SGA) , which
is equivalent to the cash cliff regime (b, SGA), i.e. θA = θAC and z
B(θ) = zC(θ) ∀θ.
ii) To evaluate the marginal welfare effect of a benefit offset policy, we can study a
marginal change in r starting from rm.
Proof. see Appendix 4A
We now study the effect of moving from a cash cliff to a benefit offset program. To do
so, we analyze the opposite change, i.e. moving from a benefit offset with work incentives
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r < rm closer to rm being equivalent to a cash cliff scheme. This way, we can start with
r = rm−  with  > 0 and let → 0. For all  > 0, there is an interior marginal applicant.
The analysis in Section 4.2.2 showed that, to get a hold of the welfare effect, we need to
evaluate (4.20).
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] R −ε+ µ
(
b− ry(θA)
b
)
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] , (4.28)
where y(θA) denotes the earnings above the earnings disregard, i.e.
y(θ) =
z
B(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA
0, if zB(θ) < SGA.
(4.29)
For r → rm, it holds that θA → θAC , y(θA)→ 0.
We can bound the numerator on the LHS with
u′(cB(θA))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) E[y(θ)|DI] ≤ E[y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) |DI]
≤ u
′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) E[y(θ)|DI], (4.30)
by concavity of u(). By the sandwich theorem, it thus holds that
lim
→0
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y|DI] =
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) , (4.31)
since lim→0 y(θA) = 0.
For the RHS, it holds that
lim
→0
(
b− ry(θA)
b
)
= 1, (4.32)
and
y(θA)
E[y(θ)||DI ] ≥ 1. (4.33)
Note that
y(θAB)
E[y(θ)|DI] is increasing in  because
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∂∂r
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] =
∂y(θA)
∂r
E[y(θ)|DI]− ∂E[y|DI]
∂r
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI]2 > 0 (4.34)
↔
∂y(θA)
∂r
r
y(θA)
>
∂E[y(θ)|DI]
∂r
r
E[y(θ)|DI] (4.35)
↔
εmarginal > εaverage. (4.36)
Therefore, y(θ
A)
E[y(θ)|DI] is monotonically decreasing for r → rm, and therefore
lim
→0
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] = inf{
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI]} = 1. (4.37)
All together, we need to evaluate
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) ≥ −ε+ µ (4.38)
for the marginal introduction of a benefit offset.
4.2.4 Extensions
Our insights presented above are derived in a stylized model. In Appendix 4B, we show
that our results generally hold for: (1) any convex preferences with single crossing (as
compared to separability of utility from consumption and disutility of work), (2) the pres-
ence of application costs to the DI program, (3) benefit substitution (i.e. the presence
of other welfare programs), (4) labor adjustment costs, (5) other sources of heterogeneity
(e.g. skill heterogeneity causing wage heterogeneity), and (6) one-period structure with
taxes. The intuition for the robustness of our results is that we exploit envelope condi-
tions to derive the welfare effects in terms of elasticities. The exact model specifications
make some behavioral responses more and less elastic. Since, we estimate the elasticities
with reduced form techniques, we do not need to know the exact model specifications.
For instance, the presence of DI application costs could make the application decision
less sensitive to financial incentives, which would show up in a lower DI benefit take-up
elasticity estimate.
179
4.3 Welfare Implications
As the empirical analysis is in process, we provide a first rough implementation of our suf-
ficient statistic formulas for the United States. Thus, this section is merely for illustration
purpose. Section 4.4 describes the planned empirical implementation for Canada.
The result of the theoretical model in Section 4.2.3 has shown that one can evaluate,
how abolishing a cash cliff in favor of a benefit offset affects welfare, by estimating the
quantities in the following equation
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) R −ε+ µ, (4.39)
where b denotes the DI benefit level, SGA the earnings disregard (location of the cash
cliff), w labor income in the first period (without disability), τ the lump sum taxes levied
in the first period, ε the earnings elasticity, and µ the benefit take-up elasticity with
respect to b.
Implementation of the LHS For the LHS, we use a quadratic approximation of the
utility function to get12
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) ≈ γ
w − τ − (b+ SGA)
w − τ = γ
(
1− b+ SGA
w − τ
)
, (4.40)
where γ = −u′′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) (w − τ) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion evaluated at w − τ.
Hence, we need an estimate of the replacement rate for the marginal DI applicant, i.e.
(b+SGA)/(w−τ). In the model, we rule out savings resulting in consumption being equal
to income. However, the LHS should capture the consumption drop and not the income
drop. Meyer and Mok (2018) study the income and consumption patterns of individuals
reporting disabilities in the United States. They find that individuals reporting a chronic
and severe disability face an after-tax post-transfer income drop of 30 percent ten years
after onset of the condition. Consumption reacts less. Hence, focusing on income can be
seen as an upper bound. Ideally, we would know the consumption drop of the marginal
applicant. We want to exploit this more in the empirical implementation for Canada,
12This is a standard approach, see Chetty and Finkelstein (2013).
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where we might explore financial well-being and distress. For the time being, we use the
income drop of 30 percent from Meyer and Mok (2018), i.e. 1− b+SGA
w−τ = 1− 0.7 = 0.3.13
Implementation of the RHS For the RHS, we need estimates for the DI take-up
elasticity with respect to benefits µ and the earnings elasticity of DI recipients ε.
The take-up elasticity has not been directly estimated in the literature. Thus, we
have to employ estimates of the application elasticity with respect to benefits and take
award rates into account. To obtain an upper bound of the take-up elasticity, we multiply
the application elasticity with the average award rate. This gives an upper bound, since
individuals, who actually react to the benefits (marginal applicants), should have lower
than average award rates. First, Low and Pistaferri (2015, Table 7) report empirical
estimates of the application benefit elasticity that range from 0.2 to 1.3 in the United
States. Low and Pistaferri (2015)’s model implies an application benefit elasticity of
0.62. Second, French and Song (2014) find an award rate after 10 years from the initial
application of 0.67 for the United States. Hence, we get a take-up elasticity µ ranging
from 0.1 to 0.9.
We are not aware of a direct estimate of the earnings elasticity of the marginal DI
applicant for the United States. Ruh and Staubli (forthcoming) exploit bunching at the
cash cliff in Austria and estimate an earnings elasticity of 0.27. Koning and van Sonsbeek
(2017) report an elasticity of 0.12 for the Netherlands. Kostol and Mogstad (2014) find
elasticity estimates between 0.1 and 0.3 for Norway. Evidence from the benefit field
experiment in the United States indicates that the labor supply elasticity might be rather
low (Weathers and Hemmeter, 2011; Gubits et al., 2018). Therefore, we use ε = 0.1.
Results Figure 4.4 illustrates the fiscal (RHS) and consumption smoothing effect (LHS)
of introducing a benefit offset as a function of risk aversion. If the consumption smoothing
benefits (red line) exceed the fiscal costs (gray lines), replacing the cash cliff with a benefit
offset is welfare improving. We plot the fiscal effect for the largest (µ = 0.9, dashed gray
line) and smallest (µ = 0.1, solid gray line) benefit take-up elasticity reported in the
literature. For the smallest µ, introducing a benefit offset is welfare improving for all
levels of risk aversion. For the highest µ, introducing a benefit offset is only welfare
13Autor and Duggan (2003, Table 1) report lower DI replacement rates. However, this replacement rate
is before additional labor income from working up to the SGA, i.e. b/(w−τ) rather than (b+SGA)/(w−τ).
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improving if risk aversion is rather large (γ > 2.6). Hence, for reasonable values of risk
aversion it is better to keep a cash cliﬀ regime.
Figure 4.4. Welfare implications.
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Note: If the consumption smoothing eﬀect (Cons. Smoothing) exceeds the ﬁscal costs (Budget
Eﬀect), introducing a beneﬁt oﬀset is welfare improving.
4.4 Empirical Implementation with Canadian Data
In this section, we report our empirical approach to implementing our suﬃcient statis-
tics formula for Canada. We cannot show results yet, as we just gained access to the
administrative data.
Framework In this empirical analysis, we plan to estimate the eﬀects of changes in the
level of DI beneﬁts and the earnings disregard on program entry and exit, labor supply, and
ﬁnancial well-being in Canada. This allows us to infer the earnings elasticity and beneﬁt
take-up elasticity with respect to the beneﬁt level, which are the crucial parameters to
implementing our suﬃcient statistics formula.
Studying the Canadian case will oﬀer lessons for other programs serving similar pop-
ulations. Moreover, estimating the behavioral response to changes in DI parameters has
been diﬃcult in the United States, because individuals largely face identical program rules
making suitable counterfactuals diﬃcult to ﬁnd (Staubli, 2011). Canada, on the other
hand, operates two distinct DI programs for Quebec and the Rest of Canada (RoC). We
can exploit exogenous variation in program parameters that is generated by two reforms
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to the Canadian Pension Plan DI program (CPP-D) that left the Quebec Pension Plan
DI program (QPP-D) unchanged. The first reform took place in 1987 and increased the
replacement rate of DI benefits by about 36 percent in RoC (Gruber, 2000). The second
reform was implemented in 2001 and increased the earnings disregard in the CPP-D to
CAD 3,800 per year (Campolieti and Riddell, 2012). As already mentioned, these reforms
were not implemented in Quebec enabling us to use the population of Quebec as a control
group in this quasi-experiment.
Data We recently received approval from Statistics Canada to work with the Canadian
Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) in the Research Data Center at the Univer-
sity of Calgary. The LAD contains detailed information of 20 percent of individuals (and
their spouse and children) filing an income tax return between 1982 and 2016. Impor-
tantly for our context, the LAD also contains information on the receipt of DI benefits,
demographics, earnings, income, other government transfers, savings, taxes, and housing.
Due to the detailed information on income and savings flows, we can study how changes in
DI generosity not only affect labor supply and DI claiming, but also the social insurance
provided by taxes and transfers.
Methods We will exploit exogenous variation in DI benefit levels and the earnings
disregard caused by two policy reforms to the CPP-D in 1987 and 2001.
The 1987 CPP-D reform: Prior to 1987, the CPP-D pension was substantially less
generous than the QPP-D pension. In an effort to align the two programs, the government
increased the CPP-D pension in 1987 to the level of the QPP-D pension. This change
increased the CPP-D pension by almost CAD 2,000 per year, corresponding to an average
increase in the replacement rate of 36 percent (Gruber, 2000). We use a difference-
in-differences (DiD) identification strategy to estimate the causal effects of this reform.
Specifically, we compare the change in an outcome variable, for example earnings, in RoC
with the change in the same outcome variable in Quebec before and after the reform.
This comparison can be implemented with the following regression
yijt = α + βTijt + θj + pit +X
′
ijtδ + ijt, (4.41)
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where yijt is an outcome variable of individual i living in province j in year t, Tijt is a
dummy that is equal to 1 if an individual lives in RoC after the reform, θj are province
fixed effects, pit are year fixed effects, and Xijt is a vector of demographic and labor mar-
ket characteristics (e.g. socioeconomic status, age, experience, or previous earnings). The
coefficient of interest is β, which identifies the effect of the 1987 benefit increase on yijt
under the assumption that trends in yijt would have been the same in RoC and Quebec
in the absence of the reform. Using program entry and exit as outcome variables allows
us to estimate the benefit take-up elasticity with respect to the benefit level. Analyzing
the effect on earnings provides insights on the earnings elasticity. Apart from the imple-
mentation of our sufficient statistics formula, we will also contribute to the literature in
analyzing the effects of the 1987 CPP-D reform in detail. Gruber (2000) studies the effect
of the same reform on labor force non-participation, while we will provide novel evidence
on the effects on DI exit and entry, government transfers, and other financial outcomes
such as savings and housing. Additionally, we will carefully investigate the validity of the
“parallel trends” assumption. Lastly, we can zoom in to the border of Quebec and RoC
similar to Campolieti and Riddell (2012) to have a more homogeneous sample in which
the concern about non-parallel trends is likely to be less prevalent.
The 2001 CPP-D reform: In June 2001, the CPP-D introduced an annual earnings
exemption allowing beneficiaries to earn up to CAD 3,800 without having their benefits
suspended. The purpose of this policy was to encourage work among CPP-D beneficiaries.
We apply two estimation strategies to examine the effect of the earnings exemption. The
first strategy is a bunching estimator, which exploits the discontinuity in the implicit
tax on work at the exempt threshold of CAD 3,800 (cash cliff). Specifically, the exempt
amount causes a notch in the budget constraint in a static labor supply model, defined
as a discrete increase in the (implicit) tax liability (Ruh and Staubli, forthcoming). This
notch displayed in Figure 4.5 creates a strong incentive for DI beneficiaries to keep their
earnings just below the exempt threshold. This type of behavior is coined “bunching”
and, as (Saez, 2010) shows, the amount of bunching can be used to estimate an earnings
elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This parameter is crucial to assess the
effectiveness of return-to-work programs and to implement our sufficient statistics model
(Ruh and Staubli, forthcoming). The second strategy is a DiD approach similar to the
one shown in equation (4.41). Specifically, we compare the change in an outcome variable
184
in RoC with the change in the same outcome variable in Quebec before and after the
introduction of the earnings exemption in 2001. Campolieti and Riddell (2012) also study
the 2001 reform, but they do not examine effects on beneficiaries’ earnings, government
transfers, and other financial outcomes.
Figure 4.5. Budget constraint under CPP-D after the 2001 reform.
Note: This illustration corresponds to Figure 4.1a in the theoretical part in Section 4.2. H∗
marks the earnings exemption (exempt amount) corresponding to SGA in the theoretical part.
CPP-D benefits is the level of flat DI benefits labeled by b in Section 4.2.
4.5 Conclusions
The past decades featured a significant increase in the share of individuals receiving dis-
ability insurance (Autor et al., 2018). Together with the number of individuals receiving
DI, the program costs have sky-rocketed. Hence, reducing program costs has appeared
both on the policy makers’ and economists’ agendas. One possibility to limit this expan-
sion is improving financial work incentives for DI recipients. Most DI programs consist of
two important parameters: the level of DI benefits and the earnings disregard quantifying
the amount of earnings DI recipients can earn before benefits are deducted. Under a cash
cliff regime, DI recipients lose their entire DI cash benefits if their earnings surpass the
earnings disregard posing as major work disincentive (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Bound
et al., 2010). Reducing DI cash benefits continuously beyond the earnings disregard by
introducing a benefit offset may increase work incentives. This could induce DI recipients
with substantial remaining work capacity to increase labor supply (labor supply effect).
However, the more generous DI program might cause more DI take-up (induced entry
effect) and increase program costs.
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In this paper, we develop a sufficient statistics model that allows us to estimate the
welfare effects of replacing a cash cliff with a benefit offset system. The model points out
that this evaluation crucially depends on two sufficient statistics: the earnings elasticity
of DI recipients, and the DI benefit take-up elasticity. The two elasticities are sufficient in
the sense that they entirely capture the labor supply effect, i.e. DI recipients increasing
their labor supply, and the induced entry effect, i.e. more individuals applying for DI.
The model contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it provides simple yet
robust sufficient statistics formulas to evaluate the welfare effects of introducing a benefit
offset. Second, it sheds light on the potential size of the induced entry effect based on
credible reduced form estimates.
In an empirical application of our model, we plan to estimate these two sufficient
statistics exploiting two policy reforms in Canada that changed the level of DI benefits
and the earnings exempt. As this is work in progress, we evaluate the welfare effects of
introducing a benefit offset scheme with estimates from previous studies. With estimates
for the United States, we find that it is unlikely that the introduction of a benefit offset
scheme reduces program expenditures if the benefit take-up elasticity is high. This is
in line with the findings from the BOND field experiment recently conducted in the
United States (Gubits et al., 2018). If the benefit take-up elasticity is sufficiently low, our
formula suggests that the introduction of a benefit offset is welfare improving. This shows
the crucial importance of credibly estimating the benefit take-up elasticity. We aim at
providing these credible estimates with our empirical approach for Canada.
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Appendix
4A Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1
Note that if the marginal applicant of the cash cliff scheme does not adjust her labor
supply under the benefit offset scheme, then all θ-types receiving DI benefits do not adjust
their labor supply either. Hence, to determine whether there is a positive labor supply
effect it is sufficient to only look at the labor supply response of the marginal applicant
θAC .
Under the cash cliff system (b, SGA), the marginal applicant θAC is determined by
u(b+ SGA)− h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θAC))− h(z(θAC), θAC), (4.42)
and thus it has to hold that
u(b+ SGA)− h(SGA, θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ), ∀θ > θAC . (4.43)
After the benefit offset scheme(b, r, SGA) is introduced, the marginal applicant under
the cash cliff system θAC solves
zB(θAC) := argmax
z≥SGA
u(cB(θAC))− h(z, θAC), (4.44)
with
cB(θAC) =
b+ zB(θAC), if zB(θAC) ≤ SGAb+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θAC)− SGA), if zB(θAC) > SGA. (4.45)
Hence, an interior solution with more labor supply by the marginal applicant θAC solves
(1− r)u′(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θAC)− SGA)) = hz(zB(θAC), θAC) (4.46)
and therefore
1− r > hz(SGA, θ
A
C)
u′(b+ SGA)
⇔ zB(θAC) > SGA. (4.47)
Moreover, we have no labor supply effect zB(θAC) = SGA if 1−r ≤ hz(SGA,θ
A
C)
u′(b+SGA) . If there is no
labor supply effect, then the application decision is still the same as in the cash cliff regime
and therefore there is no entry effect. Contrary, if there is a labor supply effect then there is
a positive entry effect as well. Let us denote the marginal applicant under the benefit offset
system θA. Suppose, zB(θAC) > SGA but z
B(θAC) > z
B(θA) ⇔ z(θAC) > z(θA) ⇔ θAC < θA.
Then, we have u(b+SGA)− h(SGA, θA) > u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA) by (4.43).  Suppose
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zB(θAC) > SGA and z
B(θAC) = z
B(θA) ⇔ z(θAC) = z(θA) ⇔ θAC = θA. Then, we have
u(b+SGA)−h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θAC))−h(z(θAC), θAC) = u(b+SGA+ r(zB(θAC)−SGA))−
h(zB(θAC), θ
A
C) but this only holds for z
B(θAC) = SGA.  Hence, a positive labor supply
effect zB(θAC) > SGA implies a positive entry effect θ
A
C > θ
A.
Proof. Lemma 1
i) The marginal applicant θA of the benefit offset scheme with (b, rm, SGA) is deter-
mined by
u(b+ SGA+ (1− rm)(zB(θA)− SGA︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y(θA)
))− h(zB(θA), θA)
= u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA). (4.48)
where zB(θA) solves
(1− rm)u′(b+ SGA+ (1− rm)(zB(θA)− SGA)) = hz(zB(θA), θA) (4.49)
and z(θA) solves
u′(z(θA)) = hz(z(θA), θA) (4.50)
By 1− rm := hz(SGA,θ
A
C)
u′(b+SGA) , (4.49) holds if θ
A = θAC and z
B(θA) = SGA. Uniqueness of
the marginal applicant implies that this is the only solution.
zB(θ) = zC(θ) ∀θ holds, because for all individuals with zC(θ) < SGA nothing
changes. Moreover, all individuals that bunch at the earnings disregard under the
cash cliff system (i.e. θ > θA(= θAC) and z
C(θ) = SGA) still bunch at SGA under
the benefit offset regime as (1− rm)u′(b+ SGA+ (1− rm)y(θ)) < hz(zB(θ), θ).
ii) Follows immediately from i). As all outcomes are the same, welfare is the same.
Lemma 2. Marginal Applicants
i) θAC is unique and determined by
u(b+ SGA)− h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θAC))− h(z(θAC), θAC). (4.51)
This implies zC(θAC) = SGA and z
C(θAC) < z(θ
A
C).
ii) θA is unique and determined by
u(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA))− h(zB(θA), θA)
= u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA). (4.52)
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where zB(θA) solves
(1− r)u′(b+ SGA+ r(zB(θA)− SGA)) = hz(zB(θA), θA) (4.53)
and z(θA) solves
u′(z(θA)) = hz(z(θA), θA). (4.54)
Moreover, we have SGA ≤ zB(θA) < zK, where zK is the intersection of the benefit
offset and the regular budget set (i.e. b + SGA + (1 − r)(zK − SGA) = zK), and
zB(θA) < z(θA).
Proof. Lemma 2
i) By definition
θAC := inf{θ|u(cC(θ))− h(zC(θ), θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)}. (4.55)
Suppose zC(θAC) > SGA. Then, c
C(θAC) = z
C(θAC) and z
C(θAC) = z(θ
A
C). Hence,
θAC /∈ {θ|u(cC(θ))− h(z∗C(θ), θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)}.
Suppose z∗C(θ
A
C) < SGA. Then, ∃ε > 0 such that θ¯ := θAC − ε < θAC and zC(θAC) <
zC(θ¯) < SGA. Hence, zC(θ¯) is the interior solution to maxz≥0 u(b + z) − h(z, θ¯).
Therefore, θ¯ ∈ {θ|u(cC(θ))− h(zC(θ), θ) > u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)} but θ¯ < θAC . 
Therefore, we must have zC(θAC) = SGA and θ
A
C is determined by
u(b+ SGA)− h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θAC))− h(z(θAC), θAC). (4.56)
Moreover, θAC is unique because of single crossing of indifference curves of different
θ-types (this is due to hθz > 0).
ii) In case that zB(θA) < SGA, the proof is analogous to i). Hence, this proof is
for interior marginal applicants (i.e. zB(θA) ≥ SGA) only. First, we show that
SGA ≤ zB(θA) < zK . For SGA ≤ zB(θA), the same argument applies as in i). If
we had zB(θA) ≥ zK , individuals could reduce labor supply and increase earnings
by leaving DI.
Therefore, θA is determined by
u(b+SGA+(1−r)(zB(θA)−SGA))−h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θAB))−h(z(θA), θA) (4.57)
where zB(θA) solves
(1− r)u′(b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θA)− SGA)) = hz(zB(θA), θA) (4.58)
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and z(θA) solves
u′(z(θA)) = hz(z(θA), θA). (4.59)
Now suppose θ1 and θ2 satisfy equations (4.57)-(4.59). Then, (4.59) immediately
implies θ1 = θ2. Hence, θ
A is unique.
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4B Model Extensions
Our results from the baseline model discussed in the main part of this paper generally
hold for several extensions: (1) convex preferences with single crossing (as compared
to separability of consumption and disutility of work), (2) presence of application costs
to the DI program, (3) benefit substitution (presence of other welfare programs), (4)
adjustment costs to changing labor supply, (5) other sources of heterogeneity, and (6)
one-period structure with taxes. With exemptions, every extension discussed in this
Appendix follows the same structure. First, we point out the difference between the
standard case and the extension. Second, we show that the sufficient statistics formula
to find the optimal offset rate r still holds. Third, we show that the sufficient statistics
formula regarding an introduction of a benefit offset scheme instead of a cash cliff system
still applies.
Convex Preferences (Non-Separability of Consumption and Disutility of Work)
All derivations for the optimal benefit offset r do not rely on the separability of consump-
tion and disutility of work. All formulas are generally valid for any convex preferences
with single crossing of indifference curves for different θ-types. A generic utility function
fulfilling these conditions could be U(θ) = U(c(z(θ)), z(θ), θ). All results from the main
part still hold, but the notation becomes slightly more cumbersome (i.e. u′(c) becomes
Uc(c, z, θ), hz(z, θ) becomes Uz(c, z, θ), and hθ(z, θ) becomes Uθ(c, z, θ)). The intuition for
the robustness to non-separability is that our results rely on envelope conditions, i.e. that
behavioral responses of individuals do not have first order welfare effects. Our results do
not exploit the functional form of the utility function.
Application Costs
Setup: In this extension, we consider disability application costs ψ > 0. We only consider
application costs that are low enough such that at least some individuals still apply
for disability insurance (i.e. ∃θmax ≤ ∞ s.t. ψ = u(cB(θmax)) − h(zB(θmax), θmax) −
u(z(θmax)) − h(z(θmax), θmax)). Individuals with disutility of labor θ choose their labor
supply z(θ) ≥ 0 by maximizing
z(θ) := argmax
z≥0
u(c(z))− h(z, θ), (4.60)
where c(z) = z. Under a benefit offset scheme (b, r, SGA), individuals with disutility of
labor θ choose their labor supply zB(θ) ≥ 0 by maximizing
zB(θ) := argmax
z≥0
u(cB(z))− h(z, θ), (4.61)
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where
cB(θ) =
b+ zB(θ), if zB(θ) ≤ SGA,b+ SGA+ (1− r)(zB(θ)− SGA), if zB(θ) > SGA. (4.62)
These are exactly the same as in the standard model. The only difference to the standard
case is that individuals choose to apply for DI if
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ) ≤ u(cB(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)− ψ
p(θ)
. (4.63)
Note that the single crossing condition is still fulfilled as the LHS of inequality (4.63)
decreases in θ while the right-hand side increases in θ. Particularly, the “relative appli-
cation costs” ψ/p(θ) decrease in θ. Consequently, the unique marginal applicant is now
determined by
u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA) = u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA)− ψ
p(θA)
, (4.64)
u′(z(θA)) = hz(z(θA), θA), and (4.65)
(1− r)u′(cB(θA)) = hz(z(θA), θA). (4.66)
Optimal Benefit Offset: Welfare is given by
W =u(w − τ) +
∫ θA
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)[u(cB(θ))− h(zB(θ), θ)− ψ]dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θA
[1− p(θ)][u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)− ψ]dF (θ). (4.67)
The government budget constraint is given by
τ =
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)(b− ry(θ))dF (θ), (4.68)
where y is defined as income above SGA, i.e.
y(θ) =
zB(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA0, if zB(θ) < SGA. (4.69)
The welfare effect of a marginal change in the benefit offset rate r is
∂W
∂r
= −∂τ
∂r
u′(w − τ)−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θ))y(θ)dF (θ), (4.70)
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where
∂τ
∂r
=−∂θ
A
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
entry effect
[
b− ry(θA)]− r ∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor supply effect
dF (θ)
−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical costs
(4.71)
This is equivalent to the standard case. In fact, the only difference to the standard
model is the determination of the marginal applicant θA. We can, however, still show the
equivalence of ∂θ
A
∂r
= −∂θA
∂b
y(θA) = − ∂θA
∂SGA
y(θA)
r
using equations (4.64)–(4.66), as
∂θA
∂b
= − u
′(cB)
hθ(z, θA)− hθ(zB, θA) + ψ p′(θA)p(θA)2
, (4.72)
∂θA
∂r
=
u′(cB)y(θA)
hθ(z, θA)− hθ(zB, θA) + ψ p′(θA)p(θA)2
, and (4.73)
∂θA
∂SGA
= − u
′(cB)r
hθ(z, θA)− hθ(zB, θA) + ψ p′(θA)p(θA)2
. (4.74)
Hence, we also arrive at
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] ≥ −ε+ µ
(
b− ry(θA)
b
)
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] , (4.75)
where µ is the benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b
µ =
∂
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
∂b
b∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
= −∂θ
A
∂b
f(θA)p(θA)
b∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
. (4.76)
Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset: All calculations from the main part of
the paper still apply.
Benefit Substitution
In this subsection, we assume that all individuals have access to an unconditional welfare
program (W) apart from DI. Everyone receiving benefits bW is not allowed to supply any
labor.
Optimal Benefit Offset: There are three possible scenarios for this unconditional
welfare program to interact with DI depicted in Figure 4A.1: (1) the unconditional benefit
paid is low bW ≤ b (panel 4A.1a), (2) the unconditional benefit is intermediate bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]
(panels 4A.1b and 4A.1c), and (3) the unconditional benefit is very high bW > ˜bW (panel
4A.1d). ˜bW is the level of unconditional income that would set the marginal applicant
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θA indifferent between working, applying to DI, and dropping out of the labor force to
receive ˜bW and is given by u( ˜bW ) = u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA).
In scenario (2), there are again two possible cases. Either the agent indifferent between W
and DI with disutility of work θO supplies less labor than SGA/exactly SGA (y(θO) = 0,
panel 4A.1b) or she supplies more (y(θO) > 0, panel 4A.1c). The scenarios and their
implications for the model will be discussed in greater detail below.
Figure 4A.1. Benefit substitution scenarios.
(a). bW ≤ b. (b). bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ] and y(θO) = 0.
(c). bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ] and y(θO) > 0. (d). bW ∈ ( ˜bW ,∞).
Note: Panel 4A.1a corresponds to scenario 1, panels 4A.1b and 4A.1c correspond to scenario 2,
and panel 4A.1d corresponds to scenario 3.
Scenario 1 bW ≤ b:
First, let us assume that bW ≤ b. This is the empirically most relevant case. With
bW ≤ b, individuals that have the most severe disability (high θ) have an incentive to
apply for disability insurance instead of not applying to DI and receiving the benefits of
W. Phrased differently, if we assume that b < bW the policy maker could increase b up to
bW without changing individuals’ behavior.
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Every individual with θ ≥ θW chooses to receive unconditional benefits bW instead of
working, where θW is determined by
u(bW ) = u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW ). (4.77)
Everything else remains as in the baseline model. By concavity of the utility function, we
further know that everyone that does not supply labor, i.e. θ ≥ θW , applies to DI. This
means that θA ≤ θ˜ ≤ θW , where
u(b) = u(z(θ˜))− h(z(θ˜), θ˜) (4.78)
u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA). (4.79)
Consequently, welfare is given by
WW1 =u(w − τ) +
∫ θA
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)[u(cB(θ))− h(zB(θ), θ)dF (θ)
+
∫ θW
θA
(1− p(θ))[u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θW
(1− p(θ))u(bW )dF (θ). (4.80)
The government budget constraint is equal to
τ =
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)[b− ry(θ)]dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θW
(1− p(θ))bWdF (θ). (4.81)
The partial derivative of welfare with respect to the offset r is
∂WW1
∂r
= −u′(w − τ)∂τ
∂r
−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θ))y(θ)dF (θ) (4.82)
with
∂τ
∂r
= −
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)r
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ) +
∂θA
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)(ry(θ)− b). (4.83)
Hence, the optimality conditions are the same as in the baseline model. The only difference
is that apart from b, SGA, and r the policy maker has to choose the optimal level of
unconditional welfare benefits bW . This is, however, orthogonal to the optimal benefit
offset program.
Scenario 2 bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]:
198
Second, let us assume that bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]. In this scenario, we have to consider three
marginal agents. The first agent with θA is indifferent between being applying to DI with
labor supply zB(θA) and supplying z(θA) without assistance. The second agent with θO
is indifferent between receiving unconditional welfare and being on DI with labor supply
zB(θO). The third agent with θW is indifferent between receiving unconditional welfare
and supplying z(θW ) without assistance. They are determined by the following equations
u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA) = u(z(θA))− h(z(θA), θA), (4.84)
u(cB(θO))− h(zB(θO), θO) = u(bW ), and (4.85)
u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ). (4.86)
By bW ≤ ˜bW and the definition of ˜bW , it follows that u(bW ) ≤ u( ˜bW ) = u(cB(θA)) −
h(zB(θA), θA). Together with equations (4.84)–(4.86), we get θW ≥ θA and θO ≥ θA.
Hence, both θW - and θO-individuals would prefer applying to DI rather than working.
Hence, we know that
u(z(θO))− h(z(θO), θO) ≤ u(cB(θO))− h(zB(θO), θO) = u(bW )
= u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW )
≤ u(cB(θW ))− h(zB(θW ), θW ), (4.87)
which implies that θO ≥ θW ≥ θA. We can distinguish between four types of agents: (1)
agents that drop out of the labor force to receive unconditional benefits θ ∈ [θO,∞), (2)
agents that apply to DI and drop out of the labor force if they are rejected θ ∈ [θW , θO),
(3) agents that apply to DI and work without assistance if rejected θ ∈ [θA, θW ), and (4)
agents that do not apply to DI and work without assistance θ ∈ [0, θA). Welfare is given
by
WW2 =u(w − τ) +
∫ θA
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ)
+
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)[u(cB(θ))− h(zB(θ), θ)]dF (θ)
+
∫ θW
θA
(1− p(θ))[u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ) +
∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))u(bW )dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θO
u(bW )dF (θ). (4.88)
The government budget constraint is given by
τ =
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)[b− ry(θ)]dF (θ) +
∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))bWdF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θO
bWdF (θ). (4.89)
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A marginal change in the offset rate r causes welfare to change according to
∂WW2
∂r
= −u′(w − τ)∂τ
∂r
−
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θ))y(θ)dF (θ) (4.90)
with
∂τ
∂r
=− ∂θ
A
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)[b− ry(θA)]− r
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ) (4.91)
−
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ) +
∂θO
∂r
p(θO)f(θO)[b− ry(θO)− bW ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
program substitution effect
.
Note that the program substitution effect is zero if ∂θ
O
∂r
= 0. This condition holds if
y(θO) = 0 which is equivalent to (1 − r)u′(b + SGA) ≤ hz(SGA, θO). Otherwise, the
program substitution effect is negative. A smaller benefit offset makes DI more attractive
as compared to the unconditional welfare program inducing DI entry and W exit. As the
costs of W are higher than those of DI, taxes can be reduced to balance the government
budget.
We can rewrite the optimality condition as
∂W˜W2
∂r
=
∂WW2/∂r
u′(w − τ) =
∂θA
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)[b− ry(θA)] + r
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ) (4.92)
−
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) dF (θ)
− ∂θ
O
∂r
p(θO)f(θO)[b− ry(θO)− bW ]
=[
∂θA
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)− ∂θ
O
∂r
p(θO)f(θO)][b− ry(θA)]
− ∂θ
O
∂r
p(θO)f(θO)[ry(θA)− ry(θO)− bW ]
+ r
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)−
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) dF (θ).
Hence, welfare decreases in the offset rate r if
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] ≥ −ε− ν
b− ry(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI]
+ κ
ry(θA)− ry(θO)− bW
E[y(θ)|DI]
P (DI)
P (W )
, (4.93)
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where ε is the earnings elasticity of DI recipients
ε :=
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)
r∫ θO
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.94)
ν is the DI take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r
ν :=
∂[
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)]
∂r
1∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
=[
∂θO
∂r
p(θO)f(θO)− ∂θ
A
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)]
1∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.95)
and κ is the W take-up semi-elasticity (program substitution) with respect to r
κ :=
∂[
∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) + ∫∞
θO
dF (θ)]
∂r
1∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) + ∫∞
θO
dF (θ)
= −
∂θO
∂r
f(θO)p(θO)∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) + ∫∞
θO
dF (θ)
, (4.96)
and
P (DI) :=
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ), (4.97)
and
P (W ) :=
∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θO
dF (θ). (4.98)
It can be shown that ∂θ
A
∂r
= −∂θA
∂b
y(θA) and ∂θ
O
∂r
= −∂θO
∂b
y(θO), allowing to rewrite condi-
tion 4.93 as
E[y(θ)u
′(cB(θ))−u′(w−τ)
u′(w−τ) |DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] ≥ −ε+ µ
b− ry(θA)
b
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] (4.99)
− ωy(θ
O)[b− ry(θO)− bW ]− y(θA)[b− ry(θA)]
bE[y(θ)|DI]
P (DI)
P (W )
,
where µ is the DI take-up elasticity with respect to b
µ :=
∂[
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)]
∂b
b∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
(4.100)
=[
∂θO
∂b
p(θO)f(θO)− ∂θ
A
∂b
p(θA)f(θA)]
b∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
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and ω is the W take-up elasticity (program substitution) with respect to b
ω : =
∂[
∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) + ∫∞
θO
dF (θ)]
∂b
b∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) + ∫∞
θO
dF (θ)
= −b
∂θO
∂b
f(θO)p(θO)∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))dF (θ) + ∫∞
θO
dF (θ)
. (4.101)
Scenario 3 bW > ˜bW :
Third, let us assume that bW > ˜bW . Consequently, we have u(bW ) > u( ˜bW ) =
u(cB(θA)) − h(zB(θA), θA). This means that even the agent that is indifferent between
applying to disability insurance and working prefers dropping out of the labor force over
DI. In this scenario, the benefit offset does not affect welfare. Phrased differently, if the
government would want to induce DI entry the offset rate r would have to be very low.
Welfare is given by
WW3 =u(w − τ) +
∫ θW
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θW
u(bW )dF (θ). (4.102)
The government budget constraint is given by
τ =
∫ ∞
θW
bWdF (θ). (4.103)
Consequently, it is not possible to calculate the optimal offset rate in this scenario. The
limit case of this scenario would be to decrease r until we arrive at scenario 2.
Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset: Again there are three possible scenarios
for the unconditional welfare program to interact with DI moving from a cash cliff system
to a benefit offset system. The three scenarios are depicted in Figure 4A.2. Note the
differential definition of ˜bW . It is the level of unconditional income that would set the
marginal applicant under the cash cliff system θAC indifferent between working, applying to
DI, and dropping out of the labor force to receive ˜bW and is given by u( ˜bW ) = u(cB(θAC))−
h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θ
A
C))−h(z(θAC), θAC). Scenario 1 in this section corresponds to scenario 1
in the Optimal Benefit Offset section, scenario 2 corresponds to scenario 2 with y(θO) = 0
in the Optimal Benefit Offset section, and scenario 3 corresponds to scenario 2 with
y(θO) > 0 and scenario 3 in the Optimal Benefit Offset section. θO still denotes the level
of disutility of work of the individual that is indifferent between applying to DI and W.
Below, the scenarios are described in detail.
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Figure 4A.2. Benefit substitution—cash cliff to benefit offset scenarios.
(a). bW ≤ b. (b). bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ].
(c). bW > ˜bW .
Note: Panel 4A.2a corresponds to scenario 1, panel 4A.2b corresponds to scenario 2, and panel
4A.2c corresponds to scenario 3. rw is the maximum offset rate leaving the cash cliff and the
benefit offset system equivalent. In scenarios 1 and 2, it is determined by 1 − rw = hz(SGA,θAC)u′(b+SGA) .
In scenario 3, it is determined by u(cB(θW )) − h(zB(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ) with cB(θW ) = b +
SGA+ (1− rw)(zB(θW )− SGA).
Scenario 1 bW ≤ b:
From the results in the previous section, it follows that moving from a cash cliff to
a benefit offset system in this scenario is analogous to the baseline case without the
unconditional welfare program W.
Scenario 2 bW ∈ (b, ˜bW ]:
As in the previous section, we have three marginal agents to consider. The agent with
θAC is indifferent between being applying to DI with labor supply SGA and supplying
z(θAC) without assistance. The agent with θ
O is indifferent between receiving unconditional
welfare and being on DI with labor supply zC(θO). The last agent with θW is indifferent
between receiving unconditional welfare and supplying z(θW ) without assistance. They
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are determined by the following equations
u(cC(θAC))− h(SGA, θAC) = u(z(θAC))− h(z(θAC), θAC), (4.104)
u(cC(θO))− h(zC(θO), θO) = u(bW ), and (4.105)
u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ). (4.106)
with
cC(θ) =
b+ zC(θ), if zC(θ) ≤ SGA,zC(θ), if zB(θ) > SGA. (4.107)
By bW ≤ ˜bW and the definition of ˜bW , it follows that u(bW ) ≤ u( ˜bW ) = u(cC(θAC)) −
h(SGA, θAC). Together with equations (4.104)–(4.106), we get θ
W ≥ θAC and θO ≥ θAC .
Hence, both θW - and θO-individuals would prefer applying to DI rather than working.
Hence, we know that
u(z(θO))− h(z(θO), θO) ≤ u(cC(θO))− h(zC(θO), θO) = u(bW )
= u(z(θW ))− h(z(θW ), θW )
≤ u(cC(θW ))− h(zC(θW ), θW ), (4.108)
which implies that θO ≥ θW ≥ θA. We can distinguish between four types of agents: (1)
agents that drop out of the labor force to receive unconditional benefits θ ∈ [θO,∞), (2)
agents that apply to DI and drop out of the labor force if they are rejected θ ∈ [θW , θO),
(3) agents that apply to DI and work without assistance if rejected θ ∈ [θA, θW ), and (4)
agents that do not apply to DI and work without assistance θ ∈ [0, θA). Welfare under
the cash cliff system is given by
WCW2 =u(w − τC) +
∫ θAC
0
u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) (4.109)
+
∫ θO
θAC
p(θ)[u(cC(θ))− h(zC(θ), θ)]dF (θ)
+
∫ θW
θAC
(1− p(θ))[u(z(θ))− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ) +
∫ θO
θW
(1− p(θ))u(bW )dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θO
u(bW )dF (θ).
We now study the effect of moving from a cash cliff to a benefit offset program. To do
so, we analyze the opposite change, i.e. moving from a benefit offset with work incentives
r < rw closer to rw being equivalent to a cash cliff scheme. This way, we can start with
r = rw−  with  > 0 and let → 0. For all  > 0, we have an interior marginal applicant.
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Note that for r = rw, y(θ) = 0∀ θ ∈ [θAC , θO). Further, we know that limr→rw θA = θAC and
thus limr→rw y(θA) = y(θAC). Let us now consider the limit case of equation 4.100. First,
let us calculate the limit of the LHS of equation 4.100. We know that
u′(cB(θA))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) E[y(θ)|DI] ≤ E[y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) |DI] (4.110)
≤ u
′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) E[y(θ)|DI].
Hence, the limit of the LHS is given by
lim
r→rw
E[y(θ)
u′(cB(θ))− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) |DI] =
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) . (4.111)
Because y(θ
A)
E[y(θ)|DI] ≥ 1 and y(θO) = 0, the limit of the components on the RHS are given
by
lim
r→rw
b− ry(θA)
b
= 1, (4.112)
lim
r→rw
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] = 1, and (4.113)
lim
r→rw
∫ θO
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θO
dF (θ) +
∫ θO
θW
1− p(θ)dF (θ)
=
∫ θOC
θAC
p(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θOC
dF (θ) +
∫ θOC
θW
1− p(θ)dF (θ)
=
P (DI)C
P (W )C
. (4.114)
Hence, the limit of the RHS is given by
lim
r→rw
− ε+ µb− ry(θ
A)
b
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] − ω
y(θO)[b− ry(θO)− bW ]− y(θA)[b− ry(θA)]
bE[y(θ)|DI]
P (DI)
P (W )
=− ε+ µ− ωP (DI)
C
P (W )C
. (4.115)
The condition for ∂W
W2
∂r
≤ 0 becomes
u′(b+ SGA)− u′(w − τ)
u′(w − τ) ≥ −ε+ µ− ω
P (DI)C
P (W )C
. (4.116)
The last term might seem counter-intuitive at first. Panel 4A.2b nicely shows that
the θO will not react to the introduction of the benefit offset system. The term’s origin
lies in the definition of µ, which is the DI benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b.
It comprises both the reaction of the lower marginal applicant to DI θA and the upper
marginal applicant to DI θO. As θO increases in b (more individuals prefer DI over W),
we have to correct for this effect. This correction is captured by the new term ω P (DI)
C
P (W )C
,
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which is the unconditional welfare benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b weighted by
the fraction of individuals on DI relative to the fraction of individuals on unconditional
welfare W.
Scenario 3 bW > ˜bW :
This is not an empirically relevant case as no individual will apply to DI. Thus, the
hypothetical marginal applicant to the cash cliff system no longer is the marginal applicant
under the maximum benefit offset system (b, rw, SGA). Instead the marginal W receiver
has to be set indifferent between DI, W, and working to arrive at the maximum offset rw.
The maximum offset is defined by u(cB(θW )) − h(zB(θW ), θW ) = u(bW ) with cB(θW ) =
b+ SGA+ (1− rw)(zB(θW )− SGA). Rather than introducing a benefit offset scheme to
the DI program in that scenario, the government could instead introduce a benefit offset
or earnings exempt to the unconditional welfare program to improve labor incentives in
this economy.
Frictions: Adjustment Costs
This extension is still work in progress. In general, one can always think of adjustment
costs when changing labor supply as a particular form of heterogeneity as extensively
discussed in Section 4B. There might be a distribution across adjustment costs in the
population with some individuals that need strong incentives to change labor supply and
others that have adjustment costs close to zero—the latter would correspond to individuals
treated in the baseline model. Consequently, the reaction caused by changes to the DI
program would just be focused in one particular part of the population. The parameters
one would have to estimate, however, would still be the same. Other possibilities to
incorporate adjustment costs when changing labor supply are presented in Gelber et al.
(2017) or Kleven and Waseem (2013). They require non-marginal policy changes, which
we did not yet include into the model.
Other Sources of Heterogeneity
Setup: Let us assume that there is some other source of heterogeneity affecting an
individual’s choice of labor supply apart from the level of disability θ. Let us call this
heterogeneity a ∈ (−∞,∞) and assume that there is some joint smooth distribution of
θ and a denoted by G(θ, a). Let us assume that what we denoted before by F (θ) is
actually the conditional distribution of θ given a corresponding to F (θ|a). Let us denote
the unconditional distribution of a by H(a). Hence, the choices of optimal labor supply
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without DI benefits and with DI benefits are given by
z(θ, a) : = arg max
z≥0
u(z)− h(z, θ, a), (4.117)
zB(θ, a) : = arg max
zB≥0
u(cB(θ, a))− h(zB, θ, a), (4.118)
with
cB(θ, a) : =
b+ zB(θ, a), if zB(θ, a) ≤ SGA,b+ SGA+ (1− r)y(θ, a), if zB(θ, a) > SGA, (4.119)
and
y(θ, a) : =
0, if zB(θ, a) ≤ SGA,zB(θ, a)− SGA, if zB(θ, a) > SGA. (4.120)
Moreover, let us assume that the wage rate in the first period also potentially depends on
the heterogeneity parameter a such that utility in the first period is given by u(w(a)− τ).
There is a marginal DI applicant θA(a) for every value of the heterogeneity parameter a
given by
u[cB(θA(a), a)]− h[zB(θA(a), a), θA(a), a]
= u[z(θA(a), a)]− h[z(θA(a), a), θA(a), a]. (4.121)
Welfare is given by
W =
∫ ∞
−∞
{u(w(a)− τ) +
∫ θA(a)
0
u(z(θ, a))− h(z(θ, a), θ, a)dF (θ|a)
+
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)[u(cB(θ, a))− h(zB(θ, a), θ, a)dF (θ|a)
+
∫ ∞
θA(a)
[1− p(θ, a)][u(z(θ, a))− h(z(θ, a), θ, a)]dF (θ|a)}dH(a). (4.122)
The government budget constraint is given by
τ =
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)[b− ry(θ, a)]dF (θ|a)}dH(a). (4.123)
Optimal Benefit Offset: A marginal change in the offset rate has a welfare effect of
∂W
∂r
=
∫ ∞
−∞
{−∂τ
∂r
u′(w(a)− τ)−
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)u′(cB(θ, a))y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) (4.124)
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with
∂τ
∂r
=
∫ ∞
−∞
{−∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)[b− ry(θA(a), a)] (4.125)
−
∫ ∞
θA(a)
rp(θ, a)
∂y(θ, a)
∂r
dF (θ|a)−
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a).
Note that ∂τ/∂r and E[u′(a)− τ ] := ∫∞−∞ u′(w(a)− τ)dH(a) are independent of a. Com-
bining everything, we get
∂W
∂r
=−
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)u′(cB(θ, a))y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) (4.126)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)E[u′(a)− τ ]y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)
+ E[u′(a)− τ ]
∫ ∞
−∞
{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)[b− ry(θA(a), a)]
+
∫ ∞
θA(a)
rp(θ, a)
∂y(θ, a)
∂r
dF (θ|a)}dH(a).
Dividing by E[u′(a)− τ ] on both sides yields
∂W˜
∂r
=−
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∫ ∞
θA(a)
u′(cB(θ, a))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) (4.127)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)b}dH(a)
−
∫ ∞
−∞
{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)ry(θA(a), a)}dH(a)
+
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∫ ∞
θA(a)
rp(θ, a)
∂y(θ, a)
∂r
dF (θ|a)}dH(a).
Let us define the earnings elasticity by
ε˜ := −
∫ ∞
−∞
{
∫ ∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)
∂y(θ, a)
∂r
dF (θ|a)}dH(a) r∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) ,
(4.128)
the benefit take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r by
ν˜ : = −
∂[
∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)]
∂r
1∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)
=
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)}dH(a)∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) , (4.129)
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the benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b µ˜ by
µ˜ : =
∂[
∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)]
∂b
b∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)
= −
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂b
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)}dH(a)∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) , (4.130)
the expected excess labor supply of DI recipients beyond SGA by
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] :=
∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) , (4.131)
and the consumption smoothing effect of changing work incentives
E[E[
u′(cB(θ, a))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]] (4.132)
:=
∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
u′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) .
Dividing equation (4.127) by
∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)y(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) yields
∂W¯
∂r
=−
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] (4.133)
− ε˜+ ν˜ b
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
−
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)ry(θA(a), a)}dH(a)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ∫∞−∞{∫∞θA(a) p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) .
Hence, a decrease in the offset rate increases welfare (i.e. ∂W
∂r
≤ 0) whenever
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ≥ −ε˜+ ν˜
b
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] (4.134)
−
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)ry(θA(a), a)}dH(a)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ∫∞−∞{∫∞θA(a) p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) .
Note that
∫∞
−∞{
∂θA(a)
∂r
p(θA(a),a)f(θA(a)|a)ry(θA(a),a)}dH(a)
E[E[y(θ,a)|DI,a]] ∫∞−∞{∫∞θA(a) p(θ,a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) ∈ [ν˜ ry(θ
A(amax),amax)
E[E[y(θ,a)|DI,a]] , ν˜
ry(θA(amin),amin)
E[E[y(θ,a)|DI,a]] ],
where amin (amax) is the level of a that yields the minimum (maximum) optimal excess
labor supply beyond SGA of the marginal DI applicant. Consequently, we can define a
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sufficient and a necessary condition for ∂W
∂r
≤ 0, which are given by
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ≥−ε˜+ ν˜
b− ry(θA(amax), amax)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
sufficient condition
(4.135)
≥− ε˜+ ν˜ b
E[E[y(θ, a)|a]]
−
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂r
p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)ry(θA(a), a)}dH(a)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ∫∞−∞{∫∞θA(a) p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)
≥−ε˜+ ν˜ b− ry(θ
A(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
necessary condition
≥− ε˜+ ν˜ b
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] .
It still holds that ∂θ
A(a)
∂r
= −y(θA(a), a)∂θA(a)
∂b
. Hence, we can rewrite the condition for
∂W
∂r
≤ 0 as
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ≥ −ε˜ (4.136)
−
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂b
y(θA(a), a)p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)[b− ry(θA(a), a)]}dH(a)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] ∫∞−∞{∫∞θA(a) p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a) .
We can bound the latter term on the RHS by
µ˜
y(θA(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
b− ry(θA(amax), amax)
b
≥ −
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂b
y(θA(a), a)p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)[b− ry(θA(a), a)]}dH(a)∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)E[E[y(θ, a)|a]]
≥ µ˜ y(θ
A(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
b− ry(θA(amax), amax)
b
. (4.137)
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Hence, we get the sufficient and the necessary condition for ∂W
∂r
≤ 0
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] (4.138)
≥ −ε˜+ µ˜ y(θ
A(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
b− ry(θA(amax), amax)
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
sufficient condition
≥ −ε˜−
∫∞
−∞{∂θ
A(a)
∂b
y(θA(a), a)p(θA(a), a)f(θA(a)|a)[b− ry(θA(a), a)]}dH(a)∫∞
−∞{
∫∞
θA(a)
p(θ, a)dF (θ|a)}dH(a)E[E[y(θ, a)|a]]
≥ −ε˜+ µ˜ y(θ
A(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
b− ry(θA(amax), amax)
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
necessary condition
.
Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset: Let us denote the characteristic of
the marginal applicant in a cash cliff system with the flattest indifference curve at SGA
by aCmin. Consequently, θ
A
C(a
C
min) is the disability level of the marginal applicant with
the lowest counterfactual labor supply if working. Figure 4A.3 depicts the indifference
curve of this limit marginal applicant together with indifference curves of two marginal
applicants with random heterogeneity characteristics ag and at.
Figure 4A.3. Heterogeneity—introduction of maximum benefit offset.
Note: This figure illustrates the benefit offset scheme which is equivalent to the cash cliff system.
The benefit offset rh is determined by 1− rh = hz(SGA,θAC(aCmin),aCmin)u′(b+SGA) .
Again, we can show equivalence between a cash cliff system and a limit benefit offset
system. Figure 4A.3 features a sketch of the maximum benefit offset rate rh that does not
affect individuals’ optimal behavior as compared to the cash cliff system. The offset rate
is given by the slope of the indifference curve of the limit marginal applicant θAC(a
C
min) at
SGA. This poses as a limit case of the previous section. For r → rh, we get θA(a) →
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θAC(a) ∀a, y(θ(a), a)→ 0 ∀a, and thus cB(θA(a), a)→ b+ SGA ∀a. The numerator on the
LHS of equation 4.138 can be bounded by
u′(cB(θA(amax), amax))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] (4.139)
≥ E[u
′(cB(θA(a), a))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
≥ E[E[u
′(cB(θ, a))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
≥ E[u
′(b+ SGA)− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
≥ u
′(cB(θA(amin), amin))− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]].
By the limits defined above, we can apply the Sandwich theorem to get
lim
r→rh
E[E[u
′(cB(θ,a))−E[u′(w(a)−τ)]
E[u′(w(a)−τ)] y(θ, a)|DI, a]]
E[E[y(θ, a)|DI, a]] =
u′(b+ SGA)− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] . (4.140)
For the limit of the RHS of 4.138, we use
y(θA(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|a]] ≤ 1, (4.141)
y(θA(amax), amax)
E[E[y(θ, a)|a]] ≥ 1, (4.142)
lim
r→rh
y(θA(amin), amin)
E[E[y(θ, a)|a]] = 1, and (4.143)
lim
r→rh
y(θA(amax), amax)
E[E[y(θ, a)|a]] = 1. (4.144)
Consequently, the sufficient and the necessary condition converge to the same limit for
r → rh. Hence, we get that ∂W
∂r
≤ 0 if
u′(b+ SGA)− E[u′(w(a)− τ)]
E[u′(w(a)− τ)] ≥ −ε˜+ µ˜, (4.145)
where the elasticities ε˜ and µ˜ can be estimated, as they represent the elasticities in the
total population, aggregated over all heterogeneity characteristics a.
One Period Model with Taxes
Setup: In this addition, we show how contemporaneous taxation affects our results.
Instead of a two-period model, we have a one-period model where disability hits at the
beginning of the period and every individual not receiving DI benefits has to pay taxes.
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This means that every individual working without benefits chooses optimal labor supply
z(θ) according to14
z(θ) := arg max
z≥0
u(z(θ)− τ)− h(z, θ), (4.146)
where τ is a lump sum per capita tax rate. Every individual on DI chooses optimal labor
supply zB(θ) according to
zB(θ) := arg max
zB≥0
u(cB(θ))− h(zB, θ), (4.147)
where
cB(θ) : =
b+ zB(θ), if zB(θ) ≤ SGA,b+ SGA+ (1− r)y(θ), if zB(θ) > SGA, (4.148)
and
y(θ) =
zB(θ)− SGA, if zB(θ) ≥ SGA0, if zB(θ) < SGA. (4.149)
Moreover, everyone with disability θ ≥ θA applies to DI, where θA is given by
u(z(θA)− τ)− h(z(θA), θA) = u(cB(θA))− h(zB(θA), θA), (4.150)
u′(z(θA)− τ) = hz(z(θA), θA), and (4.151)
(1− r)u′(cB(θA)) = hz(zB(θA), θA). (4.152)
Welfare is given by
W =
∫ θA
0
u(z(θ)− τ)− h(z(θ), θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)[u(cB(θ))− h(zB(θ), θ)]dF (θ)
+
∫ ∞
θA
[1− p(θ)][u(z(θ)− τ)− h(z(θ), θ)]dF (θ) (4.153)
14Note that we require one of two conditions to hold for this extension: either (1) u(z(θ) − τ) −
h(z(θ), θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ such that everyone paying taxes gets non-negative utility, or (2) there exists some
unconditional welfare program as in scenario 1 in the previous section that guarantees non-negative
utility to individuals with high θ that are rejected from DI.
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The government budget constraint is given by
0 =
∫ θA
0
τdF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θA
[1− p(θ)]τdF (θ)−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)[b− ry(θ)]dF (θ) (4.154)
↔ (4.155)
τ =
∫∞
θA
p(θ)[b− ry(θ)]dF (θ)∫ θA
0
dF (θ) +
∫∞
θA
1− p(θ)dF (θ)
:=
Ω
χ
, (4.156)
where Ω denotes the sum of payments to all DI recipients and χ denotes the fraction of
tax-payers in the economy (i.e. non-DI recipients).
Optimal Benefit Offset: A marginal change in the offset rate changes welfare according
to
∂W
∂r
=−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θA))y(θ)dF (θ) (4.157)
− ∂τ
∂r
[
∫ θA
0
u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θA
[1− p(θ)]u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ)]
with
∂τ
∂r
=−
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ) +
∫∞
θA
p(θ)∂y(θ)
∂r
rdF (θ) + ∂θ
A
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)[b− ry(θA)]
χ
(4.158)
−
∂θA
∂r
f(θA)p(θA)
χ
τ
=−
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ) + r
∫∞
θA
p(θ)∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ) + ∂θ
A
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)[b− ry(θA) + τ ]]
χ
.
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Hence, a decrease in the offset increases welfare (i.e. ∂W/∂r ≤ 0) whenever∫∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θA))y(θ)dF (θ)∫ θA
0 u
′(z(θ)−τ)dF (θ)+∫∞
θA
[1−p(θ)]u′(z(θ)−τ)dF (θ)
χ
≥
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ) + r
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)
+
∂θA
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)[b− ry(θA) + τ ] (4.159)
↔∫∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θA))y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)∫ θA
0 u
′(z(θ)−τ)dF (θ)+∫∞
θA
[1−p(θ)]u′(z(θ)−τ)dF (θ)∫ θA
0 dF (θ)+
∫∞
θA
1−p(θ)dF (θ)
≥
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
p
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
+
r
∫∞
θA
p(θ)∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
+
∂θA
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)
b− ry(θA) + τ∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
(4.160)
↔
E[u′(cB(θ))y(θ)|DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] − E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI]
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] ≥− ε+ ν
b− ry(θA) + τ
E[y(θ)|DI] , (4.161)
where ε is the earnings elasticity
ε := −
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)
∂y(θ)
∂r
dF (θ)
r∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.162)
ν is the benefit take-up semi-elasticity with respect to r
ν : = −∂
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
∂r
1∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
(4.163)
=
∂θA
∂r
p(θA)f(θA)
1∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
,
E[u′(cB(θ))y(θ)|DI] is given by
E[u′(cB(θ))y(θ)|DI] =
∫∞
θA
p(θ)u′(cB(θA))y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.164)
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] is given by
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] =
∫ θA
0
u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ) + ∫∞
θA
[1− p(θ)]u′(z(θ)− τ)dF (θ)∫ θA
0
dF (θ) +
∫∞
θA
1− p(θ)dF (θ)
, (4.165)
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and E[y(θ)|DI] is given by
E[y(θ)|DI] =
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
. (4.166)
The condition in equation (4.161) is equivalent to the standard model apart from the tax
term ν τ
E[y(θ)|DI] on the RHS. The expected difference of relative marginal utility changes
of DI individuals and non-DI individuals divided by the expected excess labor supply of
DI individuals are on the LHS, and the earnings elasticity and the take-up semi-elasticity
with respect to r are on the RHS. The difference on the RHS stems from the changed
cost effect of DI entry: the government has to pay b− ry(θ)A to the marginal DI entrant
and loses taxes τ .
From the first order condition of the marginal applicant one can derive the optimality
condition 0
!
= F := u(cB(θA)) − h(zB(θA), θA) − u(z(θA) − τ) + h(z(θA), θA). One can
show that −y(θA)∂θA
∂b
≥ ∂θA
∂r
≥ −E[y(θ)|DI]∂θA
∂b
. This follows from
∂θA
∂r
= −Fr + Fτ
∂τ
∂r
FθA
=
y(θA)u′(cB(θA))− u′(z(θA)− τ)∂τ
∂r
hθ(z(θA), θA)− hθ(zB(θA), θA) , (4.167)
∂θA
∂b
= −Fb + Fτ
∂τ
∂b
FθA
= − u
′(cB(θA)) + u′(z(θA)− τ)∂τ
∂b
hθ(z(θA), θA)− hθ(zB(θA), θA) , (4.168)
∂τ
∂r
=
1
χ
[
∂Ω
∂θA
∂θA
∂r
−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)− τ ∂χ
∂θA
∂θA
∂r
], and (4.169)
∂τ
∂b
=
1
χ
[
∂Ω
∂θA
∂θA
∂b
+
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)− τ ∂χ
∂θA
∂θA
∂b
]. (4.170)
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Combining the equations yields
∂θA
∂r
= −Fr + Fτ
∂τ
∂r
FθA
=− Fr
FθA
− Fτ
FθA
1
χ
[
∂Ω
∂θA
∂θA
∂r
−
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)− τ ∂χ
∂θA
∂θA
∂r
]
=− Fr
FθA
− Fτ
FθA
1
χ
[
∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
∂θA
∂r
+
Fτ
FθA
1
χ
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
(4.171)
↔
∂θA
∂r
=
− Fr
F
θA
+ Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
and (4.172)
∂θA
∂b
= −Fb + Fτ
∂τ
∂b
FθA
=− Fb
FθA
− Fτ
FθA
1
χ
[
∂Ω
∂θA
∂θA
∂b
+
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)− τ ∂χ
∂θA
∂θA
∂b
] (4.173)
=− Fb
FθA
− Fτ
FθA
1
χ
[
∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
∂θA
∂b
− Fτ
FθA
1
χ
∫ ∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
↔
∂θA
∂b
=
− Fb
F
θA
− Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
. (4.174)
We know that
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ) ≤ y(θA) ∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ) as y(θA) ≥ y(θ) ∀θ ≥ θA, Fb ≥ 0,
and FθA ≥ 0. Further, we know that FrF
θA
= − Fb
F
θA
y(θA). Hence, it holds that
∂θA
∂r
=
− Fr
F
θA
+ Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
(4.175)
=
Fb
F
θA
y(θA) + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
≤
Fb
F
θA
y(θA) + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
y(θA)
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
(4.176)
= −
− Fb
F
θA
− Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
y(θA)
= −∂θ
A
∂b
y(θA). (4.177)
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Moreover, it follows that
∂θA
∂r
=
Fb
F
θA
y(θA) + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
(4.178)
≥
Fb
F
θA
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
+ Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
(4.179)
=
Fb
F
θA
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
+ Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
= −
− Fb
F
θA
− Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
1 + Fτ
F
θA
1
χ
[ ∂Ω
∂θA
− τ ∂χ
∂θA
]
∫∞
θA
p(θ)y(θ)dF (θ)∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
= −∂θ
A
∂b
E[y(θ)|DI]. (4.180)
From −y(θA)∂θA
∂b
≥ ∂θA
∂r
≥ −E[y(θ)|DI]∂θA
∂b
, we learn that µE[y(θ)|DI]
b
≤ ν ≤ µy(θA)
b
, where
µ is the benefit take-up elasticity with respect to b
µ :=
∂
∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
∂b
b∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
= −∂θ
A
∂b
p(θA)f(θA)
b∫∞
θA
p(θ)dF (θ)
. (4.181)
We can insert these bounds into equation (4.161) to get a sufficient condition for ∂W
∂r
≤ 0
E[u′(cB(θ))y(θ)|DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] − E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI]
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] ≥ −ε+ µ
b− ry(θA) + τ
b
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] , (4.182)
and a necessary condition for ∂W
∂r
≤ 0
E[u′(cB(θ))y(θ)|DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] − E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI]
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] ≥ −ε+ µ
b− ry(θA) + τ
b
. (4.183)
Moving from Cash Cliff to Benefit Offset: Note that lump sum taxes under the
cash cliff system are given by τ =
∫∞
θA
p(θ)bdF (θ)∫∞
0 dF (θ)+
∫∞
θA
[1−p(θ)]dF (θ) = b
P (DI)
1−P (DI) . Let us define r
O as
the maximum offset rate that makes the cash cliff and the benefit offset systems equivalent.
It is determined by 1−rO = hz(SGA,θAC)
u′(b+SGA) . For r → rO, it holds that θA → θAC and y(θA)→ 0.
Consequently, the LHS of equations 4.182 and 4.183 becomes
lim
r→rO
E[u′(cB(θ)y(θ)|DI]
E[y(θ)|DI] − E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI]
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] (4.184)
=
E[u′(cB(θ))|DI ]− E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI]
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] ,
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by the sandwich theorem (see the baseline model and the previous additions). Moreover,
it holds that
lim
r→rO
b− ry(θA) + τ
b
=
b+ τ
b
=
b+ b P (DI)
1−P (DI)
b
=
1
1− P (DI) , and. (4.185)
lim
r→rO
y(θA)
E[y(θ)|DI] = 1. (4.186)
Hence, the conditions in equations 4.182 and 4.183 have the same limit. It follow that
∂W
∂r
≤ 0 whenever
E[u′(cB(θ))|DI ]− E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI]
E[u′(z(θ)− τ)|−DI] ≥ −ε+ µ
1
1− P (DI) . (4.187)
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